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From Wagner to Taft-Hartley, Revisited
Anthony Michael Daniel
This dissertation is guided by two questions: why was the right to collective,
abrupt cessation of work and production sharply truncated at the height of labor’s
power during the New Deal; and, further, what does this mean for our polity? The
extant laws governing workplace protest have gone unchanged since the 1947 Taft-
Hartley amendments to the 1935 Wagner Act. This dissertation revisits the Wagner
to Taft-Hartley period - 1935 to 1947 - to identify commonalities in the politics sur-
rounding state adoption of Taft-Hartley precursor laws, particularly those pertaining
to the right to strike.
In the first chapter, I outline the motivation for revisiting the New Deal period
and the specific importance of union militancy for realizing working-class program-
matic aspirations on the shop floor and beyond. I also outline the key empirical puzzle
of my dissertation: why did some states adopt anti-strike laws while others did not?
In the second chapter, I analyze the volume and content of the newspaper cov-
erage of labor militance during the New Deal period through Reconversion with a
particular focus on landmark historical episodes. In general, I find that coverage of
strikes mirrored their incidence. However, the content of the coverage of strikes tended
to carry more negative source-messages than positive. Further, the coverage tended to
decontextualize the class conflict wrought by strikes. These content analyses suggest
that the apparent lack of class consciousness on the part of the unemployed or the
industrial workers was buttressed by the media. Given the prevalence of anti-strike
messaging, the scope for rallying a majority to forestall retrenchment in the mass
polity was greatly limited.
In the third chapter, I assess the evidence for parallel publics in the late 1930s
and the limits of public tolerance for industrial militance. Based on Gallup surveys,
I find that the mass public, across regional and class lines, had limited tolerance
for industrial militance well before the Reconversion strikes, which are traditionally
considered the proximate cause for the move to Taft-Hartley. This tandem subgroup
variation in opinion is suggestive of an anti-labor bulwark in pre-War mass opinion.
This implies that at the height of its power, and in light of the president’s advocacy
in the court-packing episode, organized labor did not command substantial popular
support.
In the fourth chapter, I directly analyze the states and ask why did states adopt
anti-strike laws and why did states retrench against protective laws they had? I find
support for the claim that the laws were adopted swiftly to contain strikes. Further-
more, I find that the 1938 elections in the North as well as the South ensured the
decline of the right to strike. Partisan changeover is an important variable but is
the intermediary to backlash against the Congress of Industrial Organizations. The
backlash toward the Congress of Industrial Organizations chiefly took the form of
American Federation of Labor resistance and agriculture opposition. The seats con-
trolled by agriculture in the state chambers turned against the Congress of Industrial
Organizations in the elections of 1938 and sought laws to contain the Congress of
Industrial Organizations. In this chapter and throughout the dissertation, I chiefly
attend to the cases of New York, Wisconsin, and Utah because they vary on the de-
pendent variable from full retrenchment to no retrenchment until Taft-Hartley. The
method of di↵erence indicates that disruption-backlash is the best single explanation
for the emergent pattern of United States labor relations. Furthermore, the experience
of these states exemplified the di culties the union militants faced in the electorate
and mass polity.
The fifth and final chapter observes that the American people more or less
got what they wanted from New Deal labor law development and asks whether the
abridgments of worker liberty implied by broadly de-legitimized rights to strike are
normatively sustainable (i.e. were the proponents of Wagner reform correct in their
insistence that collective bargaining rights were essential to freedom?) and draws
upon work in history and political theory to advance the proposition that even a
minimal conception of citizenship freedom requires a usable right to strike. More-
over, I suggest that the latter-day trend to oligarchic politics is best understood with
reference to shop floor quiescence arising from the decades-old strike restrictions.
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”I think our freedom depends upon maintaining the free right to strike,” said
Senator Robert Taft (R-OH) in concurrence with President Truman’s veto message
regarding the Labor-Management Relations Act of 1947 (Legislative History of the
Labor Management Relations Act, 1653). This claim is a central motivation for my
dissertation. And, in light of this, I pose three central questions: Why did the United
States adopt laws to hamper worker protest despite the fact that worker protest os-
tensibly serves the interest of the majority of citizens? Further, were citizens broadly
in favor or opposed to these restrictions? Finally, what would explain these quick
policy shifts during the 1930s that stand as extant law? Throughout I will refer to
cases of states that adopted Wagner-style (protective) laws and then contemplated
retrenching (restrictive) amendments. Attention to these cases brings the mecha-
nisms of disruption-backlash into sharp relief. These will show that alternate polit-
ical strategies for labor would have failed to forestall Taft-Hartley (i.e. could labor
have coalesced with the farmers; or, should labor have been non-compliant with Taft-
1
Table 1.1: Restrictive Laws Adopted by the States
Law Adopted No Law Adopted
Protective to Restrictive PA (MA) (NY) WI UT
Restrictive AL AR AZ CA CO, CT IL IN
DE FL GA IA ID KY MT NC
LA KS NE MD ME MI NH NJ NM
MN MO MS ND OH NV OK RI SC
OR SD TN TX VA VT WA WV WY
Hartley as capital was with Wagner before it?); further, I will argue that Senator
Taft’s, and, before him, Senator Wagner’s, use of the word ’freedom’ is accidentally
illuminating. In the present chapter, I will explain the motivation for revisiting the
New Deal and the topical emphasis on strikes and then I will outline the plan for the
remainder of the dissertation.
Perhaps chief among the motivations for this dissertation is the imbalance of
scholarly attention paid to the states during the New Deal, and particularly from
1937-1947. (More on the periodization in a moment.) The literature, mirroring the
CIO itself, has overwhelmingly focused on the federal level. Theories animated by or
developed in the APD and labor history literature (Greenstone 1977 [1969]; Hacker
and Pierson 2002; Plotke 1996; Katznelson et al. 1993; Farhang and Katznelson 2005;
Schickler and Caughey 2011; Skocpol and Finegold 1982; Skocpol et al. 1990), critical
legal studies literature (Forbath 1991; Gross 1974; Gross 1981; Stone 1981; Tomlins
1985), the class power and class-disruption literature (Domho↵ 1990; Domho↵ and
Webber 2011; Goldfield 1987; Goldfield 1989; Piven and Cloward 1977; Rubin, Gri n,
and Wallace 1983; Swenson 2004), and the organized labor history literature (Davis
1986; Lichtenstein 2003[1982]; Zieger 1994; Zieger 1995) do not understand the shift
from Wagner to Taft-Hartley as a unitary process - that is, not as a backlash to the
growing power of the industrial unions. Though there is a growing APD literature
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that takes the states seriously as an object of analysis during the formative 1930s and
1940s (Orren and Skowronek 2004; Weir 2005; Chen 2007; Baylor 2013), the field of
labor relations has been overlooked.
This imbalance in scholarly attention has also privileged top-down as opposed
to bottom-up causal theorizing (cf. Shapiro 2015). The literature does not refute the
pleas of observers that had labor acted di↵erently in other respects, then it would have
gotten a less restrictive labor law regime; contemporary observers and subsequent
students of American political development took labor to task for failing to oppose
segregation, for auto-retrenching against militance, for abandoning the third-party
option too quickly (Milton 1982; Lichtenstein 1998; Moody 1988) among other errors.
This investigation of media, public opinion and state-level lawmaking suggests that
the limits of liberalism might be found in the mass public as opposed to the preferences
of state o cials or corporate liberals. A top-down theory of the New Deal would
suggest that the Wagner Act might have led to corporatism in the United States as the
Labor Boards promised a ’politicized bargaining’ that would have engendered state-
backed corporatism had Taft-Hartley not been enacted (cf. Lichtenstein 2002). A
bottom-up theory asks whether the public had a great deal of tolerance for a muscular
labor movement; attending to the states asks why were the Taft-Hartley reforms
adopted in the states so quickly after Wagner. In addressing these two questions,
I will point to an understanding of the New Deal as a period where the scope for
a pro-labor revision of the labor relations order was not much greater than it is at
present. Here I am assuming that public opinion plays two roles in a democracy: at
once an object of contestation and as an actor pressing demands.
This investigation of political behavior at the turning point begins by showing
that citizens’ shared an information environment in common that was characterized
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by framing strikes in opposition to lawful rule. This, in turn, contributed to the
widely-shared public opposition to union militance. The public antipathy toward
strikes generated an electoral backlash at the state level that preceded the Taft-
Hartley backlash. This argument proceeds via a series of tests that are suggestive,
though not decisive. That is, the chapters do not stand alone; but, taken together, the
chapters strongly support the claim that a usable right to strike had been truncated
as a direct result of its having been exercised.
My dissertation exploits the interlude between the adoption of Wagner to the
adoption of the Taft-Hartley amendments in order to explore the origins of the United
States labor relations order. Using this temporal gap, my approach leverages multiple
comparisons to explain the origins of today’s labor laws, rather than relying on the
narrative of one peculiar nation. This is to say that bringing the states into the
discussion increases the N of New Deal labor law outcomes. The structure of this
study enables a broader test regarding the promise of worker and union protest at its
height. And because industrial unions pursued a variety of strategies in di↵erent states
arriving at the same result and because workers faced retrenchment in largely white
states, race can be held constant as well, not having been concretized in economic
arrangements outside the South. In other words, heterogeneous states arrived at the
same result in the absence of labor market segmentation by race.
The core puzzle confronting this dissertation is how to explain why state gov-
ernments quickly reversed the strike rights that were fostered by the Wagner Act.
Given that the states that adopted anti-strike laws were heterogeneous, this disserta-
tion begins by asking what kinds of information citizens had about strikes and then
turns to the opinions expressed by citizens before turning to the states themselves.
People consumed news reports that conditioned their views on strikes which in turn
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conditioned the policy activity of public o cials. In order to assess the tenor of news
coverage, I begin with an analysis of the content and volume of strike coverage in
big-city daily newspapers. In order to assess patterns of public opinion, I turn to
an analysis of responses to national surveys.1 And, then, finally, I turn to the states
themselves and draw the link between strikes and retrenching laws.
If the content of newspaper coverage could be construed as favorable, or if there
existed meaningful regional or class conflict in mass opinion, then this argument would
not hold. Further, if the strikes in a given state were not clearly linked to the adoption
of anti-strike laws, the argument in this dissertation would not hold. The argument
in this dissertation stands in tension with received explanations for the sources and
timing of the New Deal reaching the limits of liberalism. If the mass public largely
agreed with restricting the right to strike absent manipulation, then a top-down
account would be incomplete; if states without e↵ectual ethnic cleavages behaved the
same as those with e↵ectual cleavages, then race-based explanations would be likewise
incomplete. The New Deal was not limited by the US entry into the Second World
War; rather, strike rights had been vitiated before then.
This dissertation, then, sets out with the thesis that backlash to the labor
militance explained the adoption of restrictive strike laws at the state level. These
laws would then form the core of the union-hampering provisions that characterize
the extant US laws. This thesis will be supported by the statistical linkage between
strike volume and restrictive law adoption as well as CIO density and Republican
seat gains in the state legislatures. Despite the fact that the CIO was launching
1The tractability of these data are due to the survey response weights devised by Berinsky (2006)
and employed in Berinsky and Schickler (2011). The weighted public opinion is reflective of what
mass opinion would have been, given scientifically valid sampling techniques. Nevertheless, because
the surveys were not conducted in accordance with sound sampling procedures, our analysis cannot
hinge upon a specific result.
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strikes that assailed the capitalist structural domination of politics, citizens were not
supportive of that militance. The experience of the states that revised their little
Wagner Acts suggests that the militance alienated essential coalition partners in the
state legislatures. These states adopted provisions that served to placate the coalition
partners disrupted by the CIO. Further, this dissertation sets out with the argument
that the union movement could not have plausibly achieved a better result than
the one it currently enjoys, despite its comparatively weak position. If we include
opportunistic state-level comparisons, we will see that the multiple paths taken at
the state level suggest that alternate courses of action by the organized labor would
not have achieved their aim. This results in two contributions that would elude the
present scholarship on the New Deal: first, attention to the Northern states exposes
a conservative reaction to strikes that created a genealogy for Taft-Hartley; second,
there was no plausible strategy for labor to forestall the onset of restrictive laws.
The Laws
The Wagner Act was the first national law that enshrined workers’ right to
bargain collectively, but was not preemptive legislation so there was space left open
for the states to enact their own policies. The states were able to erect policies
of their own as long as they did not contradict the Wagner Act. The variations
among the states enable the researcher to observe an historical laboratory in the
politics of industrial society. The passage of the Taft-Hartley amendments, though
not preemptive in the technical sense, brought a decisive national answer to the labor
question by divorcing militance from the unions, and by extension, divorcing labor
protest from social or economic protest generally. The swift change in policy did not
apparently run contrary to the wishes of public opinion but the secondary boycott,
hot cargo, and sympathy strike laws raise a tension between freedom and liberty that
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is normatively ineluctable. But the Wagner Act was not only revolutionary in terms
of enshrining the right to bargain collectively, it also was a most complete intervention
into labor law, which had largely been the province of judicial interpretation guided
by the English common law tradition (cf. Cohen 1948).
Here, I distinguish between labor relations acts and narrower acts as well as pro-
tective and restrictive acts. The labor relations acts are those that established rules
for union recognition and protected the unions from employer interference in a broad
fashion - these are the protective laws; the narrower acts were those that enumer-
ated specific unfair labor practices, typically on the part of employees (particularly
laws against sit-down, secondary and public employee strikes, strikes in violation of
contract, and use of force during strikes) and jurisdictional battles between unions as
well as their internal a↵airs. Here I put the anti-strike laws into one category despite
their distinctive features. It should be noted, though, that these anti-strike provi-
sions were often adopted alongside other measures that anticipated union-hampering
Taft-Hartley provisions (such as provisions prohibiting union political contributions,
right-to-work laws, and limitation on strike funds).
A note on the chronology and geography of the laws. The initial wave of laws in
1937 was pro-union and largely inspired by the Wagner Act. As a result of the statute
and favorable case law, union strength increased and the CIO growth disrupted extant
relations in farm industries as well as old craft unions. Moreover, the sit-down strikes
that brought US Steel and General Motors to the bargaining table seemed to a rm
the belief that the new unions were a potent force. Thus in 1939 demand for laws on
the part of those who lost as a result of union militance to curb union power increased
and the restrictive wave began. And the focus of the laws shifted from equalizing
relations between employees and owners to an emphasis on restricting union activity
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in support of the rights of the public.2 The early War years saw no restrictive laws
adopted but, in 1943, a new wave began, particularly in the South, characterized
by laws designed to restrict the internal a↵airs of unions and new organizing. The
attempts on the part of the CIO to use the war as an impetus for new industrial
organizing in the South were the evident cause for this activity. It is worth noting,
however, that this logic would not explain the persistence of Utah’s protective law,
race notwithstanding. That is, war-related industrial growth a↵ected the South and
Southwest states alike but the Utah laws remained relatively more favorable to the
unions.
The New Deal period was crucial in the development of the administrative state
(Skocpol and Finegold 1982; Schiller 2016). And the growth of the labor relations
bureaucracy is one of the defining features of the New Deal program. The statutory
changes in Norris-LaGuardia (the anti-injunction Act) and Wagner (the National
Labor Relations Act) spurred new organizing, particularly in auto, steel, rubber,
and garment unions (Bernstein 1964; Zieger 1994). When these laws were adopted
the industrial unions - the CIO unions - grew. And when the CIO grew it caused
the fracture of the political coalitions that adopted the laws in the first place. But,
importantly, the unions relied on friendly party control of government for the laws
to function: the complaining union in a Board matter controlled neither the decision
to prosecute nor the actual prosecution of the case. Because the state was assigned
the duty of preventing unfair labor practices, the board’s own attorney presented
the evidence in support of the complaint. Also, it is worth noting that the National
Board and the state Boards routinely sought to redress grievances without hearings
2It should be noted that no labor relations act passed during this period defined the term ’public.’
Distinguishing citizen qua citizen from citizen qua worker bedevils politicians and students of politics
alike.
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or sanctions (cf. Herzog 1942).
The laws varied across the regions but the di↵erent regional circumstances im-
plied di↵erent forms of government relief. That is, the more agricultural and rural
south and west were situated in opposition to the industrial north. And this section-
alism did not escape the notice of legislators at the state level (Patterson 1969; Fink
1974).
The labor relations statutes contained many of the provisions of the later Taft-
Hartley, including bans on sit-down strikes, strikes by force, limitations on peaceful
picketing, jurisdictional strikes, sympathy strikes, strikes in violation of agreements,
refusal to transport ’hot’ cargo, coercion, and closed shops. Sit-down strikes were
defined by the peaceful occupation and seizure of industrial work sites by the CIO
unions in steel, auto, and rubber (Bernstein 1969; Fine 1969; Zieger 1997). These were
particularly disruptive because they made the use of replacement workers impossible
without inciting violence. Sympathy strikes are straightforward and ’hot cargo’ strikes
are a particular kind of sympathy strike used by transportation unions (Teamsters)
who refused to deliver goods produced by firms in labor disputes (Interestingly, the
subsequent Teamster leadership would consider sympathy strikes too costly; Ahlquist
and Levi 2013, 55-68 provide a useful summary). Prohibiting jurisdictional strikes
was designed to curb CIO inroads into AFL unions (Millis 1950, 471-4) because the
prohibition served to maintain existing AFL unions in plants and sites where the CIO
might have made further gains. The right-to-work laws compel the unions to deliver
collective benefits to free-riders thus undoing the logic of collective organizing. The
general labor relations acts of the restrictive variety usually combine some or all of
these features into a larger bill, not infrequently with open shop provisions, which
made it illegal for employment to be conditional on union membership.
9
Importantly, the sit-down strike constituted a direct o↵ensive against the owner.
Not only is labor being withheld but also the site of labor is being occupied. Moreover,
the workers in a defensive position on the shop-floor were much more di cult to
disperse, and attempts at forcible dispersion would entail further capital goods losses
on the part of the owners. The sit-down strike became a tactic used to decisive e↵ect
by CIO unions in steel, auto, and rubber recognition strikes (Fine 1969). Statutory
prohibitions on strikes by force and peaceful picketing follow a similar logic. The
sympathy strike and ’hot’ cargo prohibitions keep unions that represent ’una↵ected’
bargaining units from using outside disputes as a reason for militancy. That is, while
capital was a firm-level actor, labor was a site-level actor. And, indeed, labor leaders
might well have traded Wagner protections for the right of secondary boycott were
they given the choice (cf. Compa 2015, note 5). These kinds of strikes were powerful
because they enabled workers in other areas of the supply chain or geographically
adjacent unions to join in solidaristic resistance to employer directives and capitalist
rule. Though Senator Ives (R-NY) described the secondary boycott as a ”concerted
attempt on the part of a strong union to compel employers to deal with them, even
though the employees of that employer desire to be represented by other unions, or
not to be represented at all” (Legislative History, 1056) In the United States, labor
unions had to strike to organize prior to Norris-LaGuardia and Wagner, so that it
might strike and organize under the law; but prosecuting these strikes for purposes
other than union recognition was politically costly unless, perhaps, the strike might
have been married to broader group claims.
The metamorphosis of labor law from being protective and integral to being
restrictive and contractual3 is a process that occurs in multiple political units simul-
3By ’integral,’ it is meant that the law must shield bargaining rights, because those rights are
integrated with individual rights; by ’contractual,’ it is meant that the wage bargain, however struck,
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taneously. There was less emphasis on the importance of establishing equal bargaining
power as a first condition of industrial peace, and more on the need to protect the
community against possible excesses by both sides to an existing controversy.
A substantive interest in latter-day economic and political inequality turns my
attention to the New Deal when the extant laws governing private workplace gover-
nance were adopted. The chief goal of the resultant legal regime as codified in the
1947 Labor Management Relations Act (informally, the Taft-Hartley Act) was the
containment of disruptive militance. And since the adoption of Taft-Hartley, union
membership and coverage has diminished and, importantly, strikes have diminished
while income and wealth inequality has grown in the United States (Rosenfeld 2014,
Chapter 4). The decline in strikes is the result of the distinctive laws of the United
States with respect to hiring replacement workers (Ibid 87-9). This work, though re-
liant on Jacob Rosenfeld’s insights, is distinctive in that I understand that the decline
of strikes was not purely the result of the increased use of replacement workers - or
organizing tactics, generally; all the successful employer resistance tactics were e↵ec-
tive because the unions cannot engage in sympathy or secondary strikes. Ultimately,
though, the retrenchment against worker protest was a democratic result and, indeed,
was a fairly popular result across the nation.
Why did some states adopt laws that restricted unions’ right to strike while
others did not? Why were citizens unwilling to ratify radical worker protest? These
related questions expose the distinctive character of United States labor relations
order. In the United States, the workplace is the domain of the employer and workers
are meant to obey the dictates of owners and managers. Workers can be fired for
any reason, and, therefore are in an insecure position. Unions tend to increase the
is an agreement between free equals.
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security of workers (Freeman and Medo↵ 1983, Ch. 2). However, strike rights, not
union membership, is the focus of this dissertation because the right to strike is more
important than the right to organize. To wit, France has an even lower union density
than the United States; yet more robust statutory and regulatory protections exist
for workers in France than the United States because of the legal capacity for worker
protest and strikes in public, and more importantly, at the site of production.
Definitions and Guiding Assumptions
Following Karen Orren (1995, 387), I define labor relations as the pattern(s) of
human interaction – characterized by compensation, subjugation, and discharge – by
which a society organizes purposeful activity of any notable scope. The labor relations
laws are those that govern the relations of unions, workers, and employers in the
workplace and the spaces adjacent to it. The extant laws are largely intact from the
1947 Taft-Hartley amendments to the 1937 Wagner Act – the first national level labor
relations law. The Wagner Act, the informal name for the National Labor Relations
Act, was the first of its kind and was under a cloud of constitutional suspicion from its
adoption. (Indeed, the Supreme Court ruling the collective bargaining provisions of
the National Industrial Recovery Act as unconstitutional precipitated its adoption.)
These laws were themselves adopted because of disruptive militance on the part of
the CIO. Throughout the empirical chapters, we will explore three industrial states
to lend historical basis to the pro↵ered mechanism of union-backlash.
The adoption of the restrictive amendments to the National Labor Relations
Act was connected to the subsequent decline of the American (private-sector) unions.
And it is possible that the states were decisive contributors to the canalization of
the American labor movement; indeed, the manifold provisions of the Taft-Hartley
amendments are drawn from state laws. The Taft-Hartley amendment to Section
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8(b)(4)(B) banning ’hot cargo’ strikes was borrowed from several state legislatures in-
cluding Delaware, Florida, California and Minnesota (12 total). State-level provisions,
including Louisiana, Pennsylvania and Iowa (10 total), antedated the amendment to
Section 8(d)(4) that bans strikes in violation of contract. And, of course, Section
14(b), appended to the Wagner Act, which allows states to enact right-to-work laws
(7 total), was enacted after several states had already enacted them - all Southern
states (Alabama, Arkansas, Florida and Texas) save Arizona, Nebraska, and South
Dakota. To wit, Taft intervened on the Senate floor: ”I should like to call attention
to the fact that the [prohibition on picketing] amendment is practically contained in
the Wisconsin Labor Relations Act and has been used in Wisconsin as a means not
only of preventing the coercion of employees but also of attempting bringing such
action as can be brought by administrative law, to end mass picketing [...] it seems
the simplest matter to use the same words in this law...” (Legislative History, 1032).
I use the states to evaluate counterfactuals because inference in historical social
science faces an obstacle in that
History is not rule governed and it knows no su cient causes [...] The
historians of the future, who will know how things turned out, will have a
powerful aid to understanding, not why they had to turn out in that way,
but why in fact they did: that is, they will observe in the laboratory of
events the evidence of determination, not in its sense as a rule-governed
law but in its sense of the setting of limits and the exerting of pressures.
For historical explanation discloses not how history must have eventuated
but why it eventuated in this way and not in other ways; that process is
not arbitrary but has its own regularity and rationality...characterized by
determinate relations and by a particular logic of process (EP Thompson
2001 [1978], 457-8 emphasis his).
This dissertation takes up Thompson’s challenge in two ways: first, by gen-
eralizing the politics of retrenchment against organized labor at its apogee; second,
by exploring the limits of liberalism aside from those identified by the literature on
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national elites and examining the contours of public opinion alongside contempora-
neous newspaper coverage. Ultimately, the limits of New Deal liberalism were met
in the legislative chambers, and, therefore, the electoral and attitudinal connection is
relevant. This dissertation will examine states with muted ethnic segmentation and
varying levels of militance as well as a an exemplar context wherein the labor unions
sought to forge a partisan coalition outside the Democratic Party and, therefore, point
toward the conclusion that the unions could not have forestalled the present-day anti-
strike regime.
Taking this counterfactual seriously does not imply the researcher is being se-
duced by ’the false promises of hard times’ (Gourevitch 1986); namely the belief that
the short term weakness of typically dominant actors and the ’hard times’ coalitions
that form will endure after the subsequent recovery. Combined membership of the
CIO and AFL was never an impressive figure when compared to the total employable
in the United States. However, it was important to note that the heavy manufactur-
ing industries and the core industries of the economy - motors, electrical equipment,
steel, coal, rubber, glass, and textiles - were all bowing to union control in the opinion
of business observers (Witte Papers 1937, Box 116, Folder 2).
Though the labor movement has been pacified in numerous ways by the Taft-
Hartley amendments, the withholding of labor is paramount. Because the coercive
apparatus will be applied against unions that strike illegally, the only legitimate
strikes are those that concern wages and shopfloor conditions and must be limited to
that site. Capital operates across many firms while labor is only allowed to operate in
one firm at a time. Thus, the site-level division of labor combined with the industry-
level division of firms resulted in a labor law regime wherein labor could not operate
solidaristically while owners could (Tomlins 1985, Ch. 7; Lambert 2005, 122-4).
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It would be tempting to situate counterfactuals4 in the rich drama of the Taft-
Hartley veto override in the Senate. Had Wagner (D-NY) made it o↵ his deathbed
and Thomas (D-UT) taken a steamboat back from Europe, the veto would have
only been five votes shy of sustention. Hatch (D-NM) was the only non-Southern
Democrat to vote for Wagner and vote to override Truman’s veto; White (R-ME)
voted for both Wagner and the veto override. The remaining seats were in the hands
of alarmed Dixiecrats or hostile Republicans, so positing a world where the veto would
have been sustained is mistaken. But, even if it were not a mistake to imagine Taft-
Hartley being repudiated by the Senate (the House was out of reach for the pro-labor
side), it would be less inferentially fruitful to use one historical narrative than to use
several concurrent, commensurable narratives.
The history of labor relations before the Great Depression was one of private
warfare marked by employer repression and law enforcement intervention. Before
the 1930s, the federal government tended to act as a strikebreaker if it intervened.
The 1935 Wagner Act constituted a sharp, though temporary, reversal in policy and
institutional behavior. And, importantly, it seemed to indicate an increase in the
power of unions and the working class generally. But this was a chimera: labor unions
and their liberal allies were engaged in a race against time, seeking to construct a
durable political-economic place for organized labor before the capitalist opposition
reorganized and retrenched (Schickler and Caughey 2011, 146). The attempt to win
the race was doomed because labor could not form a majority on its own, and the
only likely ally with the capacity for e cacy in the political space was the farm
bloc. Although they could form transient legislative majorities on the state level, the
4A key principle of counterfactual analysis is that as little of the world should change as possible
in the alternate case under comparison (Weber 1949; Lewis 1973; Fearon 1991). My approach here
structures the counterfactuals without resort to a conception of an alternate non-existent world, for
the states themselves o↵er comparisons wherein the causal antecedent is absent or di↵erent.
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farmer-labor capacity to form a national alliance as John L. Lewis had wanted, was
limited by the by antagonism wrought by labor stoppages. These were the selfsame
reasons that the farmer-labor alliance was transient at the state level, as we will see
in Wisconsin.
The transition from protection to restriction turns out to be an unintended
consequence of purposeful behavior. The present-day labor laws are the residue of
New Deal struggle and backlash; the same militance that won the Wagner gains
ensured the Taft-Hartley losses. Social, particularly political, inquiry struggles with
such outcomes, as it is di cult to explain them beyond noting that an actor or group
made a miscalculation or su↵ered from a misperception. As Jervis (1997, 128) puts
it, ”one change leads to others, but these neither reinforce nor dampen the initial
one. They move the system sideways, so to speak.” The CIO strikes led to a negative
reaction in the mass public and among liberal coalition members, which led to the
reaction of restrictive law adoption, the provisions of which structure the extant
labor relations order, which is itself quite distinct from the prevailing ex ante order.
This dissertation, then, does not call the policy feedback and retrenchment literature
into question directly, because actors in those theories are typically motivated by a
previous result at a later juncture (Skocpol 1979, for example) or are conditioned
within institutional structures and historical paths (as in Pierson 1996, for example).
In the period under study, the backlash was immediate and politicians immune to
institutional forces in labor relations enacted the retrenchment.
Implicit in the backlash concept is the notion that the mass polity held unions
in disfavor. This empirical question will be explored as it has been in previous ef-
forts (Bok and Dunlop 1970; Parenti 1986; Schmidt 1993; Flynn 2000; Martin 2004;
Carreiro 2005; Amenta et al. 2009, for example). Distinct from these e↵orts, this
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dissertation connects the mass intolerance toward worker protest buttressed by media
coverage to the origins of the labor relations institutional framework. Anticipating
a theme of the civil rights movement and the women’s rights movements, the mass
public had little sympathy for disruptive or unconventional protest tactics. This is
necessarily connected to the media coverage of union militance, because mass opinion
is, subject to exposure assumptions, mediated (Iyengar and Kinder 1987; Zaller 1992;
Kellstedt 2003, for example). Put another way, people did not form opinions about
strikes solely from their direct experience of labor stoppages; they relied more upon
news coverage. The linkages between media, opinion, and state-level policymaking
are not drawn directly here, particularly that between media and opinion. Rather,
this dissertation is guided by the assumption that the observed mass antipathy to
strikes was informed by the prevailing unfavorable coverage of strike actions.
In going from Wagner to Taft-Hartley, the United States foreclosed the pos-
sibility of an e↵ectual labor-left movement in politics. The limited construction of
legitimate union militance under restrictive laws – laws that inhibit union or worker
militance or organizing – is directly connected to the rise of concession bargaining and
the decline of unions in the latter part of the twentieth century (Rubin et al. 1983;
Lambert 2005; Rosenfeld 2014). Without the broad power to strike, the workers can-
not resist being denuded: militance that ensnares the site of production is essential
to compel intransigent ownership to engage in bargaining.5 In principle, the union
without the ability to withhold labor is unable to threaten the owners’ equity stake;
moreover, as a general principle, to the extent that the scope of legitimate militance
is limited, the impact of work stoppage is limited. As Estlund points out
5More subtly, the strike power is essential to the capacity for unions to provide a value-added
service to members. Thus, restraining strikes rightly diminishes the worker’s rational commitment
to or willingness to join the union (cf. Moore and Newman 1985).
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Unions cannot thrive if their employers do not. But employers can thrive
without unions and many would prefer to see unions die out [...] While
organized labor has mounted several major e↵orts at labor law reform in
the past thirty years, employers have made almost no such e↵orts since
1959. For the most part, employers who oppose unions and collective
bargaining are willing to bide their time in the political process, batting
down periodic reform proposals that might tip the scales in unions’ favor
and watching union strength ebb away (2002, 1543-4).
Scope
Some states adopted laws that were akin to the Wagner Act in 1937, shortly
after the Supreme Court decided in favor of its constitutionality. Most of those states
in addition to states that had no labor relations statutes then adopted retrenching laws
akin and prior to Taft-Hartley after the 1938 elections. That is, some states adopted
Taft-Hartley precursors without a ’baby Wagner’ law, whilst some states passed no
labor relations statute. The Taft-Hartley Act draws its anti-strike provisions from
state laws adopted in the preceding decade. As several states adopted protective laws
modeled after Wagner and then quickly retrenched with restrictive statues, a closer
look at the states is indicated.
Table 1.1 depicts the states aligned on the key dependent variable of the disser-
tation: whether a restrictive strike law was adopted in a given state; and whether the
states that adopted protective laws patterned after the Wagner Act adopted amend-
ing laws anticipating Taft-Hartley restrictions. The inferential leveraged gained from
these multiple comparisons allows an exploration of all credible counterfactuals: by
taking seriously the possibility of a third-party farmer-labor coalition (Zieger 1988,
Chapter 4); or by taking seriously the call for non-compliance issued by the left-led
unions (Rosswurm 1992; Stepan-Norris and Zeitlin 1995; Zeitlin and Weyher 2001);
or by taking seriously the spatial unevenness of militance (i.e. might labor have been
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more determined in their resistance to owners?).6
So much for the spatial scope. The temporal scope is bounded by the Supreme
Court upholding the Wagner Act in 1937 and the adoption of Taft-Hartley in 1947
which signaled the crystallizing of the United States labor relations order, which
has been intact on a federal level since the Eisenhower administration (Orren 1995;
Weatherford 2014). Moreover, since the laws governing the spaces and time where
most citizens spend most of their lives enable tyranny, the tyranny they endure is
necessarily of substantive interest to students of politics (Doellgast 2013, for a recent
example). The unquestioned prerogative of management to control the American
shopfloor (which nowadays is more often a nursery of cubicles than a mass production
enterprise) lays the foundation for the ills confronting American democracy (Winters
and Page 2009; Frymer 2010). Under the aegis of the law, agents for corporate
shareholders oversee a demoralized and insecure workforce; a workforce that translates
into an insecure mass overseen by an ensconced elite (Estlund 2002; Doellgast 2013).
The cowed workforce of the present stands in sharp contrast to the resistance o↵ered
by the workers of the young Committee for Industrial Organizing.
More so than ever before, the years from the New Deal through Reconversion
(converting the war economy to peacetime, chiefly by lifting wage and price controls)
constituted an enduring shift in authority in labor relations (Orren and Skowronek
2004, Chapter 4). Moreover, this period is critical because the Depression and World
6An alternate potential counterfactual concerns the South: many lamented the failure of Opera-
tion Dixie and historians have aptly noted that the early civil rights demanders were activated by the
CIO’s e↵orts to organize the South in the mid-1940s (Gri th 1988; Honey 1993, 1-44, for example).
But, a crucial lesson from this dissertation is that US organized labor would have failed even if there
were not a racial segmentation in market and society. Wisconsin, among others, was a lily-white
state that adopted restrictive legislation. Moreover, the confluence of newspaper coverage and the
convergence of subgroup opinion observed later in this dissertation suggests that the prospects for
laws that would allow labor to flourish were unlikely to sustain popularity.
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War II spurts raised union membership to unprecedented levels - and this pattern
might have led an observer to conclude that unions would become a permanently
influential socio-political actor. However the laws arising from the selfsame period
foreclosed this outcome (Freeman 1997, 15).
The present focus on the strike laws stands in contrast to canonical work on
United States organized labor which has focused on organizing defeats (Freeman and
Medo↵ 1984; Goldfield 1987; Farber and Western 2001). I argue strikes are more
important for understanding the e cacy of unions in light of the logic of industrial
bargaining and historical experience; that is, without the capacity to collectively
withhold labor, the workers are in a weak bargaining position. More pointedly, the
right to withhold labor is an essential component of e↵ectual collective bargaining.
If workers can be replaced for striking - or must wait years for legal remedy - then
their bargaining position is untenable. Prior to Wagner, the strikers were met with
violence; after Wagner, the strikers were met with replacement (Klare 1978; Rogers
1990; Estlund 2002; Rosenfeld 2014). Though the lot of the wage-earner has improved;
the bargaining power, and, by extension, the political power of the wage-earner has
not.
If bargaining is contentious, then the resolve of the contestants is a crucial de-
terminant of success, and, more subtly, the expectations of resolve are determinative
of strategy. A relevant condition that a↵ects the resolve of the contestants is the polit-
ical outlook of the statehouse. Sympathetic governance directly strengthens resolve.
And partisanship does not explain much in this respect. Democrat Herbert Lehman
and Democrat George Earle, governors of New York and Pennsylvania respectively in
1937 took opposite tacks toward industrial union mobilization during the New Deal.
Governor Earle was willing to call out the National Guard as strikebreakers while
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Governor Lehman repeatedly refused employer appeals (Davin 2000, 278-80; Kim
2006, 31).7
Though the Taft-Hartley provisions did not amount to being the ”slave labor
law” that then CIO president Philip Murray prophesied (cf. Lichtenstein 1997), it
did su ce to narrow the scope of militance to when contracts were up and could only
be about wage-and-hour or shop floor conditions. This is in stark contrast to the
multifarious causes for workplace stoppages during the New Deal. During the 1930s,
the industrial unions struck in furtherance of recognition; having won recognition
in the late 1930s the unions struck in furtherance of bargaining gains; during the
1940s, particularly after the war, the preponderance of strikes were related to control
of the shop floor and in furtherance of racial segmentation of labor. Despite the
heterogeneity of motivations, we can be confident that the unionists won whatever
they won because they fought resolutely and confronted repression in a solidaristic
fashion. And, crucially, the e cacy of the strikes was dependent on the coercive
apparatus not having been readily deployed against them, whether before or during
the Second World War.
The result of the New Deal was the erosion of union bargaining power and,
consequently, political power. Because the threat of the stoppage is the origin of
bargaining leverage for the worker, then the threat must have some credibility. The
laws inherited from this period that narrowly circumscribed the right to strike min-
imized the cost of a workplace stoppage to the owner. The resultant strike weapon
was too predictable and was nearly toothless because the employer could anticipate
strikes e↵ectively and maintain production; consequently, workers were left with little
7Though it should be noted that there was incidence of National Guard insubordination; to wit,
guardsmen had alerted unionists and radicals to the troop movements (Vallely 1989, 112-3).
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in the way of positive means to advance programmatic goals within the workplace
and beyond.
Grounding Examples
Throughout the dissertation, I apply the overarching argument to specific se-
lected industrial states (see Table 1.2) that vary in whether and how much retrench-
ment there was. These states vary along important axes of comparison though the ab-
sence of Jim Crow laws is common among them. These parentheses indicate variation
along the dependent variable that is not quite as far as the full turn to restriction; that
is, New York and Massachusetts adopted restrictive laws that limited jurisdictional
strikes but did not restrict many e↵ective strike tactics. So then, Pennsylvania and
Wisconsin retrenched, New York and Massachusetts partially retrenched and Utah
did not retrench. I do not select on the dependent variable because Utah’s adoption
of a retrenching law was adopted after the preemptive retrenching law was passed
by the Congress. The political mechanics of disruption-backlash are exemplified by
the states and common among the retrenching states, aside from New York, were
electoral rules that dictate a two-party system. That is, the rules of the game are evi-
dently the dominant reason that organized worker resistance was and remains stifled.
There did remain one potential avenue for labor to influence politics without having
to be mediated through the Democratic party: namely, through the construction of
a farmer-labor coalition on a national level.
I focus separately on the cases of New York, Wisconsin, and Utah because
these states form the closest analogues to the federal transition from Wagner to Taft-
Hartley. An assumption of equivalence among the actors within the states relied upon
here is based on a formal conception of class interest and formation that identifies the
shared utility function of individuals in similar straits as the definitional feature of
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class membership. To the extent that the utility is maximized by the same strategies,
those individuals are in the same class. For the theoretical purposes of this project,
I treat classes as exclusive categories.
Di↵erent sectors were predominant in the cases: the building and meatpacking
trades dominated in Wisconsin and the garment trade was predominant in New York
(WLRB Report 1937; NYS Annual Report 1937). In Utah, the mining industry was
ascendant (McCormick and Silito 2011; Powell 1977). There were important institu-
tional variations: particularly in terms of the lack of party discipline in the Wisconsin
legislature and in terms of the deep connection between FDR’s administration and
the American Labor Party in New York. And, importantly, the Wagner Act preceded
the adoption the ’little Wagner Acts.’
The labor relations activities of New York, Wisconsin and Utah help frame an
analysis of labor law adoption in the states during the New Deal. An important goal
is to point the way toward a conceptual understanding of disruption-backlash. This
study looks to these states because they are heterogeneous along the axes of compar-
ison introduced in the above and because they are directly analogous to the nation.
Further, these cases are selected because the union security laws created the most
active Labor Boards in the nation; thus, these were crucial battlegrounds during the
late 1930s. More subtly, both New York and Wisconsin had professional legislatures.
Implicit in the logic of comparison is an assumption of equivalence among the cases.
The actors in the cases need to be commensurable and the realm of contestation needs
to be comparable. These states are useful for framing the discussion because they
traveled the road from Wagner to Taft-Hartley before the rest of the nation.
The labor relations acts provided a machinery for so-called employer unfair labor
practices through administrative review. The Massachusetts, New York, Pennsylva-
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nia, Wisconsin, and Utah laws of 1937 and the Rhode Island law of 1941 established
’little Wagner’ Acts. In the cases of the early protective laws, the states formed La-
bor Boards to make the legislative policy e↵ective. The New York Board was, by far,
the most active, handling as many cases per annum as the other Boards combined
(Killingsworth 1948, 26).
The New York Labor Relations Act passed in April 1937 was the product of
a Democratic governorship lead by FDR’s lieutenant, Herbert Lehman. The Doyle-
Neustein bill passed the Assembly 101-46 and the Senate 46-2. As Governor Lehman
recalls, 1936 was the only year that brought a unified government in New York during
his tenure (Oral History Project). The wave of Depression strikes that swept the
nation were similarly widespread in New York. But these strikes were largely in the
garment industry.
The Wisconsin Labor Relations act was adopted in May during the 1937 legisla-
tive session shortly after the ’switch in time that saved nine.’ The bill, though, was
first introduced during the 1935 legislative session after years of violent strikes. The
bill failed in the upper chamber of the state legislature and this became an issue in
the 1936 elections (Blue Book 1937, 17-70). The bill passed the Assembly 66-30 but
only passed in the Senate by two votes 29-27. Once adopted, it established a state
labor relations board which actively promoted collective bargaining through imposing
fines on employers found to engage in unfair labor practices. And, like the Wagner
Act, the unfair labor practices of employers were the only ones defined by statute and
regulation.
Utah adopted its baby Wagner law in April 1937, having passed the Assembly
43-2 and the Senate 21-8, and was signed into law by the Democratic Governor Henry
Blood. It did not adopt a restrictive statute until 1947 after the federal government
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had adopted the national law. Interestingly, it was Herbert Maw, a liberal Democrat,
who signed the retrenchment bill. Perhaps it was an attempt to stave o↵ defeat in
his rematch with the Republican, Bracken Lee (more on this later).
In a formal historical narrative analysis, causal process tracing would be used to
compare the adoption of the State Labor Relations Acts (SLRAs) and the conservative
amendments in subsequent legislative sessions. For the purposes of this dissertation, it
will be su cient to note the stated positions of unions and politicians while accounting
for the immediate upshots of the SLRAs. That is, an examination of the passage of
the bills and their later amendment suggests the unifying theme of CIO disruption
as being determinative as against economic factors or alternate political theories;
however, a more detailed tracing of historical events would be necessary to examine
the political behavior results of the AFL/CIO rivalry.
The method of di↵erence, though, is su cient to rule out competing theories:
herein I compare cases that di↵er on variables on concern but are similar on others.
In this approach, the key is to find an explanatory variable along which the cases
di↵er that is itself congruent with the dependent variable (cf. Brady and Collier
2010, 337-8). There were strikes before and after the constitutionality of Wagner or
the adoption of SLRAs, which militates against class-disruption theory. Economic
variables were heterogeneous across the cases; though the Depression ravaged every
political unit, Wisconsin, New York, and the nation as a whole had variable industry
composition and factors of production. In Wisconsin, for example, land was a more
important factor than in New York or the nation generally. Yet, in the face of this
heterogeneity, the same kinds of statutes were adopted and then amended in similar
ways; so this militates against a chiefly economic basis for policy change.
In Table 1.2 above, it is evident that the count of owned farm homes distin-
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Table 1.2: Summary of the Cases
Wisc. New York Penn. Utah Mass.
Protective Law 1937 1937 1937 1937 1937
Restrictive Law 1939 (1940) 1939 1947 (1941)
Change to GOP Yes No Yes No No
Strike Volume Rank 8 6 4 41 23
Farm Owner Rank 14 27 28 13 15
guishes Wisconsin and Pennsylvania. However, consonant with the statistical results
from the fourth chapter, the rural delegations in the statehouses were the main blocs
in retrenching legislation. Because the farmer-labor possibility was a threatening one
to the status quo this dissertation will focus on Wisconsin and treat Pennsylvania as
a site for opportunist comparison.
The farmer-labor divide was historically constructed; the farmers had a his-
tory of policy success in the US during the latter part of the 19th century (Prasad
2012, Chs. 1-2). This meant that labor growth politically constituted a force that
diminished the preeminence of agricultural interests. This served as a sti↵ barrier to
cooperation in itself. The American state was non-interventionist for labor but was
not for farm interests (Boudreaux and DiLorenzo 1993; Prasad 2012). And, more sub-
tly, the American farmer who owned his enterprise was more inclined to view himself
as a capitalist than as a laborer. In any event, agricultural interests were given to
viewing wage gains warily; for example, Milo Swanton, a leader and organizer of farm
owners concluded that: ”It is true in a country like ours, with surplus farm produc-
tion, that, when the farmers are prosperous the rest of society is prosperous. This is
true because a surplus of farm product cannot be sold at good prices to unprosperous
customers. The converse of this statement is not, however, equally true.” (Swanton
1936, ”Mutual Relations of Agriculture, Labor, and Industry” WCAC Files, Box 8,
Folder 1). That is, many might well prosper when the farmer does not, but the agri-
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culture interest cannot prosper when others do not. In a separate address, ”Butter
is the same in price as twenty-five years ago, while the wages of skilled workmen are,
roughly, fifty percent higher. Can the farmer help to boost wages which he has to pay,
while his own income stagnates, or goes lower?” (Ibid 1937, ”Address to Milwaukee
Chamber of Commerce” WCAC Files, Box 8, Folder 5).
A notion of the unions as invader figured prominently in the descriptions of
John L. Lewis’ attempts to unionize the dairy industry after his break with the CIO
(WSHS, Milo Swanton Papers). Lewis had an ambition to put a national farmer-
labor majority together8 that was frustrated from the outset. For example, ”Control
of the food supply is a weapon. John L. Lewis knows that if he controls the nation’s
milk supply, he controls the destiny of the people” (Milo Swanton Papers, ”Hoard’s
Dairyman” June, 1942). Because the farmer is historically prior to the laborer, agri-
culture concerns were unwilling to join with labor unions as a junior partner. 9 Upon
winning in the 1936 elections, the farmer-labor majority in Wisconsin saw its role as
concentrating ”on pursuing legislation to the left of the New Deal [...] Farm tenantry
must be attacked by a resettlement program. It is important we support civil liberties
as a means of opposing fascism. Finally, we must press for cooperative ownership on
a wider scale than otherwise attempted” (Amlie Papers, ”Joint Meeting of Wisconsin
and Minnesota Farmer-Labor Parties”). The socialistic and statesmanlike vision of
the progressive leadership was at odds with the interests of the owners of dairies.
Plan of the Dissertation
8In the 1930s, more than a third of the population of Wisconsin lived on farms; about a fifth of
Utah’s residents lived on farms; and about a tenth of New York’s population did (Statistical Abstract
1937, Table 10).
9Alternately, perhaps agriculture went to war with the Axis alongside the national government.
That is, in the same way that patriotic concerns influenced unionists’ compliance with no-strike
pledges (cf. Gerstle 1991), farmers may well have been willing to subsume their concerns to the war
e↵ort.
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These multiple comparisons lend insight into the political dynamics of public
choice during the New Deal, holding racial segmentation constant while envisioning
the process of legal change as a bottom-up as well as top-down process. The legal
outcome of strike restriction was a product of mass opinion (as measured by ballots
and surveys) which in turn was embedded in a media context. In short, the prevailing
coverage of strikes facilitated citizens’ unfavorable opinions of strikers and strikes;
this, in turn, led to anti-strike laws being adopted. This dissertation unravels the
connection in the following chapters. Conceptually, these chapters proceed from an
examination of the information people had to an examination of people’s attitudes
and then an examination of policy outcomes in the states. Insight from case studies
of New York, Utah, and Wisconsin will be interspersed throughout.
The next chapter, ”What Did People Read About Strikes,” I ask when Ameri-
cans consumed news about strikes, what did they ingest? How in terms of quantity
and tenor did the news portray strikes? I will provide counts of strike and related
articles as measures of salience; examine the frames of coverage of strikes as disrup-
tion; I shall examine the framing of unions as racketeering organizations as opposed
to welfare organizations; and I shall examine the framing of John L. Lewis, the CIO
labor leader. These frames are chosen in light of the lines of attack chosen by union
adversaries. These frames stand in contrast to those employed by the CIO, which
tended to emphasize shopfloor hazards and wage and hour disputes.
I argue that the media coverage of major strikes in newspapers with wide cir-
culation consistently emphasized the inconvenience or disorder resulting from strikes
without considering the basis for worker demands. Indeed, the use of the word ’de-
mand’ as opposed to ’grievance’ or ’plea,’ suggests that the striking unions are a pos-
itive threat. Widespread negative coverage of strikes was connected to the backlash
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against industrial union growth, which was impossible without militance. Moreover,
the growing substitution of the word ’management’ for ’capital’ or ’owners’ served to
foster the impression that class interests were not at stake in labor relations. I am not
the first to focus on the content of media coverage of strikes (Parenti 1986; Rondinone
2010, for example) or successful business e↵orts to frame labor relations in a fashion
that obscures class conflict (Fones-Wolf 1994; Phillips-Fein 2011, for example), but
the marriage of studies of the several states and empirical study of media and surveys
during the New Deal in order to incorporate mass opinion into the study of the limits
of liberalism is original.
In the third chapter, ”What Did People Think of Strikes?” I turn to the public
who defined the boundaries of acceptable militance. The elections of 1938 and then
1946 returned majorities to legislative chambers for retrenching laws. The mass pub-
lic, generally speaking, had (and still does have) little tolerance for opinion leadership
from radical militants (Page, Shapiro and Dempsey 1987, 37). Implicit in describing
the speedy retrenchment as a ’backlash,’ is the sense that public opinion indicated
disfavor for unions, or at least union militance. Works in the interest group canon
(Key 1964; Truman 1971) emphasize that the esteem in which the mass public holds
interest groups is directly related to their capacity for political e cacy. The public
opinion literature that utilizes relevant polling from the period (Verba and Schloz-
man 1977; Berinsky and Schickler 2006; Panagopoulos and Francia 2008; Schickler
and Caughey 2011) has broadly covered this ground before, but the aggregate stabil-
ity of opinion is left unconnected to the development of the labor relations framework.
In contrast to other works which emphasize the 1940s retrenchment, my dissertation
emphasizes the importance of the 1938 elections in the decline of New Deal liberalism;
in contrast to work that emphasizes the importance of the 1938 elections in the elec-
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tion of conservatives (Patterson 1968; Katznelson and collaborators), my dissertation
finds the limits of liberalism in the North and in overwhelmingly white states.
In the fourth chapter, ”State-level Origins of Anti-strike Laws” describes the
labor laws and proceeds to draw a clear link between union militance and the adoption
of laws designed to neuter resistance. This section will introduce a data set of state-
years from 1937 and 1947, for the reasons noted above. The structured comparison
between the states that adopted protective statutes and amended them and the states
that did not adopt a state law inform the case studies. Furthermore, placing the
origins of the backlash in 1937 casts the 1938 elections in a significant light and
this motivates a turn to studying mass opinion during this period. The viability of
the disruption-backlash explanation is contingent on its place in the 1938 elections,
for the retrenchment against the Wagner Act began at the state-level enacted by
politicians elected in the wake of militance. I find a clear relationship between state-
level militance and Republican seat gains in 1938 statehouses outside the South. The
cases referred to throughout are treated in this chapter in order to exemplify the logic
of political backlash to strikes.
The fifth and concluding chapter takes the findings and non-findings together
and contemplates the implications for union revival alongside managerial domination
of the workplace. The death of the American labor stoppage was an ineluctable, if
delayed, result of the anti-strike laws passed in the 1930s and 40s. Public opinion,
arguably against its own interest, generally favored pro-business strike laws. Interests
are a treacherous topic in terms of imputing them onto individuals on the basis of
supposed commonality. However, observers at least since Freeman and Medo↵ (1984,
251), have seen that the decline of unions and workers as counterpoised groups versus
business would carry implications for wealth inequality and political oligarchy.
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A distinctive benefit of the mixture of methods deployed in this dissertation is
the resultant insight into whether a di↵erent historical path might have been taken
and why those alternate paths were occluded. Building o↵ the literature that iden-
tifies US laws as the best explanation for its distinctively commoditized labor force
and small welfare state (Esping-Andersen 1990; Pierson 1996; Western 1997; Hall and
Soskice 2001; Hall and Thelen 2009, for example), and the decline of labor stoppages
as the chief source of labor decline (cf. Rosenfeld 2014), I investigate the causes of
restrictive law adoption at their historical origin revealing the proximate cause to be
a reaction to disruptive strikes. The logic of this claim, investigated in the cases,
reveals that organized labor needed coalition partners in order to secure a majority
but this was unrealistic. Labor could not form a majority coalition centered on its
interest in broad socio-political reform because there were bulwarks in mass opinion
against worker radicalism and militance that were buttressed by news media. Over
the course of US industrial and post-industrial society, the political power of unions
has been minimal compared to their own programmatic aspirations or their counter-
parts in other a✏uent polities. Their decline has been decades long but it can be
traced back to labor laws adopted during the turbulent 1930s.
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Table 1.3: Timeline
January 1935 Textile organizing strikes across the nation
May 1935 Norris-LaGuardia collective bargaining ruled
unconstitutional
June 1935 Wagner Act adopted
October 1935 Congress for Industrial Organization leaves AFL
November 1935 - March 1936 Rubber Workers Organizing Committee Akron
sit-down strikes
April 1936 Goodyear accepts RWOC demands
save recognition
December 1936-February 1937 United Auto Workers-CIO Flint sit-down strike
February 1937 General Motors recognizes the UAW
February 1937 Supreme Court Enlargement Bill introduced
in Senate
March 1937 US Steel recognizes the CIO
April 1937 Supreme Court upholds Wagner Act
April 1937 Utah adopts ’little Wagner Act’
April 1937 Wisconsin ’little Wagner Act’ adopted
May 1937 New York ’little Wagner Act’ adopted
June 1937 Pennsylvania ’little Wagner Act’ adopted
August 1937 Massachusetts ’little Wagner Act’ adopted
November 1937 CIO becomes Congress of Industrial Organizations
April 1937 CIO organizes dairy cooperatives in Wisconsin
and across Midwest
January 1938 Onset of ’Roosevelt recession’
November 1938 Republicans gain in mid-term election
May 1939 Wisconsin ’Labor Peace’ Act adopted
June 1939 Pennsylvania ’Labor Peace’ Act adopted
March 1940 Smith Committee hearings
November 1940 John L. Lewis resigns CIO presidency
April 1941 Westbrook Pegler wins Pulitzer for
racketeering coverage
September 1941 - December 1941 Captive Mines Dispute
December 1941 US enters Second World War
December 1942 Lewis Announces Drive to Organize Dairies
June 1945-June 1947 Reconversion strikes
June 1945 Ball-Burton-Hatch Bill introduced in Senate
September 1945 CIO launches Operation Dixie
March 1947 Taft-Hartley introduced in House
March 1947 Utah adopts its ’little Taft-Hartley’
June 1947 Taft-Hartley veto override
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Chapter 2
What Did the Public Read About
Strikes?
Introduction
As emphasized in the previous chapter, the states adopted similar policies hav-
ing followed similar trajectories amidst heterogeneity. A key historical challenge aris-
ing from this observation is well-encapsulated thusly: ”What we have to study to
understand history is how structural forces cause people to change their notions of
what kind of situation they are in, and to sustain those new notions su ciently long
to build them into institutions that in turn sustain them” (Stinchcombe 1978, 117).
The media are central to this process of structuration, for the popular notions of the
disruptive militance were drawn from the media, more likely than personal experience
(Gilens 1999, for example). Therefore, I begin by asking what did people learn about
strikes from the mass media, chiefly newspapers? Did these articles tend to foster a
pro- or anti-union outlook among citizens?
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A potential worry confronting the researcher is that ”the concept of the media is
too vaguely defined to be useful in research, given the degree of change over time in the
composition of mass media” (Woolley 2000, 161). This is not unreasonable, but what
is at stake in the present study is the role of newspapers - as the predominant form of
news in this era - over a defined period of time. We are not evaluating a counterfactual
regarding whether the formation of labor law would have turned out di↵erently had
the newspapers and its leading columnist1 taken a di↵erent tack; rather, we are
evaluating the prospects for the labor movement to have avoided retrenchment.
The overall lesson of this chapter is that the framing of union militance and
the indexing of o cial sources combined to buttress mass intolerance toward worker
militancy. Baumgartner and Jones (1993, 249) point out that ”in American politics,
issues that are phrased in terms of class interests, or as protecting the lower classes
against business interests, have little chance of success.” Since society could not exist
in the absence of labor relations, the cessation of labor production implied a direct
threat to the social order, or equilibrium. Though the salience of strike coverage was
diminished by war coverage, this does not imply that the prevailing frames were less
relevant (Ibid 1993).
Paletz and Entman (cf Sexton 1991, 270) argue that the ”general impact of
the mass media is to socialize people into accepting the legitimacy of their country’s
political system [...] direct their opinions in ways which do not undermine and of-
ten support the domestic and foreign objectives of elites [...] and deter them from
active meaningful participation in politics - rendering them quiescent before the pow-
erful.”
1Pace Lippmann. Though he was a highly regarded and longer-running syndicated columnist
than Pegler, Lippmann did not occupy a partisan niche in contrast with Pegler, who was firmly on
the right.
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If the history of United States labor relations was a kind of private warfare,
then the recognition contracts won by the young CIO in rubber, auto, textiles, and
steel, were a kind of ceasefire. And the purpose of that ceasefire was for newly
defensive capital to reorganize and reverse labor’s programmatic gains. As I wrote
earlier, the unions gained whatever they won by means of the strike. Because the core
industries were closely coupled, the gains for labor in one industry implied further
gains (or losses) in others. Victories and losses in steel and coal were closely linked
with the industries of auto with rubber and steel (Fine 1969; Goldfield 1989; Zieger
1995).
Consonant with the previous chapter, I will analyze the volume as well as the
content of newspaper coverage of post-Wagner episodes of protracted and salient
labor disputes. The two central questions of this chapter are: how much were citizens
exposed to news content on strikes and the CIO; and whether there was a pro-con
directional thrust to that news. I proceed in four parts below: first, I review the
theoretical expectations with respect to news content and exposure assumptions; then
I turn to the data and method; then, I discuss the results, and I conclude in a final
section, connecting the lessons of this chapter to the study of public opinion in the
next.
I will proceed by analyzing the volume and content of news and columns about
strikes. This chapter begins its analysis by examining the count of articles on strikes
in major newspapers against the volume of strikes during the Wagner to Taft-Hartley
period. Then it turns to the content of selected articles to investigate how worker
protest and organization was constructed in the popular imagination. I investigate
coverage content in five ways: first, I examine the volume of strikes as covered in the
press over time; second, I present counts of the volume of coverage of labor leaders;
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third, I examine the volume of key descriptions of the motivations of the strikers;
fourth, I study the content of coverage of key instances of salient CIO militance; fifth,
I examine the columns of the then-popular syndicated columnist, Westbrook Pegler.
Syndicated columns became increasingly popular during the 1930s and they facilitated
homogeneous messaging across the nation. Foremost among these columnists was
Westbrook Pegler, the 1941 Pulitzer Prize laureate for journalism2 wrote a column
that ”went out six days a week to 174 newspapers that reached an estimated 10
million subscribers” (Witwer 2005, 2).
It will be graphically apparent that the coverage of labor became less positive
and less union sourced. This negative tenor in coverage was notably linked to the
increase in denunciatory statements by Roosevelt administration o cials. In the Flint
episode, I collect more than 250 articles and for the captive mines episode, I collect
150 articles; the other episodes had received rather less front-page coverage.
However, in order to prevent an inferential bias arising from beginning the
analysis after the CIO was instantiated, I take a look at the articles on the disruptive
strikes that marked the decline of Norris-LaGuardia and accompanied the adoption
of the Wagner Act - the 1935 textile and rubber recognition strikes. Furthermore,
the newspaper coverage of these strikes serves as a baseline for the analysis of strikes
later in the New Deal. Importantly, the strikes that precede the Wagner Act were
essential and prior to the formation of the CIO.
Theory and Expectations
In his seminal work, Gans (1979, 40-1) identified ’enduring values’ through
which journalists construct narratives and understand events; chief among those
2The first columnist to win the award, in fact. Though in some respects the forerunner of right-
wing ’infotainers,’ his work during this 1930s and early 40s was widely respected.
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frames being ’individualism’ and ’moderatism:’ ”one of the most important enduring
news values is the preservation of the freedom of the individual against the encroach-
ments of nation and society [...] the idealization of the individual could result in
praise for the rebel and the deviant, but this possibility is neutralized by an enduring
value that discourages excess or extremism. Individualism which violates the law, the
dominant mores, and enduring values is suspect; equally important, what is valued
in individuals is discouraged in groups.” That is, individuals might be hailed for tak-
ing visible stances outside the mainstream, but groups are unlikely to be lauded for
analogous stances.
These values are in opposition to the deployment of disruptive labor stoppages.
Iinterpreting strikes through the lens of moderatism and individualism paints strikes
and strikers as rebellious and highlights the costs of idleness as against the costs of
shop floor depredations; moreover, anti-militance messages and sources are privileged
over pro-militance ones. This is resultant from the phenomenon of news indexing
(Bennett 1990), meaning that the news organizations weigh their sources and frames
according to a power index: who is relatively more powerful in the situation being
reported. In the case of labor militance, the empirical question that arises is whether
union sources or ownership sources are being relied upon and in what proportion.
And, perhaps more important, it is a matter of whether public o cials are delivering
pro or con messages with respect to labor.
In order to investigate whether mass opinion might have been manipulated, I
collect articles from the various outlets that most citizens relied upon. The condition
of manipulation cannot obtain unless the editors and owners intentionally presented
biased or selective information with the purpose of misleading readers (cf. Page
and Shapiro 1992, 356). This condition of intentionality is di cult to demonstrate;
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indeed, it is di cult to demonstrate that the information presented was itself slanted.
At all events, the public did come to support policies that were inimical to their
interests. I proceed under the assumption that citizens shared a common framework
for understanding the disruptive strikes. Primarily, there was a shared valuation of
civil order. Or, at a minimum, there was a shared evaluation of what constituted
disorder.
How does a news article a↵ect the reader? First, citizens must be exposed to the
article(s). The canonical political science understanding is that political awareness is
the best predictor of receiving news messages (Price and Zaller 1991). Unfortunately,
these early Gallup surveys do not include political awareness items. For this reason,
the subsequent analysis will focus on front page news so as to make my exposure
assumption minimally heroic. If an article has an e↵ect across people in a uniform -
or at least, similar - fashion, then it must be interpreted and received in a uniform,
or at least similar, fashion. In part, processing is a function of the political values
elicited by the content. In their resistance, the CIO unions threw the patterns of
social and economic relations into deep question, even property itself (Lichtenstein
1995). The capitalists (and the government) in their repression of strikers exposed
the limits of revolutionary resolve on the part of the militant unionists.
The unionists were portrayed as a vector of social disorder by the various outlets;
and, not unreasonably, the public came to see unions as an interest group. This was in
part because of the personality and style of the leader of the CIO John L. Lewis. Some
discussion of where he fits is in order here, as his name was a metonym for organized
labor militance (Zieger 1988, Chapter 4). His opponents within and outside the labor
movement used his connection to the communist militants in the CIO to try and
turn mass opinion against him. Ultimately, however, the depiction of unionists as
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separate interest from the commonweal was likely a partial result of Lewis being a
fairly self-interested labor leader. To wit, Lewis was a proponent of essentially laissez
faire capitalism in the 1920s (his argument for union security legislation was that it
would fix labor costs among the various competitors so as to level competitive pressure
within the coal industry). Moreover, Lewis’ proximate interest for the formation of
the CIO was to bring recalcitrant steel owners to heel (James Wechsler Papers, Box
1, Folder 2).
President Roosevelt expressed concern about the syndicated columns and the
ways in which they seemed to be shaping opinion against him (White 1979, 27). In
Graham White’s seminal study, he found that the press was in fact not particularly
biased against the president (Ibid, Chapters 2-4). However, following his approach,
in that I juxtapose coverage of identical events, I might weigh the relative di↵erences
in sources and directional thrust of statements.
Also, I pay attention to the rise of the use of the word ’management’ in the
place of ’capital.’ After all, in any reasonable formulation, the antonym of capital
is labor. The concept of management as a distinct entity accords the workplace a
special location as a site of scientific control. This in turn reifies the ’public interest’
as an outcome that is coterminous with industrial and shopfloor order. The scientific
notion of management implies that industrial disputes have a fundamental solution
that is evidently in the public interest. This concept of the public as a third party to
industrial disputes was one shared by the workers themselves (Harris 1982; Rondinone
2010, 147-50). That is, the workers did not conceive of their e↵orts - even in the
disruptive sit-own strikes - as a class force let alone fighting for industrial democracy;
they were fighting for shopfloor improvements. In a nutshell, management coming to
stand in for capital served to mystify economic relations. Then, management came
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to be linked in the public imagination with smooth production of materiel in a just
and successful war e↵ort. The upshot was a national perspective that was, at its core,
hostile to labor militance.
What these selections will illustrate - and all these are articles in the content
analyses were on the first page of the papers - is that readers were generally exposed to
frames of the sit-down strikes as sites of disorder, as opposed to sites of well-motivated
protest. In the previous section, I suggested that the news media was in concert
with the capitalist elites. But this is a di cult proposition to sustain, particularly
given that editors do not ”directly take the audience into account when selecting
and producing stories but instead assume what interested them would interest the
audience” (Gans 1979, 229-30). That is, the fact that the newspapers produced and
framed stories against the industrial unions is not enough to press the case that they
were in league against them. One might well have concluded that the disorder frame
was the best way to sell papers.
The journalist need not be ideologically in line with the capitalist owners in
order to slant the news. Nor need the ownership of the papers be involved on a daily
basis in order to maintain a pro-capitalist slant in terms of new or editorial slant.
The reporter may engage in self-censorship (Gans 1979, 196) or the editors may
discourage or pressure their subordinates. The tension between the profit motive
and the First Amendment responsibilities of the press is laid bare in the coverage of
strikes. During the episodes we will examine below, the media did not challenge the
anti-labor interests of media owners or capital-holders generally.
With respect to the interest of newspaper editors, the rise of syndicated columns
served their end of promoting the American tradition of union suppression. Earlier,
I identified Pegler as a subject deserving of focus because of the acclaim he received
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during the 1930s and 40s and, more importantly, because the widely disseminated
Scripps chain featured his columns across the nations. Pegler’s reportage on union
racketeering in Northern cities exposed notable corruption. Pegler was among the
first to use the term ’right to work’ and apply it to the right for workers to break a
picket line - the more intuitive reading for many is as a kind of label for a full em-
ployment program. ”This [the Wagner Act] is a law which drives millions into unions
against their will, under the rule of unioneers [sic] whose character the government dis-
claims any right or responsibility to investigate” (Washington Post 10/15/39). But
the reactionaries were not altogether unreasonable in their branding because what
was putatively at stake was citizen liberty to work for a wage in order to make a
living.
Data and Method
The focus of this chapter will be twofold: how much news were people exposed to
and what was the valence of that information. First in order to measure the overall
volume of articles relating to strikes, I begin by searching the ProQuest Historical
Newspapers database of twenty newspapers in large cities for articles with ’labor’
or ’union’ and ’strike’ mentioned in both the headline and main text of the article.
This yielded a total 54,633 articles from 1936 to 1947. The count of strike articles
comprised a large proportion of the total articles regarding union activity, which was
100,978. About a sixth of the articles are drawn from the New York Times and New
York Herald Tribune; the remaining proportion are roughly equally divided among
the other big city newspapers (i.e. Boston, Washington, Chicago, Atlanta), and then
the remaining newspapers comprise a small proportion of the overall count. Broadly
speaking, the overall coverage of unions was dependent on their militance; that is,
the coverage of unions was visibly related to strikes. (See Appendix for outlets and
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search strings.) This database relies on having archived long-running big-city US
newspapers. In addition, I include newspapers targeted at the black community,
though these contained only a few instances of strike coverage.
With respect to the content analysis, like Page and Shapiro (1983; 1987), my
independent variable is pro-con statements made by valenced sources. Each mea-
surement, then, is a unit of analysis in measuring aggregate newspaper content. The
content analysis in this chapter will be comprised of 362 articles spanning five key
episodes in the New Deal period. Though this study relies on a single-coder, an audit
of the items in the Appendix will reveal that the coverage of unions was unfavor-
able. However, demonstrating that the coverage was unfavorable does not in itself
demonstrate that the coverage was unfair. Indeed, a reader might well view that the
instances in this chapter’s Appendix as instances of factual reporting. However, the
way that these reports stack up over time and across contexts, doubtless redounded
to labor’s detriment. There are many ways to understand a strike but the newspa-
pers preferred to understand the strikes as being in opposition to social harmony or
patriotic demands.
In this chapter, I measure pro-con source-messages in several contexts: most
comprehensively, I measure the directional thrust of coverage by analyzing the content
of coverage of key episodes during the Wagner to Taft-Hartley interlude. In the
Appendix, the reader can find each instance of an anti-CIO or anti-worker protest
item cited in the figures. The strikes were, not altogether unfairly, implicitly described
as insurgent in many cases in most newspapers. The main expectation is that a lens
sympathetic to the cause of worker resistance would be relatively uncommon and
increasingly so during the Wagner to Taft-Hartley period.
The data are summarized in tables that depict the overall thrust of the source-
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messages in the articles wherein articles are classed as favorable, unfavorable, bal-
anced, or neutral with respect to strike actions. A favorable item was one where
the balance of source-messages was supportive of labor; an unfavorable item was one
where the balance of source-messages was opposed to labor; a balanced item was one
where the source-messages were even; and, finally, a neutral item was one where there
was no directional thrust to the source-messages.
Woolley (2000, 165-6) advises the use of a deflator to adjust for the implicit
selection biases arising from the indexing process. Here ’indexing’ connotes the pro-
cess by which the newspaper archive arranges and classifies articles. These biases are
unavoidable and can only be partially remedied by evaluating the search results by
hand. Therefore, I might report counts relative to the total number of articles about
strikes indexed when dealing with the issue of attention paid to unions. But, the
visual juxtaposition of the article counts in Figure 1 below suggests that I need not
report the counts as ratios of the total number of indexed articles because both counts
move in tandem (r=.93). At all events, this concern is orthogonal to the matter of
news exposure.
To justify the focus on Lewis, I compare Lewis mentions to the those of other
prominent labor leaders. Lewis dwarfs the other principals of the CIO in news cover-
age. Only the radical communist Harry Bridges of the Longshoremen’s union received
nearly as much attention as John L. Lewis in any given year. This is consistent with
the view that the militant workers were being brought under a disproportionate media
spotlight. Lewis coverage was especially disproportionate to that of the contempo-
raneous head of the AFL, William Green whose newspaper count was a fraction of
Lewis’. This imbalance, I argue, is a manifestation of a long-standing media bias to-
ward conflict, following canonical works in the social science literature on the media
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(Gans 1979; Iyengar and Kinder 1987, for example). Conceptually, the methodolog-
ical problem of index bias does not arise when I deal with the media attention to
labor leaders because I am comparing attention paid to labor leaders merely to es-
tablish Lewis’ primacy among them, so any articles that were excluded by those who
arranged the database should a↵ect the various union principals equally (or at least
randomly). As a contemporaneous and long-time Lewis observer, James Wechsler,
pointed out,
Admittedly, [the] CIO was the creation of many anonymous men, of industrial pres-
sures, of forces that might not have been indefinitely suppressed. But Lewis was its
founding father, its emotional symbol, its commander-in-chief. And nearly all of the
rollicking recruits who signed CIO card identified the movement with the name and
person of John L. Lewis. So did Mr. Lewis. (James A Wechsler Papers, Box 1, Folder
2)
In order to identify pro-labor or anti-labor source-messages through content
analysis in a replicable fashion, despite the interpretive nature of the exercise, I pro-
ceed by analyzing coverage of identical episodes by di↵erent outlets. I focus on several
salient episodes guided by insight from the history literature: the Flint sit-down strikes
of 1936-7; Lewis versus Hillman in the breakup of the original CIO in 1937-403; the
captive mines4 dispute of 1941; and the Reconversion strikes of 1945-6 (Fine 1969;
Zieger 1988; Lichtenstein 1982[2003], for example). I code an source-message as ’con’
when it contains references to militance that cast aspersion upon the workers or sets
the struggle as inherently in opposition to civil society, delivered by a source from
ownership or a public o cial. And, mutatis mutandis, I code a source-message as
’pro’ when the strike is contextualized within existing grievances or is delivered by
3Lewis resigned the presidency of the CIO in after the 1940 convention because the unionists in
leadership and rank-and-file supported FDR instead of demanding more concessions.
4By ’captive,’ it is meant that the coal mines were vertically integrated with the steel firms that
used their output. Thus, the mines were e↵ectively captured by the steel firms.
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a union source. The typical negative framings of worker militance during this pe-
riod held that strikes were to be abhorred because they excluded men who wanted
to work; because they were in opposition to property and, by extension, the rule of
law; and because the news tended to index the views of o cial sources, the source-
messages in question are pro-capitalist or pro-worker in that they reported events in
a slanted fashion, chiefly by editorializing in news sections. Again, the limitations of
single-coder analysis notwithstanding, it will be evident that the coverage of unions
cannot have been construed to have been generally favorable toward unions, even if
a skeptical reader would argue the coverage was fair.
Also I will examine the columns of Westbrook Pegler, who arguably foreshad-
owed the latter-day syndicated conservative columnists; Pegler’s columns, usually
featured above the fold across from editorials, formed the basis for a newly crystalliz-
ing American conservative perspective on labor unions that emphasized their corrupt
elements and the costs borne by workers a↵ronted by the picket line. The construction
of unions as corrupt and as obstacles to an orderly society find some of their earliest
wide expression in Pegler’s columns (Kennedy 1999; Witwer 2005). A major reason
that Pegler was granted national reach was that Roy Howard (of Scripps-Howard) had
turned against the New Deal in 1937; moreover, Howard sought to ape the national
cohesion of the Hearst papers (White 1979, 190; Emery 1972, 431).
Analysis
Figure 2.1 depicts the volume of front-page coverage of strikes plotted alongside
coverage of John L. Lewis, the CIO, racketeering, and communism. The count of
articles on strikes notably spiked in the major years of labor unrest of 1937 and
1946 and the volume of CIO coverage likewise spiked in those years. The John L.



























Figure 2.1: Strike Coverage Per Annum
was personally linked - negatively - with disruptive militance, even after his break
with the CIO. Though the coverage of communism in strikes was relatively muted, it
also tracked the overall coverage of strikes (r=.38). The racketeering frame, however
(r=.33), had little to do with the prevailing levels of militance and received relatively
little attention in the mainstream press, in contrast to its salience for right-wing
backlash to unionism in the 1930s. Overall, the sheer volume of strike coverage on
the front page suggests that citizens in the mass public were well-acquainted with
portrayals of labor militance. During the peak strike years, citizens were exposed to
more than 7,000 front page stories about strikes per year; in other words, at the height
of industrial conflict, the nation was blanketed by strike coverage. And, importantly,














































































Figure 2.2: Strike Coverage and Strike Volume
Figure 2.2 shows the count of strike articles plotted alongside a strike volume
measure (cf. Hibbs 1976) and the union approval measure from the next chapter, re-
spectively. In Figure 2, we observe that the coverage of strikes and the strike volume
vary together until the Second World War when the coverage of strikes increased as
the strike volume was flat. During the immediate post-war period, citizens ranked
industrial disputes as the most important problem facing the nation. Though Gallup
did not ask the question in a su cient number of instance to analyze along the lines
of Funkhouser (1973), this result does suggest that newspapers inflated the strike
problem. We will see in the next chapter that movements in union approval moved
inversely with the volume of strike coverage; as the volume of coverage increased the
overall level of union approval tended to decline.The volume of strike coverage was
clearly linked with the strike volume measure (r=.57) borrowed from Hibbs.5 Further-
more, the count of strike articles has an even stronger relation with the count of CIO
articles (r=.89). The count of articles was negatively, though insignificantly, related
5See Chapter Four.
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with the expressed popular approval of unions (r=-.04) and strongly negatively corre-
lated with approval of John L. Lewis (r=-.51).6 Relatively more anti-strike coverage
emerged over the course of the sit-down strikes as shown in Figure 4 below. And,
indeed, the framing of the issue is suggestive in support of capitalist power. As noted
above, the negative coverage in newspapers took two forms: first in the descriptions
of union militance and second in the sourcing of reportage. Taken together, these
results are consistent with the hypothesis that the valence of coverage buttressed























































Figure 2.3: Lewis, Hillman, and Murray Coverage
Figures 2.3 and 2.4 show a comparison of the volume of coverage of prominent
labor leaders. We can see clearly that the coverage of John Lewis greatly exceeded
that of any other labor leader. In presenting the labor leaders in this fashion, the
media was tending to highlight the most combative labor leader. In juxtaposing the
6I do not present the Lewis approval measure in the figures because the time-series is incomplete.
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Table 2.1: Flint Coverage
NYT Herald Trib Balt Sun Wash Post CSM Bos Globe Total
Fav. 20% 12% 22% 25% 26% 35% 13% 22%
Unfav. 46% 31% 30% 17% 19% 15% 26% 27%
Bal. 32% 35% 41% 54% 55% 50% 52% 45%
Neu. 2% 22% 7% 4% 0% 0% 9% 7%
N 40 26 27 35 31 20 23 221
coverage of the labor leaders, the media were e↵ectively presenting the choices facing
organized labor and the public over increasing militance and heightening demands as
opposed to subordinating to membership in the FDR coalition. And, indeed, Lewis
was cast as out of the mainstream by much of the press. Though Lewis was not a




























































Figure 2.4: Lewis, Green, and Bridges Coverage
Table 2.1 depicts the measures for the coverage of the Flint sit-down strike.
A total of 221 articles were recovered from the search. In these items, most were
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balanced or neutral, though there were more unfavorable items than favorable. The
New York newspapers were more anti-strike than those elsewhere. It should be noted
that numerous strike articles were written by the wire reporters and therefore many
of these items were identical across the nation.
Table 2.2 deals with the juxtaposition of John L. Lewis and Sidney Hillman in
the newspapers from 1937 to 1940, the final year the original CIO would be intact.
Here the papers are not disaggregated because there were relatively few articles con-
trasting the two During the run-up to FDR’s second reelection, Lewis argued that
the industrial unions should have opposed Roosevelt in the absence of specific con-
cessions to organized labor. Hillman, saw that labor needed the president more than
he needed the upstart unions. This logic is based on the idea that the workers could
not carry on using their collective might unilaterally to impose political and policy
demands. Lewis, for his part, in trying to utilized voluntarist logic was missing out
on how hostile the Republican Party was. The only viable plan for Lewis, which he
came upon after his resigning as head of the CIO was to seek a farmer-labor alliance.
In this table, the balance of the articles is again mostly that of general discussion
an dispassionate reportage; however, to the extent that a slant is noticeable, it tends
toward the anti-Lewis side.
Table 2.3 depicts the coverage of the 1941 captive mines dispute. These strikes
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Table 2.3: Captive Mines Coverage
NYT Herald Trib Balt Sun Wash Post CSM Bos Globe Total
Fav. 26% 13% 25% 15% 19% 15% 0% 15%
Unfav. 55% 46% 75% 70% 43% 39% 50% 51%
Bal. 19% 37% 0% 15% 38% 39% 33% 28%
Neu. 0% 4% 0% 0% 0% 7% 17% 6%
N 31 22 8 13 21 13 12 150







were an attempt to unionize the mines that were owned and operated by steel firms for
use in production. The National Defense Mediation Board - a tripartite commission
- ruled against the United Mine Workers (Atleson 1998, 20-31). In response, Lewis
called a headline-grabbing strike that would have served as a grave obstacle to war
production (Zieger 1988, Chapter 4). (Public disfavor in survey responses regarding
these selfsame strikes are presented in the next chapter.) A total of 150 articles were
found in this search. This table shows the coverage of the captive mines dispute of
1941, which occurred during the run-up to World War Two. In this episode, the
negative coverage was spread across the national outlets. And, again, only a small
proportion of the articles might be said to be have treated the militant unionists
favorably. The majority of items are coded as unfavorable in this instance. In contrast
with the Flint episode, the captive mines episode had more negative coverage than
neutral coverage. The key di↵erence in this episode being that the union militance
was places in direct opposition to the war footing; this is in keeping with the highly
favorable view of defense strike bans examined in the next chapter.
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Table 2.4 depicts the coverage of the reconversion strikes. These connote the
strikes that attended the ’reconversion’ of the economy from a wartime to a peacetime
basis during 1945-6. The Reconversion strikes, which were more numerous than the
size of the sample studied here would suggest, were more largely sourced o cially than
previous episodes. Nonetheless, the Truman administration was not as denunciatory
as the preceding administration. The N here is only thirty-nine, but this is because I
am selecting strictly for the articles that frame the strikes as reconversion strikes. The
Reconversion strikes, chiefly against General Motors and US Steel, were designed to
insert labor into the post-war management paradigm. Materiel loss was a key theme
though out the wartime period, but the dominant negative frame here was that of
insurrection.
Table 2.5 depicts the coverage of the disruptive wave of textile and rubber strikes
that helped form the CIO in early 1935 (cf. Bernstein 1966; Zieger 1995). A search
of strike articles related to textiles or rubber on the front page in 1935 before the
adoption of the Wagner Act yields 33 results. The pre-Wagner coverage, though, was
not ideologically more favorable to unions. And, as previously, the negative mentions
are presented in the Appendix. Here, though, 33 percent of the articles were favorable
compared to 11 percent unfavorable. In this coverage, the e↵orts by the President and
senior o cials to forestall and broker labor disputes was favorably covered. In other
words, there existed a manifest bias toward labor peace even in otherwise neutral
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coverage.
By way of example, here are quotations from earlier in the sit-down wave.
From the New York Herald Tribune, ”Ten thousand persons were thrown out of work
today when the B.F. Goodrich Company suspended production because of a series
of departmental ’sit-downs” (9/24/36). From the Baltimore Sun of the same day
”Labor disputants reported to fists and stones in two widely separated cities today,
while others sought to end strikes though conciliation.”
In order to give the reader exemplars of what is meant by a ’negative’ phrase7
in the lead paragraph, I will present randomly selected articles coded ’negative.’
From the February 4, 1937 New York Times, explaining why the Sheri↵ of Flint,
Michigan called for the National Guard to encircle the ”thousands of sitdowners
and pickets there that had defied him to compel its evacuation and end picketing
under the injunction issued” (New York Times 2/4/37). From the February 25,
1937 Los Angeles Times on page three, ”A bitter clash of opposing union leaders
yesterday marked mediation of a paralyzing sit-down strike at the giant Douglas
Aircraft Corporation” (Los Angeles Times 2/25/37). From page one of the March 22,
1937 Chicago Tribune, ”Professional agitators with communistic sympathies, carefully
trained for their duties in a New York City labor college, are the storm troopers
and the backbone of the present strike wave’ (Chicago Tribune 3/22/37). From the
Washington Post of the same day, ”It is surprising that President Roosevelt with
his proper concern for the many grave problems which confront the Nation, has as
yet found no occasion to express himself publicly on the subject of sit-down strikes.
The crisis in Detroit where a great city is rapidly drifting into a condition not far
7I do not report positive mentions because relatively few existed. Though there were fairly
positive features in newsmagazines such as Harper’s and Life, newspapers were either factual in
their introductory paragraphs or biased against the industrial unions.
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removed from anarchy” (Washington Post 3/22/37). The antagonism over the sit-
down strikers was so pitted that the Governor Frank Murphy (D-MI) was the target
of death threats as ”some of those threatening him assail him for not adopting more
vigorous politics in the ejection of sit-down strikers, while others would have revenged
themselves on him for permitting such ejections” (Chicago Tribune 3/22/37).
In these articles, the strikes are often described using a metaphor of armed
conflict and battle. John L. Lewis was referred to or likened to a leader in combat on
a consistent basis. It is di cult to identify negative mentions of Lewis as opposed to
the strikers or unions generally. Adjectives such as ’unyielding’ - commonly applied to
Lewis - are more ambiguously valenced when applied to individuals than to interest-
groups. A typical report on Lewis: ”John L. Lewis tonight exposed what he considers
his ace in the hole in the automobile strike. ”We helped Roosevelt lick industry, now
let Roosevelt help us lick industry” (Chicago Tribune 1/21/37). This invocation of
Roosevelt here implied that in exchange for CIO support in reelection, the President
would support the sit-down strikers.
As Figure 2.5 shows, newspapers carried twice as many articles about labor
union demands than about labor union grievances or pleas. The distinction be-
tween ’demands’ and ’pleas’ is found in the implicit power-relation connoted by the
terms: where a demand is imperious, a plea is suppliant. The count of the latter in
this analysis is somewhat inflated by articles concerning grievance machinery within
firms. Pairwise correlation with union approval in survey responses shows a positive
correlation for ’plea’ (r=.32, N=12) and a small negative correlation for ’demand’
(r=-.16, N=12) from 1937-48. These correlations imply that unions were more likely
to viewed favorably when they were framed as supplicants rather than as insurgents.






















































































Figure 2.5: Use of Plea v. Demand
’demands’ and 4,072 referring to ’pleas.’
Rather than referring to capital as such, ’management’ began to prevail as the
preferred moniker. And, more subtly, the description of labor comes to be synony-
mous with unions and not with the class itself (Rondinone 2008, Chap 6). In other
words, there was an absence of apprehension of class conflict during the pitted mili-
tance. The idea of management - a sub-class of capitalists, strictly speaking - serves
to deny the urgency of the claims and demands of either side and consigns the conflict
into a technocratic realm. And a scientific outlook on management implies an incor-
rectly pluralistic take on American labor relations (Harris 1982, 7-9; Atleson 1983).
Necessarily, the government comes to be viewed as a player in strikes alongside capital
and labor.8 Interestingly, Governors Murphy of Michigan and Earle of Pennsylvania
8This is a distinct point from saying that all politics constitutes the ordering and sublimation of
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were often protagonists in the articles about the strikes in their states. The rise of
the perceived legitimate role of government in sorting out labor militance was related
to the news media predilection for defusing class war.
Pegler helped make racketeering within unions a salient issue for many Amer-
icans. In terms of identifying unions as actors, he drew the unions as a gatekeeper
over jobs that free people seeking work. For example, ”The unioneer’s solemn as-
sertion of a man’s right to work is sacred until it violates the decree of a few union
politicians whose appetite for power has been tempted by a group which seems ready
for a raid” (Washington Post November 11, 1937, 11). Also, ”The fact is that the
labor leader very often is a dictator maintaining his power by union politics at the
expense of democratic procedure which places the rank and file in the position of
the Italian or German citizens who just rock along submitting to discipline” (The
Atlanta Constitution June 6, 1937, 4). The racket issue brings Michels’ iron law of
oligarchy into focus. The leaders who are trusted to ensure that the worker cartel is
administered and organized have distinct and sometimes opposing incentives to the
rank-and-file members. Senator Wagner, introducing his eponymous law, claimed ”I
do not underestimate racketeering in organized labor. It exists, unfortunately, as it
exists in politics, in industry, among lawyers, and with bankers and brokers” (NLRA
Legislative History 1935, 1319).
In March 1941, across classes, respondents overwhelmingly responded in the
a rmative to the following item: ”Westbrook Pegler, the newspaper writer claims
that many union leaders are racketeers.”9 Do you agree or disagree with him?” (Gallup
conflict.
9’Racketeering’ connotes a fraudulent service - a service that would not exist were it not for the
racket. In this case, unions, such as the Teamsters (Witwer 2004, for example) used their control of
jobs to compel incoming workers to surrender wages.
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3/12/41). Survey results reflect the absence of the expected class cleavage on this
item. Those on relief and the wealthy overwhelmingly agreed with Pegler that unions
were largely rackets. Every region and class sub-group agreed at a rate greater than
70 percent Moreover, there was little regional variation, except, unsurprisingly, the
South was especially likely to disparage labor leaders. Astonishingly, a majority of
union members that responded answered in the a rmative. It is typically a mistake
to dwell on one poll result but this response is starkly negative.
There is a relevant normative consideration here: that of the individual rights
of the workers wishing to cross the picket line. And here the researcher cannot avoid
taking a normative stance as the pluralist neutrality redounds to an a rmation of
capital’s preeminence over labor. The choice is whether would-be free riders can be
delivered benefits on a particular and selective basis from group activity; since the
union’s gains are non-excludable in the workplace, the union is impelled to demand
dues. Pegler’s insistence on the right of workers to cross picket lines as well as for
the ’public’ not to be deprived of goods articulated the conservative backlash to
union power and served to anticipate the o↵ensive against unions that attended the
’right turn’ of the 1980s and the preset-day opposition to public sector unions. Put
another way, the discourses surrounding the rise of the New Deal were the ones that
surrounded its fall a half-century later.
In his column, cheekily entitled ’Fair Enough,’ Pegler wrote that ”organized la-
bor is assuming the powers of government without the responsibility of government,
and with business in shackles that is a lopsided arrangement which cannot continue
indefinitely” (Los Angeles Times, 8/8/39). By this, he meant that the use of strikes
that seized the site of production or obstructed the flow of commerce were an arroga-
tion of power by the unions. Worse yet, the unions were not necessarily doing their
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workers bidding. Like Michels before him, Pegler had the insight that the incentives
faced by workers were distinct and potentially contrary to those faced by labor leaders
hungry for dues. Moreover, Pegler was critical of the perceived violence of strikers
who assaulted those who meant to cross picket lines. Basically - and this is more
true of the CIO unions - the nascent union movement of the 1930s was characterized
by an expansion of internal governance structure that has its own taxation scheme
and ability to annex parts of the United States. And, indeed, the GOP would make
curbing union power the central theme of the 1946 midterm elections, capturing the
spirit with the slogan ’Had Enough?” (Lee 1966, 47).
The relationship between capital and labor was antagonistic throughout US
history. And newspapers took di↵erent perspectives, though typically maintaining a
pro-capitalist bias. Unhappily, there do not exist valid measures of public opinion
prior to the adoption of the Wagner Act. Nevertheless, we can surmise that the
coverage of the strikes before the Wagner Act were not substantially more favorable,
and to the extent that the coverage of militancy became more negative over the
course of the New Deal, it appears attributable in large measure to the increasingly
negative stances taken by the Roosevelt administration and the president personally;
Roosevelt took his his strongest stance against militance during the captive mines
dispute.
A sampling of newspaper coverage - even a more comprehensive one than that
presented above - would be insu cient to summarize the news that citizens received
about strikes, as radios became more commonly owned throughout the period under
study. However, newspapers were the dominant source of information. And, sub-
stantively, what they have to teach us would not be materially a↵ected by attention
to newsreels or radio, as it is unlikely that the newsreels and radio presenters would
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have been delivering markedly di↵erent content.
Newspapers in Utah and Wisconsin
Continuing with the theme of analyzing states that had protective laws before
restrictive laws, I examined the front pages of newspapers in Utah and Wisconsin with
an eye toward stories about labor disputes. Given that the New York newspapers
comprise a substantial fraction of the national dailies in the analysis presented above,
this section will take a brief look at Utah and Wisconsin papers which were not dig-
itally archived in a searchable fashion. But there are numerous examples of negative
framings of strikes from the New York papers in the Appendix. Further, it should
be noted that the presses with narrow circulation often reprinted the big-city chains.
The generalized logic drawn from the big-city newspapers is applied to these states in
this section: here, we are looking for examples of strike coverage that are inconsistent
with the business interests of media owners. For Utah, I used the Deseret News, a
statewide daily that had the attention of Mormon Church members. For Wisconsin,
I used the Milwaukee Journal as this paper had the widest circulation in the state.
I attained these newspapers from the Google News digital archive. (Though that
archiving project was eventually abandoned, these collections are largely complete,
missing no more than a handful of articles per year.)
In contrast to the concerns raised about the Utah case in the previous chapter,
the First President of the Latter-Day Saints, Heber Grant, stated in a front-page
editorial that ”The Church does not interfere nor has any intention of interfering
with the fullest and freest exercise of the political franchise by Church members”
(Deseret News 11/2/36). One might not treat this statement in a credulous fashion
but the forceful denial itself evidences the importance the Mormons put on presenting
themselves as endorsing individual political freedom.
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In covering strikes in silver and copper mines, the Deseret News distinctively
led articles on the strike by presenting the workers’ position rather favorably, for
example: ”the general rise in metal prices and commodities are reasons for the mine
operators to look with a friendly eye on worker demands” (Ibid 11/7/36, 1). However,
on the very same page, the paper presented strikes occurring in the San Francisco
shipyards as ”threatening paralysis for national shipping” (Ibid). And furthermore
that article began by pointing out that ”eggs were hatching aboard a strikebound
vessel” (Ibid).
In covering out-of-state strikes, the News was sometimes less than even-handed.
For example, ”Strikers attacked o cers with stones when attempts were made today
to open a strike-bound cannery at Stockton” (Ibid 4/23/37, 1). But, on the other
hand, it o↵ered a fair contextualizing of a CIO strike against Jones and Laughlin
”Police hurled tear gas into a crowd of shouting, demonstrating pickets today at the
strike-closed Aliquippa works of the Jones and Laughlin corporation” (Ibid, 5/13/37,
1). Foreshadowing an issue this dissertation revisits in the conclusion, ”Striking steel
workers adopted a ’quit work or starve’ policy against men remaining in besieged
mills, and the Republic Steel Corporation answered with a protest” (Ibid, 5/29/37,
1). And this was not the only time the News relied upon a martial metaphor to cast
labor in an unfavorable light, referring to the ”strike-sieged plants of Youngstown”
(Ibid 6/28/37, 1). It should be noted, though, that this newspaper did spend more
time on the events in Europe than on industrial strife at home.
Overall, the Deseret News o↵ered a more even-handed approach than other
newspapers. Indeed, when Senator Elbert Thomas (D-UT) questioned a Repub-
lic Steel executive on the provision of weapons for Chicago police o cers acting as
strikebreakers, it made front-page coverage (7/3/37) whereas the New York Times
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and even Chicago Tribune relegated the story to well inside the paper. And when
Lewis began to turn on Roosevelt in 1937 the Salt Lake newspaper elected to em-
phasize the Labor Day celebrations at the expense of highlighting the growing rift
within and between labor and the administration (Ibid, 9/6/37, 1). Though the paper
hardly dealt with strikes on the basis of their national salience - indeed the Deseret
News did not report on the Flint sit-down as front-page news until nearly the end
of the strike. And, indeed, upon the passage of the state’s little Wagner Act, there
was no report of the bill’s passage whatever. But, by way of comparison with the
state’s other major daily The Salt Lake Tribune, the copycat sit-down strikes that
came shortly after Flint - which, after all, convinced General Motors to recognize the
CIO union - were described as an ”epidemic” on the Tribune front page while it did
not get mentioned in the News (Salt Lake Tribune 3/3/37, 1). And, what is more,
the News did not cover the captive mines dispute either. During the post-war strike
wave, the News was quick to point out that the steel and coal strikes would have little
e↵ect on Utah (Deseret News 1/16/46,1). However, the position of the editors of the
News should not be mistaken for progressive: indeed, the paper printed editorials in
opposition to child labor laws on the grounds that the ”state should be kept free from
federal usurpation” (Ibid 1/26/35, 12). Furthermore, they argued against supporting
Roosevelt’s reelection bid suggesting that, in light of numerous New Deal laws being
held unconstitutional, ”Church members must stand for the Constitution and should
feel duty bound to vote to protect it” (Ibid 10/31/36).
Upon the passage of the Wisconsin Labor Relations Act (WLRA), the Milwau-
kee Journal wrote ”On the hundred and first roll call of a continuous 12-hour session,
the hungry and weary state senate passed the administration’s labor disputes bill
in just the form its sponsors wanted it” (4/3/37, 1). On that same front page, the
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Journal prominently features a quotation by Senator Borah (R-ID) that anticipates
a discussion that we will save for the final chapter: ”I confess I have not been excited
over the fact that labor in its struggle with capital has seized property but you cannot
separate this sole issue from all the others involving individual rights” (Ibid).
In the wake of the WLRA having been passed, the unions sought to organize
the creameries and dairies of Wisconsin. Examples of negative agricultural responses
were salient and featured in the Journal. Early after the passage of the Wisconsin
little Wagner Act, the Journal began an article about a strike as ”paralyzing the
produce trade” (Ibid 5/6/37, 1). Another example, ”Unionization of the Richland
Cooperative Creamery Company at Richland Center was protested Monday night
by 325 farmer-patrons” (Ibid 4/19/38, 1). The next month: ”Sixteen square jawed
farmers representing the Wisconsin Dairy Industries Cooperative declared here Mon-
day that they are prepared to don ’political brass knuckles’ for a showdown resisting
unionization of farmer-owned plants” (Ibid 5/17/38, 1). And the next day, ”Oper-
ators of twelve large Milwaukee poultry and egg firms took the initiative in a labor
controversy and closed their commission houses after negotiations broke down over a
closed shop provision” (Ibid, 5/18/38,1). The Journal featured the farmers’ backlash
prominently, ”Union Grove farmers who were ’innocent bystanders’ of the spinach
strike last spring started to do something about their plight Monday. ’No closed shop
on the farm!’ was their keynote” (Ibid 7/26/38,1).
Having won a sit-down strike against Allis-Chalmers in May 1938, the Journal
framed its front-page coverage of the union victory thusly, ”Immediately upon [col-
lective agreement] ratification, leaders warned men to avoid new trouble” (5/7/38, 1).
Later that month, the Journal featured the AFL chief William Green denouncing the
CIO, ”In some cases industry has been plagued by sitdown strikes and the AFL and
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its unions do not and will not condone such illegal methods of organization” (Ibid
5/22/38, 1).
The captive mines dispute was front-page news in the Milwaukee Journal five
times over the course of the episode. Here, the coverage was largely synoptic. The
most unfavorable lede was a quotation of a presidential statement wherein FDR as-
serted that ”the cessation of coal production would create a further danger to Amer-
ican defense and it was the indisputable obligation for the President to see the coal
production not be stopped” (Ibid 11/14/41, 1).
Overall, the Journal was not distinct from the national sample analyzed above
while the Deseret News contained examples of strike coverage that contextualized
the labor unrest. This is consistent with the observation that Utah was the only
state to keep its protective law intact. Sadly, these newspapers are not archived in
a fashion that allows for reliable keyword searching that would enable valid content
and volume analysis. However, in light of the relatively light coverage of strikes and
strikers by the Latter-Day Saints’ preferred newspaper, it is plausible to suggest that
the readers of Utah were situated in a distinct information context. Though including
more articles in the present analysis might be enriching, the core conclusion that the
national coverage was unfavorable would not be gainsaid. The New York papers are
treated in the main body of this chapter, but it is evident that the coverage there
was not favorable to strikes or strikers.
Manipulation or Education?
Even if the probes above were to persuade the reader that the press was pro-
capitalist (or anti-strike), it would not be clear whether this was simply to sell news-
papers or was revelatory of an editorial bias. A Herald Tribune editorial said the
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Flint strike ”cannot be permitted to prevail if the law and the courts are to survive”
(1/10/37, 10). TheWashington Post summarized its stance thusly, ”Sloan [GM chief]
is everlastingly right in demanding that his company’s plants be evacuated by un-
welcome squatters. There isn’t an honest, intelligent mind in the country that can
gainsay this. Least of all should it be condoned, even by silence, by the President
of the United States” (1/31/37, 9). The Christian Science Monitor was agnostic
by contrast, stating that ”The American conscience is still weighing the sit-down
strike” (2/1/37, 18). The Atlanta Constitution, though, adopted a law-and-order
stance, ”The grave threat of the sit-down strike to the welfare of the nation is causing
concern...the law is being flouted by strikers who refuse to respect authority in any
quarter” (3/23/37, 6).
In the captive mines dispute, the Washington Post submitted that ”John L.
Lewis has taken a stand in defiance of the United States. By his arbitrary refusal
to abandon coercion during this critical period, he has laid before the government
a challenge which it cannot fail to accept” (10/27/41, 10). And the Herald Tribune
took a similar tack, ”John L. Lewis’s peremptory defiance of the President in order to
call forthwith a strike which grabs the defense industry by the throat at least accom-
plishes this much - it puts the issue of the union shop...on the worst possible ground”
(10/27/41, 14). An editorial in the Atlanta Constitution argued that the strike ”has
forced a situation where the issue remaining is simply whether Lewis as head of his
union, or President Roosevelt, as head of the nation, shall dictate the terms on which
this nation’s defense and war aid program shall proceed” (11/18/41, 6). The New
York Times was less hyperbolic but was nonetheless worried about the power of the
United Mine Workers, pointing out that to award the workers a closed or union shop
in mediation would be ’capitulation’ (10/31/41, 22). The following week, they saw
that ”An increasing number of union leaders are no longer content merely to bring
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pressure on the employer. They are attempting by the threat of strikes to coerce
government itself” (Ibid, 11/5/41, 22). The Los Angeles Times described Lewis as
a ’man up a tree’ and claimed that ”no ’labor leader’ since Debs has gone so far to
defy the government or flout the national interest as he” (11/14/41, 4).
In the Reconversion episode, the editorials were less strident, though they re-
mained opposed to strikes. From the Herald Tribune, ”The prospect that reconversion
to a peacetime economy will be hampered by labor strife is grave enough to demand
statesmanship...and the Wagner Act does not provide the machinery for a really fair
adjudication of the issues that will arise” (7/16/45, 8). The Washington Post was
dismayed to observe that ”no sooner had the news of Japan’s surrender been broad-
cast than a message from the CIO went over the airwaves stating that the no-strike
pledge was o↵” (8/18/45, 4). The Atlanta Constitution described the nascent strike
wave as ”spreading like an epidemic” (9/26/45, 6). Some editorials called for labor
peace, ”The President’s directive to the national conference of unions and manage-
ment, to find some way of settling disputes without strikes and without government
interference is good advice” (Los Angeles Times 11/6/45, 4). As the strike wave
wore on, the Washington Post editorialized, ”The immediate inconvenience caused
by any kind of large-scale labor disturbances is annoying rather than serious. But
the malign e↵ects of strikes and lockouts that slow down industrial activity and tend
to perpetuate wartime shortages of essential civilian products can hardly be exag-
gerated” (1/7/46, 6). Nor did the boards take the demands of unions seriously, the
Wall Street Journal was typical in this regard: ”President Philip Murray of the CIO
and past leaders of that organization are masters of drawing red herrings across the
path of plain logic and common sense” (1/30/46, 6). Overall, though, throughout the
year of 1946, the editorial emphasis was on the importance of production and less on
65
denouncing unions and strikes.
The editorial pages during the major strike episodes suggests that the editors
of the major dailies were decidedly unsympathetic to labor grievances, let alone labor
militance. Nor was this pattern confined to the post-Wagner period. ”No man may
be legally compelled to work for wages he does not consider adequate and no man
has the privilege of denying his neighbor the right to sell his labor at any price he
desires” (Washington Post 8/25/32, 6). The Christian Science Monitor embraced
a related theme, ”in every case of industrial warfare, the consumer is inevitably
the su↵erer...the cessation of any essential service cannot but strike at the innocent
bystander, the public, which stands all the inconvenience and pays all the bills”
(1/28/33, 16). Further, the Wall Street Journal approvingly referred to Senator
Wagner (D-NY) who ”told the American Federation of Labor in convention that
labor’s obligation was to maintain discipline within its own ranks and to win the
support of the public. In his mind public sympathy and support are not to be won
by the propensity so frequently of late to strike” (10/12/33, 8).
The editorials suggested that the patterns observed in the content analyses were
borne out of an anti-strike slant. However, this observation is not su cient to label
the coverage of strikes as manipulative. The suggestion of slant does not demonstrate
the presence of manipulation. But it does rule out the possibility of labor militance
receiving a balanced hearing. Having said this, it is more likely that the outcomes
that interest this dissertation are likely as not the result of majority preference being
represented. Again, for the condition of manipulation to obtain, the editorial boards
would have had to have willfully intended to deceive. The observed patterns do not
rise to this level.
Conclusion
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Taken together, these initial empirical probes combined with the next chap-
ter outline the contours of the possible in the mass polity. These alternate sites of
investigation have the advantage of revealing paths of potential variation that were
foreclosed. New Deal liberalism was delimited in the mass public at the height of
labor power - and militance - across the United States. Across jurisdictions, and
in advance of the conservative Democrat rebellion against the New Deal, the states
adopted laws to restrain strikes because ordinary citizens opposed the e↵orts taken
by other citizens that challenged existing relations. The relational threat posed by
militant industrial unionism demanded a powerful response.
The CIO saw itself as making a positive gain in terms of providing grievance
machinery. The CIO said that ’Patriotism outweighed all other considerations” (CIO
News June 1945). The CIO was flummoxed by a conundrum: the majority of people
are wage earners, so, then, how could the CIO be seen to seek special privilege?
Its interests paralleled the community’s since wage earners’ families largely make up
the community. Furthermore, the CIO took credit for the independent activities
of the Industrial Union Councils in New York and New Jersey that agitated for
the adoption of the first-in-the-nation fair employment legislation at the state level,
presaging its alliance to push the conservative Southern Democrats out of the caucus
(Baylor 2013).
In the present discussion, media owners are theorized to be motivated by the
desire for profit and support of free enterprise and not necessarily try to use their
power to influence the shape of public discussion and therefore use information as a
tool of class power and oppression. Political beliefs do not automatically reproduce
themselves nor does a social and economic order automatically reproduce itself. It
involves conscious propagation to sustain shared beliefs and values on a widespread
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basis.
Consistent with Parenti’s observation (1986, 94-5) that protesters are described
more than their grievances are attended, the ways in which protesters were di↵erent
than the mainstream were widely emphasized in strike coverage. In part, for this
reason the landmark sit-down strikes were widely framed as an insurrection. By
framing the protests outside the mainstream, journalists served to reinforce the view
of the world that the capitalist ordering of the society and economy stood beyond
reproach.
The labor movement had great di culty explaining its demands to the wider
public in a fashion that obscured their particularism. Consulting the wartime strike
record, one finds that workplace stoppages were the function of shopfloor conflicts
more than of organizational directive (Swo↵ord 1946, 9-14).10 Over the course of the
Wagner to Taft-Hartley period, the strikers were acting with an evidently di↵erent set
of motivations over time in their militance. At the outset of the New Deal, the strikes
were in furtherance of organization; as the New Deal wore on, the strikes came to be
motivated by shopfloor power struggles. In principle, this might frustrate the analyst
because the object of public derision is a shifting target within my temporal frame.
This is a challenge for inferring the underlying logics of mass opposition to strikes,
but it does not inhibit understanding the limits of progressive demand-making.
Strikes were essential to the gains the workers won through New Deal protest
- though this was not su cient; the su cient additional condition being the non-
intervention by the coercive apparatus (i.e. the National Guard not being used as
strike breakers). This is an important factor to consider for the labor movement was
subsequently incorporated into the Democratic coalition from a position of weakness.
10This was a study commissioned by Senator Joseph Ball (R-MN) of Ball-Burton-Hatch fame.
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This was resultant from of the absence of other plausible coalition partners.
The coverage of strikes did seem to grow less favorable over the course of the
1930s, but it is far from evident that the news coverage was su ciently unfavorable
to have constituted clear bias against labor. Unfavorable coverage does not imply un-
fairness, nor does it imply that public opinion was crafted by these articles. However,
the coverage certainly did not facilitate the formation of pro-strike opinion. And,
although the ’hard news’ regarding strike actions was factual, the choice was made
to focus more on the social costs of the strikes as opposed to the class conflict that is
inherent to the shop-floor. The simultaneous and nearly instantaneous retrenchment
against strikes suggests that these phenomena were governed by a shared logic. The
next chapter turns to survey data that depict the attitudes citizens held in the light
of the coverage analyzed in this chapter.
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Chapter 3
What Did the Public Think of
Strikes?
Introduction
In the previous chapter, I investigated the coverage of strikes in newspapers
across the nation and in the present chapter, I turn to surveys of the citizens that
elected anti-strike legislative majorities across the nation. What did citizens think
about strikes and would it meaningful or sound to understand them as a homogeneous
public? If citizens’ views on militance were sharply divided along class or regional
lines, then the adoption of Taft-Hartley might be an instance of class or regional dom-
ination. On the other hand, if citizens were responding to the emerging turbulence in
a similar fashion, this would be consistent with the view that the public got what it
wanted from New Deal labor law. Finally, to what extent was mass opinion in tension
with the coverage of strikes presented in the previous chapter?
It is puzzling that the public came to take a dim view of industrial organizing,
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rather than blaming capital. The public disfavor of the CIO strikes appears wrong-
headed in that most citizens had class interests more in common with the strikers
than with the owners. Interests are a treacherous topic from a normative or posi-
tive perspective. Defining an interest necessarily implies a discounted utility function
whose discount rate is impossible to demonstrate. If the rate is posited a priori, then
one has a di cult time demonstrating that observed preferences that di↵er are flatly
wrong. Nevertheless, it is equally di cult to posit that a political vehicle in American
history has achieved more gains for economic losers than organized labor. And the
power of labor over capital lies not in the fact of its organization, but in the withhold-
ing of its productive capacity. Moreover, the very process of profit-generation implies
exploitation: in order for a firm to make a profit, it must sell its goods for more than
it costs to produce them; a positive di↵erence can only arise when labor earns less
than it creates.1
The negative potency of union militance was also reflected by the media cov-
erage of strikes for ”the symbols of revolt are not drawn like musty costumes from a
cultural closet and arrayed before the public. Nor are meanings unrolled out of whole
cloth. The costumes of revolt are woven from a blend of inherited and invented fibers
into collective action frames” (Tarrow 1998, quoted in Kellstedt 2003, 83). The 1930s
strikes were evidently highly salient and, though citizens are typically disinterested in
news, they can typically be counted upon to perk up when it clearly matters to them
(Key 1965; Page and Shapiro 1994). As noted in the introduction, this dissertation
di↵ers from much of the New Deal literature not only because of its focus on the
1To point out that the capitalist had secured unpaid labor for a sold product does not mean the
same thing as to say that he has secured a profit. Elaborating beyond the above simplification would
take us beyond the scope of the present study. In future work, though, I would like to explore the
relationship between marginal profit, workplace tyranny, and political activity; it is my suspicion
that firms with narrower margins tend to be more extreme in their political rightism and tend to
visit more depredations on their workers.
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states, but also its focus on bottom-up policy change. Here we are interested in how
much the substance of citizens views were connected with newspaper content.
To buttress the rationale for studying newspapers, I examined Gallup poll re-
sponses to the question ”Do you read a daily newspaper?” In April 1937, across
regions and class, more than eighty percent of respondents a rmed that they read
a newspaper on a daily basis. In October of the same year, the same result held.
And, once again, in April of 1939, the overwhelming response was in the a rma-
tive across classes and regions. Though it is worth pointing out, that as one might
expect, the South and Sunbelt were the least-read regions by self-report. Desirabil-
ity bias raises measurement validity concerns but this result dovetails with Bartels’
(1993, 269) observation that newspaper reading ”appears to be a su ciently stable
behavior.” Furthermore, assume the contradictory position: if citizens formed views
on strikes from personal experience, then there should have been clear regional varia-
tion in opinion as the strikes were geographically concentrated. In May 1939, Gallup
asked ”Would you prefer to get national news from a daily newspaper or from the
radio?” Interestingly, there was a class and regional cleavage here wherein the upper-
class respondents preferred newspapers; and, the Midwest (West Central) and the
Mountain West expressed an equal preference for print and radio. Sadly, this poll did
not contain a question asking whether the respondent actually owned a radio because
the variation in class preference might be a result of deprivation.
Happily, in 1944, we can explore responses to the same question juxtaposed
with radio ownership. By 1944, respondents owned radios by a greater than 4:1 ratio
and at this point across class and regions, citizens preferred to get their news from
the radio broadcasts. The turn toward radio and then television coverage carries im-
plications for exposure and processing that are distinct unto themselves (Prior 2006,
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for example), but that is beyond the scope of this investigation. Some studies have
suggested that radio content significantly overlapped with newspaper coverage (Albig
1937; Anderson 1971, for example) and that the radio coverage was mostly unfavor-
able in its coverage of labor unions (Sussman 1945; Schiller 1981, for example). As
we will see, the backlash to strikes and strikers did antedate the growing preeminence
of radio.
In outlining the contours of citizen attitudes toward unions, strikes, and the
Wagner Act, I find that, contrary to expectations drawn from sectional or class in-
terest, the mass public was generally hostile to worker protest upon the formation of
the New Deal coalition. In principle, the lower-class citizens and the more urbanized
regions might have had more sympathy for unionists and strikers.
When citizens consumed news about strikes, what kind of news did they con-
sume? This is an important question because the strikers were struggling to be
understood by the mass polity. The CIO actively sought to shape interpretations
of events though speeches, radio programs, and pamphlets (Foster 1975; Fones-Wolf
1994; Charnock 2012). In surmising why citizens might have held similar opinions, we
would look at the information they shared. Moreover, since Hadley Cantril, observers
and students of politics have known citizens to make their evaluations of policy more
on a concept of the public good than their own self-interest; and to rely on elite cues
to form standards and evaluations (Eisinger 2003). Elite cues comprise much of the
substance of the news and citizens were typically exposed to a limited number of
sources. So, then, subgroup opinion, having been exposed to information in common
and sharing processing rules, would tend to move in parallel (Page and Shapiro 1992,
318-9).
In this chapter, I assemble aggregated national survey responses to items re-
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garding labor militance, particularly the sit-down and strikes during the run-up to
the Second World War. Previous studies identifying a mass backlash to the CIO have
emphasized the importance of the post-War strike wave in giving the Taft-Hartley
delegation a workable majority in both chambers of Congress (Lee, 1947 47-52; Atle-
son 1998, Chap 11, for example). In this chapter, I will identify mass opposition to
union power that antecedes the War, let alone the Truman presidency. Patterson
(1969) identified the rise of the conservative majority in the Congress as a result of
backlash to court-packing in part. I will also examine public attitudes on this.
Classic works in political science emphasize that the impact of interest groups
is directly related to the esteem in which they are generally held (Key 1964; Truman
1971). Therefore, it is necessary to outline the contours of public opinion on unions
and strikes in order to see whether the glass is ’half-empty.’ There was evidently
more tolerance for the disruptive strikes for union organization than for the strikes
to secure particularistic benefits, political clout, or programmatic gains.
Typically, political science studies of the New Deal are focused on the politi-
cians and the bureaucracy, but the mass public was a target of e↵orts at persuasion.
Political elites - particularly the president and newspaper owners - were interested in
shaping opinion within the hard bounds set by mass preferences. This task is essential
to delimiting the limits of liberalism: because the white supremacist delegation had
a veto tells us why Congress was not a potential site for improving labor’s statutory
fortunes; that senior liberals in the FDR administration were not committed to code-
termination of production tells us why the bureaucracy was not a potential site for
improving labor’s regulatory fortunes. But these obstacles were themselves held in
place by a bulwark of mass opposition to labor defiance. More subtly, this chapter
sets the stage for connecting individual-level attitudes with the legislative outcomes
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analyzed in the next chapter that interest this dissertation.
The public opinion literature that utilizes relevant polling from the period
(Verba and Schlozman 1977; Berinsky and Schickler 2006; Panagopoulos and Francia
2008; Schickler and Caughey 2011) has broadly covered this ground before, but the
aggregate stability of opinion is left unconnected to the development of the labor
relations framework. Implicit in the backlash concept is the notion that the mass
polity held unions in disfavor. This empirical question will be explored as it has been
in previous e↵orts (Bok and Dunlop 1970; Parenti 1986; Schmidt 1993; Flynn 2000;
Martin 2004; Carreiro 2005; Amenta et al. 2009, for example). Thus, this chapter is
not only interested in using this analysis to ask whether the organized labor move-
ment might have achieved a better result from the New Deal; it is interested in the
contours prevailing attitudes toward militance and the protective laws that promoted
it. In particular, this chapter is distinctive in its focus on salient strike episodes and
its emphasis on pre- and post-War continuity in mass opinion.
In studying the volume and content of news, I have been implicitly considering
opinion formation at the individual level; however, the survey data examined here are
treated as aggregates. The data are not ideal but they are better than what students
had even a decade ago and they are essential for bringing in public opinion. And
the question is not whether the data are ideal but whether we can plausibly proceed
without it. If public support for strike restrictions is not noted, then we would not
see why the Taft-Hartley restrictions were ineluctable.
Again, the exclusionary focus on labor militance as opposed to alternate eco-
nomic or social items is motivated in part by the observation that capital was satisfied
with seeing unions denuded over the course of decades in the cul-de-sac of federal la-
bor law since Taft-Hartley (Estlund 2002). More to the point, the labor relations
75
area is one of the few areas in which mass opinion moved rightward during FDR’s
tenure (Schickler and Caughey 2011, 163-4). And the stability and breadth of re-
strictive opinion helped to ensure that the labor-liberal alliance would be checked
until it could make an alliance with the civil rights demanders to take control of the
Democratic Party (Frymer 2008; Roof 2011; Baylor 2013).
In addition to being crucial in the development of the American labor relations
order, the strike waves of the New Deal period lends an opportunity to examine
conflict between broad economic groups in society. Particular attention to the sit
down wave of 1937 and the UMW (Lewis’ group and the financial core of the CIO)
disputes of 1941 will reveal that the contours of mass opinion did not hold any promise
for a more favorable legal outcome in the United States.
Theory and Motivation
The foregoing analysis has taken 1937 as the starting point for the investigation
because Wagner was ratified as legitimate in that year, which allowed the states to
play out the labor relations development alongside the federal government. Yet,
during the same year, the anti-labor coalition of Northern Republicans and Southern
Democrats began to emerge as President Roosevelt sought to pack the Supreme Court
and ’primary’ conservative Democrats (Patterson 1969). Amidst this fracturing of the
Wagner coalition, the anti-labor laws that would structure the labor relations order2
for the rest of the century into the next were adopted. The chambers that enacted
the restrictive backlash came to power in the 1938 elections, thus an account of the
backlash would be incomplete without reference to public opinion.
Though the search for class cleavages in mass opinion toward strikes is the chief
2As before, ’labor relations’ connote the shop-floor dealings of employer and employee. ’Order’
means overarching framework or legal structure.
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motivation for this chapter, regional cleavages are of interest as well. Following Bensel
(1984), I distinguish between the industrial core and periphery. In this seminal work,
Bensel argues that sectional interests were decisive over bill adoption across a variety
of economic issues, as opposed to partisanship or ideology. In the present chapter,
we might expect to see that worker protest was more acceptable to respondents in
the industrial core than to those in the periphery because core respondents might
have been more likely to identify their common cause with the strikers. Alternately,
presence in the industrial core likely exposed one to the inconvenience related to labor
stoppages, thus increasing the likelihood of opposing worker protest. At all events,
the argument that sectionalism has been the dominant factor shaping the political
economy implies substantial regional variation in opinion unless strikes were widely
understood as an injury to all. For the purposes of the regional classifications below,
we will take the South and Southwest and Mountain West regions as the periphery
while the other regions will be taken to be in the core. Though this approach does
not have the granularity of Bensel’s ’trade areas’ taxonomy, it will be su cient to
examine whether opinion was determined by the respondent’s region.
This chapter will show that there was support for strike bans as well as a
generalized opposition to militant unionism across the nation amidst muted class
cleavages. As we will see in the next chapter, the immediate upshot was Republican
seat gains in 1938, particularly in the states that adopted ’baby’ Wagner Acts. In
short, the industrial union organizing precipitated by Wagner caused a social and
political perturbation that was programatically threatening but insu ciently strong
to repel the backlash.
The term ’backlash’ implies that there existed a previous equilibrium that had
been disturbed (Pierson 2000, 85). Before the Wagner Act, would-be union militants
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had little reason to expect that statutory gains would be e↵ective in the face of judicial
opposition. The Supreme Court upholding Wagner in the face of political pressure
legitimized strike activity. Consequently, the newly legitimized industrial unions were
wedded to the Democratic Party, because it was the Democratic administrative com-
mitment to Labor Relations Boards that made the CIO growth legal. But the direct
e↵ect of CIO growth positioned the industrial unions in direct opposition to prior
members of the coalitions that enacted, or might have enacted, protective laws. And,
Gross (1981, Chapter 2) rightly emphasizes the role that public criticism of the NLRB
had in the push for Wagner emendation. The Supreme Court held, consistent with
prevailing views, that the illegal seizure of plants by strikers was ”more troublesome
than the illegal actions of employers” (Ibid, 26). And, further, though Roosevelt was
popularly connected to the Wagner Act, the president himself was skeptical of the
Board’s pro-CIO leaning (Ibid, 39-40).
There was a shift in the legitimate exercise of authority in labor relations (cf.
Orren and Skowronek 2000) as a result of Wagner. Prior to this, the dominant
pattern of labor relations was a relation of force. This substantial change in policy
seemed to contemporary observers to indicate that a fundamental social reordering
was nigh (Goldfield 1989, 1264-5; Columbia Oral History Project, Frances Perkins
Reminiscences). With the benefit of hindsight, it is easy to understate the peril that
was perceived by elites. This perceived danger forms the first empirical question of
this chapter: how class conscious might the public have been? Put another way, did
the poorer respondents identify with union resistance?
Plausibly, one might suggest that personal experience with strikes would be
su cient to form a negative opinion. For example, one’s having been deprived of
milk due to a transport sympathy strike with the dairy cooperative could well have
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turned one’s opinion against CIO organizers. However, as we will see, the strikes
were regionally concentrated and mass opinion does not show meaningful regional
variation. Moreover, though the responses show clear di↵erences in levels of opinion
by occupational class suggesting that opinion formation was a function of interests, the
parallel movement of class opinion over time is consistent with Verba and Schlozman’s
(1977, 317) conclusion that New Deal respondents lacked class-consciousness broadly -
indeed, majorities of blue-collar and unemployed respondents did not see management
and labor as being in opposition (Ibid, 308). Like that study, I find little evidence that
the unemployed or the poor were particularly desirous of robust industrial democracy,
shop floor codetermination, let alone ending capitalism.
’Switch in Time’
The court packing episode was a turning point in the history of the Wagner Act
and is deeply relevant to the present analysis. The Supreme Court had held several
New Deal measures unconstitutional, including the collective bargaining provision of
the Norris-LaGuardia Act which the Wagner Act was designed to replace. The Court
was expected to rule the Wagner Act unconstitutional as well. This episode is deeply
relevant because the President might have been seen as to have been subverting old
norms in order to reward his new friends in labor. The backlash under study here
may have been against the perceived presidential overreach rather than the industrial
union disruption.
Happily, these survey data present the opportunity to revisit the 1937 court
packing controversy. Early in 1937, FDR threatened to pack the Court in the face
of its doctrinaire constitutional reading that denied the right to withhold labor while
enjoining capital to bargain. It is important to note that interpreting public opinion
on the court packing controversy and labor issues is fraught with pitfalls as there
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was a long chain of reasoning linking the Court and the right to strike. And, the
court-packing plan was about more than the Wagner Act; it was about the power
relations between the branches.3
Though the Supreme Court had, at various points in US history, been the
target of fulminations by sitting presidents and public outrage, the court packing
moment stands out as consequential because it coincides with the beginning of the
end of New Deal liberalism. However, the proximate cause for the proposal was the
anticipated rejection of the Wagner Act after the Court had found previous elements
of the New Deal unconstitutional, particularly matters related to labor relations. It is
plausible that the key to union legislative defeat was that the Supreme Court ratified
the Wagner Act under duress. That is, FDR subsequently betrayed the militant core
of the CIO that was central to his reelection because he had spent all his ’political
capital’ protecting the Wagner Act (which he did not support openly until a few weeks
before its passage).4 Or, one might argue that mass disfavor of the union power by
which the Supreme Court was cowed also generated the electoral backlash to FDR
in the Congress and in the states that made leftward movement in New Deal policy
nigh-impossible. At all events, the Roosevelt reelection coalition included numerous
Republican supporters (Sinclair 1978; Erikson and Tedin 1981), which suggests that
the mass support for further leftward policy change was limited, particularly a shift
at the cost of long-standing US constitutional patterns.
3Perhaps it is worth considering, despite being speculative, that FDR might have been able to
enlarge the Court had he not been insistent on adding six judges. According to Altman, the Senate
was going to recess daily and limit speeches in opposition to the bill (1937, 1079). That is to say
that Roosevelt might have successfully attained Senate approval for enlarging the Court had he not
sought to emerge with such an overwhelming majority of co-partisans.
4The ’political capital’ metaphor, though often tenuous, is particularly inapt in the present
instance. What was happening during this 1933-1937 period punctuated by general strikes in popu-
lation centers and sit-down strikes across core industries constituted a direct assault on the existing
social relations, and, perhaps, the right to property altogether. (Lichtenstein 1997)
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Caldeira in his study of Gallup polls from 1938 (1987, 1149) finds that ”two
crucial events - Jones and Laughlin and Justice Van Devanter’s resignation - spelled
doom for FDR’s bill to enlarge the Court and pack it with justices favorable to the
New Deal.” That is, the acquiescence of the Court to the demand that the Wagner
Act be upheld and the stepping-down of one of the judicial opponents of the New Deal
cooled public enthusiasm for altering the Court’s structure. However, this influential
work did not present subgroup analyses, preferring to treat the issue items as a
continuous dependent variable in a linear model. Here, I am more interested in the
class and regional cleavages that theory would expect: the upper class, being aware of
the Court and its conservative role ought to have disfavored enlargement; and those
on relief who owed their presence on the rolls to Roosevelt would have tended to
support the president. Baum and Kernell (2001) find evidence that cleavages in class
approval of the Roosevelt presidency were a peacetime phenomenon that was eroded
by US entry into the Second World War.
FDR, having been a highly salient figure, obscures the interpretation of citizens
views because approval of the politician himself conditions responses on items related
to him. But the instance was a turning point in his presidency as FDR pivoted toward
foreign policy thereafter. Of course, the loss of liberal Democratic seats in the 1938
elections played a significant role of Roosevelt’s calculus. Although the Sunday New
York Times of April 3, 1938 pointed out that ”The sea and things of the sea, the
navy and its ships and men and guns are probably the outstanding passions of the
President’s life” and ”The Navy is being run from the White House these days.” It is
hard to say whether the patrician former Undersecretary of War for the Navy would
have sought to pivot even if he had packed the Court with cronies and had endless
coattails (or, at least, not reverse ones). Moreover, the attempt to ’purge’ recalcitrant
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Bourbon Democrats did actually succeed in unseating John O’Connor, the chairman
of the Rules committee in the House, and an opponent of liberal New Deal measures
(Polenberg 1968).5
Data and Method
In the following, I ask whether class and region put di↵erent groups at odds over
the legitimacy of strike actions. Though limited by available survey data, I present
subgroup opinion (see Appendix for question wordings) on salient items during 1937,
the height of the sit-down troubles. I continue to dwell on the important year of 1937,
wherein Roosevelt proposed to enlarge the Supreme Court. Then, I present opinion
responses to the union approval item form 1937 to 1943 comparing respondents by
region and by class. I turn to opinions on the Wagner Act, which was a salient issue
throughout the period; then opinions on John L. Lewis the militant labor leader; and
opinions on defense strikes during the run-up to the Second World War.
In order to assess public opinion regarding militance in 1937, I take a collection
of issue items from 1937 Gallup polls and present the subgroups comparisons by re-
gion6and class7 However, there are no items repeated across all the 1937 surveys, save
FDR approval questions. Moreover, to the extent that the items are heterogeneous,
5Though the result was the ascension of Dixiecrat Howard Smith of Virginia.
6The regions are as follows: Northeast (Maine, New Hampshire, Vermont, Massachusetts,
Rhode Island, Connecticut), Middle Atlantic (New York, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Maryland,
Delaware, West Virginia), East Central (Ohio, Michigan, Indiana, Illinois), West Central (Wis-
consin, Minnesota, Iowa, Missouri, North Dakota, South Dakota, Nebraska, Kansas), South and
Southwest (North Carolina, South Carolina, Virginia, Georgia, Alabama, Arkansas, Florida, Ken-
tucky, Louisiana, Mississippi, Oklahoma, Tennessee, Texas), Mountain West (Montana, Arizona,
Colorado, Idaho, Wyoming, Utah, Nevada, New Mexico), and Pacific Coast (California, Oregon,
Washington).
7The classes were Average-plus (Upper), Average (Middle), Poor and Poor-plus (Lower), and
those receiving emergency aid (Relief). The Gallup interviewer scored the respondent as belonging
to the economic classes having screened for those reporting having received relief spending. Though
this is seemingly a recipe for coder bias problems, the recorded scale correlated with reported income
at .74 (Baum and Kernell 2001, 205).
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this serves to bolster the claim that regionalism was subsumed into a broader opinion
climate that was itself mediated.
Despite their distinctiveness, the items address the substance of the CIO threat
directly. The personality of the leader John L. Lewis was salient because he was
famous for his militance and the Mine Workers provided the bulk of the CIO’s op-
erating budget (Foster 1975) and the sit-down questions bear on the current study
directly. The key point here is that the class cleavages in the mass public, then as
now, were not su cient to inspire counter publics. Workers qua citizens did not favor
radical leftist programs, and proved receptive to messages that constructed unions as
negative forces.
Though it may seem curious not to dwell on the union approval series, this
ground is covered well by Schickler and collaborators in previous e↵orts. What these
studies do not emphasize - and what we touched upon in the previous chapter - is
that the dips in union approval from their all-time highs in 1940 and 1954 (Gallup
2011) were precipitated by racketeering scandals in AFL unions. And indeed, even
Robert Taft might have answered the union approval question in the a rmative at
various points throughout the New Deal; what was critical was the widespread view
that union militance was excessive.
Analysis
The union approval opinion response did not vary systematically by region,
as shown in Figures 3.1 to 3.3. The regions moved roughly in tandem over time. In
Figure 3.1, the Northeast, Mid-Atlantic, and Pacific Coast regions are plotted against












































































Figure 3.1: Union Approval, Northeast, Mid-Atlantic, Pacific
industrial core. The Northeast moved in tandem with the rest of the nation, though
these states did typically approve of unions at a higher rate than average. Even at
the troughs of support, a majority of the public expressed a favorable view of unions;
and notably, these troughs are found in the strike-heavy years of 1937 and 1941.
No less than 60 percent of the public expressed a favorable view of unions in this
region, or the nation generally. The Mid-Atlantic region, which has the highest level
of union support, consistent with those states being in the heart of the industrial core;
however, the region does move in tandem with the other regions. Absolute levels of
union support were typically greater than 70 percent and not below 65 percent in
any survey. Perhaps unsurprisingly, the Pacific Coast (Figure 1), with strong left-
wing contingents in their shipyard unions, contained the most favorable response to












































































Figure 3.2: Union Approval, East Central, West Central
The East Central region, as depicted in Figure 3.2 closely tracked the national
average response. However, the West Central region consistently approved of unions
at a below-average rate. I juxtapose these regional trends because these states were
in the industrial core, but were marked by higher levels of agricultural production.
Also in this figure, we observe parallelism in the direction of opinion change in each
survey but this region tends to disapprove of unions more than average. Both regions
maintain 65 percent approval at the lowest survey readings, though they average 74
and 72 percent respectively.
Figure 3.3 depicts the response for the South and Southwest alongside the
Mountain West; unsurprisingly, these periphery regions had the only net negative
response to the union approval question during the captive mines dispute in 1941
wherein the South reported a 47 percent approval rating of unions. On average,











































































Figure 3.3: Union Approval, South and Southwest, Mountain West
this region were distinctive, not only in terms of Jim Crow laws but also in terms of
military siting, the responses change in a parallel fashion. The Mountain West whose
response closely tracked the national average, with levels of approval not going lower
than 65 percent.
Consistent with the present day, the South and Southwest region consistently
reported the lowest relative approval of labor unions while the Northeast was generally
the most favorably disposed. Notably, while the South declined in union approval
during the captive mines dispute, the Mountain West did not. Within each item, there
is consistent homogeneity across regions. Also, none of the regions are consistently
outlier subsamples. The patterning suggests that regionalism did not have a strong
e↵ect on opinion related to union approval. In terms of temporal di↵erences, there
was a generalized dip in union approval in 1938, preceding the electoral backlash to
FDR.
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Each region is positively correlated with every other region on union approval.
The Mountain West was the most distinctive region with respect to union approval
compared to the other regions. The Mountain West was most weakly correlated with
the Northeast and the Mid-Atlantic, consistent with the argument that states in the
core and periphery would express di↵erent attitudes. The public in Utah displayed
weaker support for unions than in the Northeast, yet the Utah law remained intact.
However, the overall level of union approval in this region closely tracked the national
average. And, moreover, unions enjoyed a net positive approval rating in each survey











































































Figure 3.4: Union Approval, Upper and Middle Class
Figures 3.4 and 3.5 depict the class sub-samples for the same union approval
items. In Figure 4, the responses from upper-class respondents are juxtaposed with











































































Figure 3.5: Union Approval, Lower Class and Unemployed
dictably, were more likely to disfavor unions. Nonetheless, upper-class respondents
did express a net favorable opinion of unions across surveys with no survey reading
showing a lower than 55 percent approval. Here, though, the expectation of opinion
parallelism breaks down somewhat as the subsample opinion moves in opposite di-
rections to the national average, increasing during an overall decrease and vice-versa.
Though the middle-class respondents typically disapproved of labor unions more than
the national average, the change in survey responses moved in parallel with the na-
tional average. As before the troughs are in 1937 and 1941, but the readings are all
above 65 percent. These results do not suggest a class cleavage in union approval
response.
Likewise in Figure 3.5, the lower-class respondents moved in parallel with the
national average though approving of unions at level slightly higher than the national
average. Here the approval levels were not less than 65 percent. In this figure we see
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that the respondents on the relief rolls approved of unions more than the national
average in most surveys and the subgroup opinion mostly moved in parallel with
the national average (r=.88). And, importantly, the poorest respondents expressed
a lower level of approval than the upper class respondents (r=.27) in 1937 and 1941.
While the unemployed respondents - the ones on relief - typically had the highest
approval of unions and the respondents coded as upper class held unions in the lowest
relative regard, this condition did not hold across all surveys, thus militating against
there having been a class cleavage in opinion. However, the general trend over the
1937 to 1944 period was downward. And, again, the distinct publics move in parallel
rather than in a fashion that is suggestive of class cleavage. Though citizens typically
lost regard for unions, they do not tend to view them in an unfavorable fashion. It
should also be noted that the union approval time series is at its lowest point prior to
2009 in 1941 (Gallup 2014). The upper-class respondents had the weakest correlation
with the average response among the class groups, while the other groups were close
together in approval levels. Importantly, though, the correlation was weakest between
the upper and lower-class, as opposed to with those on the welfare rolls. But even
the upper-class respondents did not report net disfavor in any survey. The key story
with union approval here is that though the overall levels of approval are high, the
trend throughout the critical early post-Wagner period was downward.
Figures 3.6 to 3.8 show the responses to the John L. Lewis survey items by
regional subsample. In Figure 3.6, the Northeast (r=.85), Mid-Atlantic (r=.66), and
Pacific Coast (r=.71) regions all closely tracked the national average and are generally
declining over time. Though, consistent with being in CIO strongholds, these regions
were consistently above the national average. And the Pacific Coast region, is likewise



































































Figure 3.6: John L. Lewis Approval, Northeast, Mid-Atlantic, Pacific
site of radical worker protest. Figure 3.7 depicts the East Central and West Central
regions, which also shows graphical evidence of parallelism.
Figure 3.8, depicting the South and Southwest(r=.49) and the Mountain West
also evidences parallelism, though this region expresses the lowest levels of Lewis
approval, as both regions expressed below-average Lewis approval. The average levels
of approval move from net favorable to deeply net unfavorable over the six years of
survey items. The national average was net 2 favorable in early 1937 and fell to
negative 80 percent after the captive mines dispute. Indeed, every region at the nadir
of Lewis approval during the captive mines dispute was below 20 percent.
Figures 3.9 through 3.10 depict the Lewis approval responses by class. Pre-
dictably, in Figure 3.9 we observe that the upper-class respondents were markedly


































































Figure 3.7: John L. Lewis Approval, East Central, West Central
with the national average (r=-.43). Also in Figure 3.9, we see that the responses
for the middle-class, whose opinion was close to the national average within and
across surveys. In Figure 10, the lower-class respondents, constituted a parallel pub-
lic as well, though, predictably, they supported Lewis more than the national average.
Likewise, the responses by those on relief, who typically supported Lewis above the
national average. However, importantly, this group which had the most to gain from
Lewis’ opposition to the political relations between the classes, converged toward the
generally high disapproval of Lewis by the run-up to the Second World War in light
of the ’captive mines’ dispute, which we treated in the previous chapter.
In general, the items specific to John L. Lewis showed a clear overall trend
toward increasing disapproval of the militant labor leader. Across regions and classes
the trend was identical. This is in keeping with the narrative of his increasing es-


































































Figure 3.8: John L. Lewis Approval, South and Southwest, Mountain West
as a marginal figure as a result of his break with Hillman and Murray (Lichtenstein
1982; Zieger 1995); but the evident threat his vision posed to the incumbent Demo-
cratic Party suggests that views on Lewis implied views on the legitimacy of the ruling
coalition.8 Importantly, John L. Lewis approval began to plummet in 1937 leading
into the turning-point elections of 1938.
Regional averages in support of Lewis were mostly positively correlated, though
significantly less so than in the case of overall union approval. Notably, the West
Central region, containing Wisconsin, had negative correlation with the Northeast,
Mid-Atlantic, and Pacific regions. This highly agricultural region was opposed to
Lewis during the captive mines dispute and his subsequent move to organize dairy
workers.
8Also, we should note that Lewis’ notoriety ought not be conflated with leftism; indeed, he was



















































































Figure 3.9: John L. Lewis Approval, Upper and Middle Class
However, there was substantial divergence in class opinion on Lewis. The upper-
and middle-class respondents substantially diverged from the lower-class and unem-
ployed. Upper-class responses were not at all correlated with the other groups, sug-
gesting that the disruptive threat posed by Lewis was clearly recognized by those
who had the most to lose. Though every class displayed a negative net favorable
rating of John L. Lewis, the poorer respondents had a higher peak from which to
fall. But these di↵erences are fairly muted: upper-class respondents expressed a net
negative 94 percent approval, while respondents on relief expressed a net negative 78
percent.
In 1941, the identical question was put 6 times over the course of the year:
”Should the Government forbid strikes in industries manufacturing materials for our
national defense program, or should the workers in those industries continue to have



















































































Figure 3.10: John L. Lewis Approval, Lower Class and Unemployed
strikes in the Northeast, Mid-Atlantic, and Pacific Coast regions plotted alongside the
national average. The Northeast region moved in tandem with the national average
but this industrial core region supported such a measure at a markedly lower rate.
The Mid-Atlantic subset tells a similar story. Likewise, the Pacific states was more
muted in their support for a wartime strike ban.
The East Central region (Figure 3.12) which closely tracked the national aver-
age. The West Central trend shows that this region tended to support the strike ban
above the national average and this region supported it at an increased level when
the national average declined.
Figure 3.13 depicts the South and Southwest where support for strike bans was
consistently elevated above the national average, though this region moved in parallel
















































Figure 3.11: Strike Ban Approval, Northeast, Mid-Atlantic, Pacific
the national average though less so than the South and Southwest. No less than 65
percent of the public in any region expressed support for an outright ban on strikes
in defense industries. It is, furthermore important to note that any large industry
could have been easily construed as defense-related.
Figure 3.14 shows the upper-class respondents’ support for defense strike bans
which moved in tandem with the national average, though, unsurprisingly was above
it. The responses for the middle-class tracked the national average closely. Unsurpris-
ingly, the lower-class were more likely to oppose a ban on defense strikes, though a
decisive majority of those respondents favored one as shown in Figure 3.15, which also
reveals that the respondents on the relief rolls were the least likely to support such a
measure, though this group opinion moved in tandem with the national average















































Figure 3.12: Strike Ban Approval, East Central, West Central
the Northeast was negatively correlated with most other regions. However, the aver-
age level of support was above 60 percent in all regions. In terms of class di↵erences,
the unemployed were in opposition to the upper class, but otherwise the classes were
positively correlated. These di↵erences are small in percentage point terms, as each
class favored a defense strike ban by more than 70 percent in each survey. Here we
can see that those who were received public benefits were the least likely to support
a ban on defense strikes; the reserve army of the unemployed was the least likely to
countenance strike bans in support of the war e↵ort.
All regions were in favor of there being a measure adopted to forbid strikes
in defense industries. But the South and Southwest region - the Deep South and
Sunbelt - consistently reported the greatest willingness to see a law forbidding strikes
altogether. This is in keeping with the fact that this region would be the home















































Figure 3.13: Strike Ban Approval, South and Southwest, Mountain West
consistent with the expectation that the a✏uent would favor more repressive laws but
crucially about three-quarters the poor and unemployed supported such a provision
in the months preceding the attack on Pearl Harbor. It should be noted that for all
the publicity attending the defense strikes in the early 1940s, there was actually less
militance in 1941 than in any of the preceding ten years. Moreover, average levels of
strike volume varied greatly across the regions, in contrast to the general homogeneity
of opinion, as all groups opposed defense industry strikes at a high level.
The questions on the Wagner Act vary slightly in wording but prompt the
respondent to identify as someone who would leave the Wagner Act unchanged or
not. Since the law was evidently a tool for disruptive organizing and a casus belli
for sit-down strikes, opinion on the law reflected sentiment about organized labor
as a powerful force. Labor organizing under the law was the result of the Wagner















































Figure 3.14: Strike Ban Approval, Upper and Middle Class
opposition to industrial unionism.
Figure 3.16 shows the level of support for leaving the Wagner Act unchanged in
the Northeast, Mid-Atlantic, and Pacific Coast regions plotted alongside the national
average. These regional opinion moved in tandem with the rest of the country; though,
unsurprisingly, the NLRA was more popular in these core states than the rest of the
country. Unlike the survey items examined above, the Pacific Coast did not support
the pro-CIO response at an elevated level.
In Figure 3.17, we observe a similar pattern within the East Central region as
well as in the West Central region. Perhaps surprisingly, in Figure 18, the South
and Southwest did not markedly di↵er from the national average within and across
surveys; likewise, in Figure 39 the Mountain West tracks the national average.















































Figure 3.15: Strike Ban Approval, Lower Class and Unemployed
changed, aside from an outlier reading in the Northeast. Though a majority of citizens
did approve of unions generally, there was never a great deal of popular support for
the law that had legitimized labor militance. Unhappily, though, these surveys began
after the 1937 strikes, so there is no pre-Jones and Laughlin baseline for comparison.
Nonetheless, it would be correct to state that there did not exist a solid pro-Wagner
issue public that over time would have constituted a majority in any region.
Figures 3.19 and 3.20 depict the level of support for leaving the Wagner Act
unchanged by class. Predictably, as shown in Figure 19 the upper-class respondents
were less likely than average to oppose amending the Wagner Act. The middle-class,
being the largest group in these surveys, tracks the national average closely. The
lower-class respondents, as depicted in Figure 3.20, were likelier to support theWagner
Act than average, though, importantly, those survey measures move in parallel with






























































Figure 3.16: Wagner Act Approval, Northeast, Mid-Atlantic, Pacific
Figure 3.20, we observe that those on the relief rolls were overwhelmingly more likely
to support the Wagner Act; however, even this public moves in a parallel fashion.
Nonetheless, there is some evidence of class cleavage on the Wagner Act, indeed as
the NLRB carried on its work through the 1930s, the lower class and unemployed
respondents formed a majority in support of the law. However, as Gross (1974; 1981)
explains, the Board was changed in a more anti-CIO direction after 1938, so the
machinery of the Wagner Act was changed over the course of the surveys during the
late 1930s.
Regional opinion toward the Wagner Act was largely correlated as all but one
regional correlation was negative. Unsurprisingly, this was the South and Southwest
region, which found the Wagner rights especially destabilizing. Contrary to the sur-
veys examined above, the upper-class respondents and the lower-class respondents





























































Figure 3.17: Wagner Act Approval, East Central, West Central
were the most weakly correlated with the national average among the class groups.
However, over the course of 1939, support for leaving the Wagner Act unchanged
declined and then rose at the end of the year: 54 percent of respondents would have
left the Wagner Act unamended in February 1939, falling to 34 percent in Novem-
ber that year. The public disfavor toward the Wagner Act coincides with the Smith
Committee hearings regarding charges of unfair application of the Wagner Act by
the National Labor Relations Board. The Smith Committee recommendations drew
union-hampering provisions from the Wisconsin and Pennsylvania 1939 ’Labor Peace’
Acts (Gross 1981, Chapter 4).
On a regional basis there was clear evidence of subgroup parallelism. Unsur-
prisingly, the Northeast held the Wagner Act in the highest esteem while the South
and Mountain West were the least amenable to keeping the law on the books un-


























































South and Southwest 
Mountain West 
Total 
Figure 3.18: Wagner Act Approval, South and Southwest, Mountain West
to Wagner emendation. What is more, the lower status and the unemployed respon-
dents did move in tandem with the other groups. That the unemployed would have
pro-Wagner opinion does not follow unless it is assumed that unions were class ve-
hicles.9 Predictably, the highest status respondents were the least inclined to leave
the law unchanged. For the most part, before the second World War, the public was
already quite open to the idea of amending the Wagner Act and this viewpoint was
not limited to the owners of capital and the managerial class. The strike-hampering
provisions that characterize the present legal regime were adopted by governments
that were in line with mass preference in policy.
Though Roosevelt was lukewarm on the Wagner Act, it came to be a central
legislative achievement, since the unions it legitimated were evidently a major com-





















































































Figure 3.19: Wagner Act Approval, Upper and Middle Class
ponent of his landslide reelection; further, the Wagner Act would be the proximate
cause for the court-packing scheme, as the Court was evidently inclined to strike
down the Wagner Act. For this reason, I graph approval of FDR against support for
leaving the Wagner Act unchanged. In this respect, I am asking whether those who
supported the president would have tended to prefer leaving the law he championed
unchanged. Though the public on average expressed 33 percent support for leaving
Wagner unchanged while those who approved of FDR were 45 percent in favor of
leaving the Wagner law unchanged. But here, as shown in Figure 21, the pro-FDR
opinion converged toward the view that Wagner should be amended. And, after the
1938 elections, the president would move to sta↵ the National Labor Relations Board
with members more inimical to the CIO (Gross 1974, Chapter 4).
In 1937, public opinion on the Court packing episode is measured by responses





























































Figure 3.20: Wagner Act Approval, Lower Class and Unemployed
Court? The subsample responses are reported in Figures 3.22 to 3.24. The regional
subgroups reveal an interesting pattern in that the Pacific Northwest (Figure 3.22)
and the South (Figure 3.24) were the most supportive of enlarging the Court though
all groups converged on the mean by mid-1937. Overall, the public expressed 48
percent support on average for the court-packing scheme, though this was a 52 percent
average before Jones and Laughlin and 44 percent thereafter. The South responded
with the greatest inclination to enlarge the Supreme Court; this is odd in light of
the region’s typical conservatism. On a class basis, the lower class (Figure 3.26)
moved closer toward the average that believed Article 3 of the Constitution should be
left intact, declining from a 75 percent average before the Court reversed tack to 68
percent afterward. Thus, when the constitutional system came under frontal assault
from a perceived class agent - or at least a broad reformer - the mass public favored
































































Figure 3.21: Wagner Act Approval, by FDR approval
of these same Gallup polls, as the Court moderated its position, the mass public that
supported the president lost its appetite for Court expansion. However, as Figures
3.25 and 3.26 show, the upper-class respondents were consistently below the national
average in their approval of the court-packing scheme while those on relief were more
likely to support enlarging the Court than average. Nonetheless, these two groups
moved in tandem with the national average.
The states in New England were negatively correlated with the other regions.
And, indeed, the New England states were opposed to the enlargement plan in each
survey, in contrast to the rest of the nation, which tended to favor the plan before the
Supreme Court upheld Wagner. Most regions averaged around 50 percent support
for Court-packing while the Northeast averaged 39 percent.






















Figure 3.22: Court-packing Approval, Northeast, Mid-Atlantic, Pacific
of opinion change. The regional and class subgroups tended to change about the
same amount between survey readings on leaving the Wagner Act unchanged. A
consistent outlier, however, was the Mountain West, which is attributable to some
combination of measurement error and social polarization arising from strikes in ex-
tractive industries. The unemployed were the most unstable in variation between
measures. A similar story applies to the defense strike items. Again, the Moun-
tain West was the had the greatest variation between poll readings but the classes
were more stable. Variation among the union approval and John L. Lewis data re-
veal an interesting pattern where the upper class was the most unstable, but this is
attributable to rapid increases in disapproval toward unions and their increasingly
expansive demands.
Taken together, with respect to the union approval and labor militance items,





















Figure 3.23: Court-packing Approval, East Central, West Central
order, there was often not clear di↵erentiation between the lower classes and the rest.
Any overall coherence in opinion patterns applies to the super aggregated opinion
as well as any group therein.10 The opinion data presented above reflects a mass
public that was largely in sync in terms of levels of support or disfavor toward unions
although some class and regional di↵erences existed. The mass public tended to
disfavor the sit-down method and it tended to hold strikes against the war e↵ort -
even before the war began - in low regard. Indeed, in 1937, in two Gallup polls,
the public favored the adoption of a ban on sit-down strikes at a 60 percent level.
However, the respondents on the relief rolls were evenly split. This is in keeping
with Page, Shapiro and Dempsey’s (1987, 37) observation that the mass public looks
askance on militant protest. This data historicize that result further. But this raises
10It is worth noting that the classes retain their order within each region. The interaction between
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Figure 3.24: Court-packing Approval, South and Southwest, Mountain West
the question of what explains why, say, militant protest against the Vietnam War
succeeded where militant sit-downs in the 1930s failed? In part, the news media was
increasingly friendly to protests as the war wore on (Zaller 1992) - which raises a
question as to why the media moved in one case and not the other. The previous
chapter suggests that editors were more implacably opposed to labor militance than
literal militance.
Substantively, the mass public was in favor of laws that would greatly cir-
cumscribe strikes prior to the beginning of the War, and that the run-up to it only
hardened those views. Furthermore, the public had little regard or sympathy for the
militant union leader, John L. Lewis. This was likely more due to Lewis’ defiance of
the government than of capital. Indeed, it was public favor toward the president that





















Figure 3.25: Court-packing Approval, Upper and Middle Class
The direct causal link between media and opinion is untestable directly given
the sparseness of the opinion data. Were the time-series fuller, then lagged variables
would lend inferential leverage. However, it is implausible to assert that there was
no connection between the homogeneous coverage of strikes and the homogeneity of
national opinion. Moreover, the correlation coe cients presented below show a weak
relationship between opinion at year t and opinion at year t+ 1 during the 1930s. In
Figure 3.27, the union approval time series is juxtaposed with the volume of strike or
CIO coverage, an inverse relationship is apparent (r=-.03 and r=-.24, respectively).
As coverage increases, negative sentiment toward unions seems to increase as well.
Though not dispositive, this is suggestive and consistent with the argument laid out
in this chapter. The Lewis time series is much shorter, not even the entire Wagner to
Taft-Hartley period, but the same pattern is apparent: the increased focus on Lewis





















Figure 3.26: Court-packing Approval, Lower Class and Unemployed
This is not surprising in light of his well-known opposition to defense mobilization
(Lichtenstein 1998, 45-8). Furthermore, when the count on strikes and CIO articles is
compared with the strike volume measure, a fair connection is evident. Coverage was
tracking the amount of industrial disputes closely on an annual basis. The relative
salience of strikes was not stoked by editorial decisions. Had editors wanted to expose
readers to strike news, then the volume of coverage would have been less sensitive to
the volume of strikes.
Because mass opinion was never clearly on the side of the radical workers - and,
indeed, tended against them - elites never had to take seriously the claims of left-
leaning workers. This, combined with capitalist structural power, served to ensure
that a quick retrenchment of strike laws was a nigh-foregone conclusion. The backlash
was partially ensured by citizens hostile to working-class militance and indi↵erent


























































Figure 3.27: Strike Coverage and Union Approval
correspondence to President Roosevelt drawn from their work: ”Most of us would
not accept public gratuities - they are the gift of providence to the profligate and
lazy and foolish for the greater part, though to be sure, all these have votes, and
no doubt in excess of the hard workers and self-respecters” (Ibid, 18). ”You pamper
poverty and throttle thrift. [...] Your administration has coddled those whom it
was politically expedient to conciliate and imposed upon those who, like myself are
politically unorganized although we probably pay more taxes in the aggregate and
have a greater stake in the country than any other class” (Ibid 20-1). ”The middle
classes have su↵ered a great deal [...] What has the government done to help this
class? They do not belong to a union, so nothing has been done but to raise their
taxes” (Ibid, 25). ”The fall of prices took away our farm and savings. In spite of
this, we have managed to send eight of our children through high school [...] We
and our children, trying to keep from relief, are taxed 3 cents on every dollar to
keep these people who have all the things we cannot have and when I complained
to the authorities, they said, why you haven’t been refused relief have you? All of
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our children work and not through luck. But if they have to give us everything they
are being penalized for being industrious and are paying two sets of relief taxes -
one for us and one for the neighbors who rest while the children work. We object
to having relievers trying to put us on relief” (Ibid, 26-7). ”As it is carried on, [the
relief program] is making paupers faster than any method ever devised [...] The relief
families are sure learning fast how to work the racket and live better than the average
farmer” (Ibid, 26). This correspondence to the White House from ordinary people
who were often skeptical of government assistance exemplified why anti-strike laws
more likely to be supported than opposed.
What, in the end, seems to have doomed working class radicalism in the United
States is the lack of class consciousness on the part of its citizens. A deeper analysis
might have been possible were researchers able to supplement the survey responses
with just a bit more information about the respondents - vote choice, for example
- a more comprehensive analysis would be possible. However, in terms of providing
relief or allowing for legitimate worker protest, there seems to have been little e↵ect
from class consciousness. People who might have seen themselves as being deprived
of the value they had created instead seem to have blamed their lot on themselves or
Providence, being mystified by capitalism.
The meaning and content of strikes changed over the course of the New Deal.
Sit-down strikes became defense strikes which became Reconversion strikes. The
strikes were varied in their ends and sit-down strikes in defiance of statutes became
less common over time (Lichtenstein 2013, Chapter 2). What unified the strikes, im-
portantly, was that the strikes were costly to production. The initial wave of sit-down
strikes were aimed at recognition while the defense strikes were toward multiple and
di↵use ends while the reconversion strikes - which are typically viewed as a proximate
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cause for the adoption of Taft-Hartley - were attempts at forging workplace citizen-
ship (see Lambert 2005, Chapter 5 for a discussion of UAW- and CIO-led proposals).
Likewise, temporal variation in opinion regarding strikes was not substantial and was
generally negative. Nonetheless, the citizens’ divide between work and private life is
bounded by a constellation of psychological factors that are historically constructed
and attenuate the e↵ect of class on citizens’ worldview (Katznelson 1981, 6).
This analysis is consistent with the Schickler and Caughey (2011, 186) conclu-
sion that while ”public views on labor unions in general were consistently favorable,
attitudes toward pro-union policies, aggressive labor tactics, and militant labor lead-
ers were highly negative.” However, in contrast to that work where the authors looked
more closely at the 1940s, here this conclusion is shown to be applicable to the US
prior to Pearl Harbor and, indeed, prior to the 1938 elections. By turning the focus
onto the critical year of 1937-8, we get snapshots of the contours of mass opinion,
which played heavily into the considerations of elites (Brinkley 1995; Eisinger and
Brown 1998). Since the mass public and elites were comfortable with the existence of
unions while disfavoring the militance directed toward programmatic ends, retrench-
ment was an unavoidable result.
As Page and Shapiro (1992, 287-8) point out, ”public opinion may change in a
uniform fashion across the whole population, if the national media transmit similar
information to all groups and the receive and process it in similar ways. This is
especially likely to be true to the extent that di↵erent groups have similar interest or
think in terms of public good and the collective, or national interest.” The collective
interest is not a given; it is constructed in large part by elites. An important, though
soon to be supplanted, medium for the transmission of pro-capital messages were
newspapers. Elites sought to shape opinion and industrial unionists were hard done
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by it. And, as Fones-Wolf (2000) points out, the CIO unions were aware of the
media slant against them and recognized it as an obstacle to organizing and coalition
formation.
Bearing the state cases in mind, it is worth emphasizing that the regional dif-
ferences in opinion were relatively muted across surveys, each region was typically
positively correlated with all other regions. Despite the distinctiveness of the local
editors, the overall patterns of approval were consistent. Therefore, citizens in dif-
ferent states and regions cannot be said to have been marked by significant opinion
cleavages. And, at the state level, the governing parties in New York and Wisconsin
made similar moves. The Wisconsin state Republican Party in 1935 ”pledged the
worker the right to singly, or collectively bargain for working conditions and wages,
either as an individual or through a representative of an organization of his own
choosing,” but in 1937, the GOP ”pledged to defend the right of labor to organize
and bargain collectively” (Blue Book 1935, 487; Blue Book 1937, 282). The New York
Democrats expanded their definitions of unfair labor practices under the protective
regime to include the unfair practices of labor unions (Red Book 1939, 146). In Utah,
the recognition of collective bargaining was dependent, in part, with the assent of the
Mormon leadership, in light of the perceived communist threat posed by mine worker
organizers in competition with Lewis’ outfit (Powell 1977, 98-100). Utah, though,
had a labor board that was far less busy than its counterparts in New York and Wis-
consin, handling less than ten percent of the caseload of the other two states (Cohen
1948, 11). In other words, despite the fact that strikes were di↵erentially disruptive
across political units, the attitudes toward them were similar.
The above presentation of regional sub-groups strongly suggest that the states
that adopted Wagner-style laws were not marked by notable divergence in opinion
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toward unions or strikers. The various regions moved in tandem and had similar
levels of approval across survey items. The absence of state-level opinion data is
lamentable, but it does not undermine the conclusion that regional parallelism was
the rule with regard to worker protest before, during, and after the Second World
War. Indeed, it would be fairly unlikely that the states of New York, Wisconsin, and
Utah were all substantial outliers from their neighbors. Likewise, though there were
di↵erences in levels of approval by class, there was no divergent movement between
the classes; that is, the sub-groups moved in tandem even though those on relief and
the upper-class were distinct. The absence of contrary sub-group dynamics evidences
the lack of class consciousness at the height of labor’s protest power.
Conclusion
In the first chapter, I noted that the same militance that won statutory gains
for labor was the same militance that ensured statutory losses. In this chapter and
the previous one, I asked whether that same militance had di↵erent results because
of media presentation of strikes. Perhaps, though, there exists a reason for a sub-
stantial change in public opinion and voting behavior in the changing nature of strike
grievances. The strikes that won the Wagner Act were strikes for recognition whereas
the strikes that followed were strikes in furtherance of union wage and benefit de-
mands, or in sympathy with strikes of that nature. Therefore, the mass public cannot
be said to have been manipulated. In broad strokes, the policy outcomes people got
were in line with the policy outcomes they received.
It would have been doubly tragic if the inability of the press to realize its
democratic ideal was instrumental to the reversal of industrial democracy. This was
not the case. Though the newspapers did emphasize the social costs of strikes without
contextualizing of the worker grievances, the mass public cannot be said to have held
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the opinion that the labor policy should have been more to the left. And, indeed, there
is clear evidence that citizens did not wish to tolerate the industrial action workers
had to take in order to maintain bargaining strength against employers.
The backlash against unions played out in the press though the mass public
was clearly disposed toward taking the view that strikes to ensure union bargaining
power were not worth the social cost. And, as we shall see in the next chapter, the
strikes that prevented militant unions from garnering public sympathy were strikes
that prevented labor from being part of a winning legislative coalition. The labor
stoppages deprived consumers of desired goods while antagonizing essential legislative
partners.
Citizens evidently had a limited respect for unions. Though happy to see unions
exist, the mass public did not support radical militance nor did they support strikes
in conflict with the war e↵ort, prior to Pearl Harbor. Furthermore, the public did
not support the Roosevelt presidency to the extent that lack of resolve on the part
of FDR can be blamed for the delegitimizing of worker resistance. On the contrary,
citizens supported FDR’s court packing until the Court agreed to uphold the collective
bargaining law - note the decline in support across all groups after the April 12, 1937
’switch in time.’
The mass public accepted that unions should exist but generally had little
patience for labor militance. In light of this, the failure of congressional conservatives
to enact more repressive retrenchment programs can be viewed as a victory of sorts
for the labor movement. Indeed, this dissertation has wrestled with the question of
whether to treat the development of American labor relations as a glass that is half-
full or half-empty. However, an interpretation that laments the missed opportunities
of the New Deal is undermined with reference to the contours of mass opinion. We
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are getting close to definitively ruling out the ’half-empty’ perspective. In the next
chapter, we will do so.
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Chapter 4
State-level Origins of Anti-Strike
Laws
Introduction
The introductory chapter presented the states as usable sites for comparative
investigation during the Wagner to Taft-Hartley interlude. The succeeding two chap-
ters framed the information environment and opinion patterns in which the states
were situated. The citizens were found to be generally opposed to strikes and to
have been presented newspaper articles that were generally unfavorable to strikes
and strikers. Given that the various states shared a common discourse that was
unfavorable to radical worker protest, in this chapter I ask, why did states adopt
anti-strike laws? Further, why did states that adopted Wagner copycats adopt re-
trenching amendments in short order? This chapter will use a series of regressions to
address the first question and reference to our key state cases to address the second;
in both elements, the variable of interest is whether a state adopted an anti-strike
law in a given year.
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Recalling the introduction, this chapter assumes that the states are su ciently
similar to invite comparison. The analysis in this chapter also assumes that the pol-
itics within the states is su ciently similar with the federal government to invite
comparison. From an inferential perspective, broader comparison enables broader
generalization about the logics governing politics. These assumptions are not partic-
ularly heroic because strikes lay bare much of the political struggle that organized
politics seeks to sublimate.
Implicit in the preceding analysis is the assumption that the object of political
contestation in the various political units is the opinion of the mass public. That is,
the struggle for chamber majorities and friendly Labor Boards called for the mar-
shaling of favorable opinions. And, from the late 1930s into the WWII period, public
opinion turned against unions and this fact did not escape the notice of labor (Foster
1975, Chapters 1-2) or capital (Fones-Wolf 1994, Chapter 2).
The questions this chapter addresses also bear on the counterfactual wherein
Wagner is left untouched. In particular, the cases exemplify anti-union political
dynamics and suggest why alternative pro-union paths were occluded. In order for
the unionists to have defended their early-Wagner strike rights, the labor movement
would have had to organize and strike in a fashion that was costly to owners without
spillover costs being absorbed by potential coalition partners. In practice, chief among
these partners was farmers, who were quick to turn against the CIO. The potential
for alternate coalition partners was dim at the time - quite rightly, the CIO sought
to form an alliance with the NAACP in the following decade (cf. Baylor 2013). But,
the third party option was evidently precluded in the 1930s, in light of the experience
of the states.
The logic that produced the speedy retrenchment against organized labor evi-
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dently applied to states that adopted Taft-Hartley precursor laws as well as the nation
as a whole. Most important among these provisions were those pertaining to strikes
because those laws served to turn the coercive apparatus against disruptive worker
resistance. To begin, I aggregate the restrictive laws adopted by states pertaining
to strikes that were subsequently in the Taft-Hartley law. In the remainder of this
chapter, I will investigate the cases of several states that adopted protective laws
after Wagner was upheld in order to draw out the logic of the previous chapters and
to address the question of why the disruptive militance of the New Deal period was
double-edged.
The cases will treat three of the five states that adopted protective laws mod-
eled after the Wagner Act: New York, Massachusetts, Pennsylvania, Wisconsin, and
Utah. I leave Massachusetts o↵ to the side because its protective law provided for
mediation but not for a Labor Board; therefore the state administrative apparatus
was not tightly coupled with the militant industrial unions as in the other cases.
The other four laws established a Board with adjudicatory powers regarding labor
disputes. The Pennsylvania case will be referenced but is not a central focus because
the labor stoppages in that state were marked by protracted and bloody showdowns
(Lichtenstein 2012; Davin 2000). That is, the disruption in Pennsylvania, particu-
larly in the ’little steel’ conflicts, manifested the kind of violent class opposition that
democratic politics is meant to sublimate. The remaining three states vary over the
outcome of interest but are su ciently similar as to warrant comparison. And, we
shall see that the seeming ’odd duck’ of Utah serves to elucidate the logic as an
exceptions which proves the rule of disruption-backlash retrenchment.
The New Deal period was crucial in the development of the American state.
And the expansion of the labor relations bureaucracy was one of the defining fea-
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tures of the New Deal program. The statutory changes in Norris-LaGuardia (the
anti-injunction Act) and Wagner (the National Labor Relations Act) spurred new or-
ganizing, particularly in auto, steel, rubber, and garment unions (Zieger 1986, Chap
2). When these laws were adopted, the industrial unions - the CIO unions - grew.1
And when the CIO grew, as we shall see, it caused the fracture of the political coali-
tions that adopted those laws in the first place.
Recent studies in APD on the origins of fair employment legislation in the
states and the alliance between the industrial union and civil rights movements that
realigned the parties have used proxies for CIO power, Republican control of veto
points, and state-level variation in racial makeup as variables of interest (Zeitlin and
Weyher 2003; Chen 2007; Baylor 2013, for example). In the following I investigate in
a similar fashion, using state-years as my unit of analysis, bearing in mind that the
restrictive statutes were reflective of mediated public opinion.
It is unlikely the protective statutes would have been passed at the state level
in any instances had the federal government not passed the Wagner Act first. The
construction of the Labor Boards with subpoena powers was necessary to give the
pro-union laws force. And, it was the organizing spurred by the Boards and the
very passage of the Wagner Act that caused the restrictive majorities to coalesce.
A related question is why do states without protective laws adopt restrictive ones
subsequently? That is, outside the South, is the policy shift a story of Republican
seizure of legislative control spurred by militant union disruption? If so, then, this
pattern of protection to restriction is just a story of capitalist disarray and subsequent
reorganization. But an argument that places capitalist elites at the center of the story
needs an explanation for the widespread application of social democratic policies in
1Sadly, there are not data on state level membership.
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other countries. Although the American businessman has a unique distrust of his
state (Vogel 1978; 1983), capital’s interest with respect to labor is invariant across
time and space. More subtly, there was cross-national experience with social insurance
policies in the 1930s (Amenta et al. 2001, 224); an argument that emphasizes the
decisive impact of capital in the content of the Wagner Act needs to explain why
elites who shared information arrived at wildly varying policies despite having the
same interest.
Substantively, the protective laws entailed the formation of new institutions -
the Labor Boards - to expand labor’s capacity. This was evidently the understanding
that the CIO unions had, for every industry covered was faced with organizing strikes
(Foster 1975, 8-11). And crucial to the explosive growth of the then-renegade AFL
unions was the belief on their part that the Wagner Act had created a new space for
legitimate, disruptive action. The Boards were the crucial enforcement mechanism
for the protective labor relations acts.
The political undoing of the National Labor Relations Board has been treated
extensively elsewhere (Gross 1974; 1981). However, the institutional irony of the
labor relations acts is that their very energy was the primary cause of their undoing.
The power of the young CIO within the Democratic Party was dependent on the legal
protection and relief provided by a Labor Board. Because the new labor boards were
active proponents of CIO organization, they served to work as an opposing force to
the AFL which increased the AFL’s willingness to join the Republican coalition in
some states, such as New York, as noted below.
In theory, a backlash implies that there existed a previous equilibrium that had
been disturbed (Pierson 2000, 85). Before the Wagner Act, would-be union militants
had little reason to expect that statutory gains would be e↵ective in the face of
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judicial opposition. The Supreme Court upholding Wagner in the face of political
pressure solidified industrial union gains. The newly legitimized industrial unions
were wedded to the Democratic Party, because the Labor Relations Boards that made
the CIO growth possible were reliant on Democratic control. In e↵ect, this served to
contrapose unions with preexisting members of (state) Democratic coalitions, be they
AFL-allied machines, agricultural interests, or white supremacists (Fink 1969; also
discussions of Wisconsin Farmer-Labor tensions throughout the dissertation speak to
this).
What this contraposing chiefly entailed was the CIO threatening to make the
AFL irrelevant; or to displace agriculture interests. Recalling the discussion of feed-
back and equilibria in the first chapter, what CIO organizing strikes served to do was
disturb an existing equilibrium. Labor was strong enough to break the old arrange-
ment but it had far too little leverage to determine the emerging equilibrium.
There was a shift in the legitimate exercise of authority in labor relations as
a result of the Wagner Act. New institutional actors, in the form of the industrial
unions and the Boards, carved out space at the expense of the AFL, farmers, and the
urban machines. What happened at the state level was not unlike what happened at
the national level: widespread and salient, strikes served to generate public disfavor
that formed the basis for Republican majorities (outside the South). The result was a
fracturing of Democratic coalitions at the sub-national level, which led to Republican
seat gains. The 1938 backlash was the result of union militancy under the Wagner
regime.
Did strikers empowered by protective labor laws cause the adoption of restrictive
laws? In order to examine the extent to which the concomitant backlash to CIO
growth was determinative over restrictive statute adoption, I outline the analysis
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in four parts below: first, , a description of the data under investigation and the
method; second, the results, which o↵er modest support, under a stern test of the
theory; third, the case studies; finally, I conclude with thoughts on further study.
This investigation is in the service of amending the literature on the role of labor
in politics in the New Deal and the decline of US private-sector unions to include a
place for outcomes at the state-level and to leverage these state-level comparisons to
highlight the logics seeming to govern the political conflict between labor and capital.
Statutory prohibitions on sit-down strikes, sympathy strikes, ’hot cargo’ strikes, and
jurisdictional strikes all served to diminish the range of legitimate disruptive activity
in which unions, particularly industrial ones, might engage.
The environment of state politics was embedded in a context that had been
defined by their failure to reverse the setbacks of the Depression (Patterson 1969
was among the first to notice this). In response to the shortfalls, the federal govern-
ment expanded its spending and administrative capacity. Whether state government
political and policy outcomes were more a function of partisanship or economic cir-
cumstance is an open question on the face of it. The economic crisis was deep and
the 1938 recession approached the nadir of the Roosevelt years.
[TABLE 4.1 ABOUT HERE]
Ostensibly, the strikers made great gains in their organizational membership
(see Table 4.1) through recognition strikes in the core industries and would have been
well-served to maintain their independence from the Democratic administration. And,
on the face of it, organized labor’s access to FDR’s burgeoning administrative state
was the basis for a relationship worth cultivating. However, Roosevelt’s selective
granting of access to Hillman and Murray (accomodationist leaders of CIO unions in
textiles and steel, respectively) over Lewis (the militant head of the CIO and the mine
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workers) helped deepen the rift within the industrial labor movement and wed the
mainstream of the CIO to the Democratic Party (Lichtenstein 1982, Chap. 3; Milton
1982, Chap 4). Rather than seeking their own fortunes under a separate banner as
Lewis recommended, the CIO threw their lot in with the Roosevelt administration
and with the Democratic Party outside the South.
This is not to suggest that the marriage with the Democratic Party was an
error, as such. It is hard to argue that Hillman was not as much FDR’s envoy to
labor as he was labor’s envoy to the President. However, alternate coalitions were
tried at the state level, and courses that led unions to be aloof from the Democrats also
failed to forestall retrenchment. Put all together, the hard left proposition that labor
might have secured a more favorable outcome through adherence to labor stoppages
is di cult to sustain. More subtly, access to government is of varying and quite
limited degrees of usefulness to a labor movement that cannot credibly countenance
voluntarism. Voluntarism is the idea that unions should ’reward friends and punish
enemies’ as Gompers said - it is the idea that labor should support whichever choice
in a given election that is more palatable, or preferable. But this idea is inapplicable
in a context in which one party is highly oppositional.
Outside the South, we will see that the states that adopted union restriction
laws, with a broad or narrow statutory scope, were heterogeneous in their partisan
composition as well as factors of production. Within regions there was also significant
variation in statutory outcomes. As noted above, New York and Pennsylvania had
far di↵erent labor relations experiences (as did Oregon and California or Indiana and
Ohio). Neighboring states with similar characteristics traveled di↵erent paths.
This analysis of restrictive statute adoption leaves the committees in the cham-
bers unobserved. As the Ways and Means and Defense Committees were essential
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to Dixiecrat New Deal retrenchment, so were subnational majorities to state-level
retrenchment. However, the data are clearly in support of the claim that there was a
relationship between militance in a state-year and whether a restrictive labor law was
adopted. Although this analysis does not dive into the battles over statute adoption
in the chambers, it is evident that the laws were enacted in response to strikes with an
eye toward curtailing them. This chapter will deploy a mixture of methods to provide
an explanation for the adoption of these statutes. First, the backlash explanation will
be investigated statistically; then, narratively.
Method and Data
Following the periodization in the first chapter, the 48 states between the years
of 1937 and 1947 inclusive, comprise my units of analysis. My outcome of interest is
whether a state-year saw the adoption of a restrictive labor law and my key variables
of interest are strike volume in the state-year and Republican control of a state veto
point, the expectation being that these variables will vary directly with anti-strike law
adoption. Republican control of a veto point connotes whether a legislative chamber
or the governorship was controlled by the Republican Party (Council of State Gov-
ernments, 1937; 1939; 1941; 1943; 1945; 1948). As the Northern Democrats were
motivated by an interest in leveraging the New Deal labor relations institutions to
sustain the growing industrial organized and immigrant voting bases, the Republican
o ceholders were motivated by the demands of business organizations and agricul-
tural concerns. I do not double-count multiple anti-strike statutes because any and
all of the banned labor stoppages were and remain essential for wage earners to obtain
leverage over their paymasters. I do not code for pro-union statues because none were
adopted aside from the Wagner copycats which will be dealt with in the penultimate
section of the chapter. (See Table 4.8 for exemplar laws. As noted in the first chapter,
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these laws were primarily bans on sit-down strikes and jurisdictional strikes.)
The disruption that arises from labor stoppages can be measured not only by the
sheer number of workers involved, but also by its duration as well by their frequency.
To this end, following Hibbs (1973), I employ a strike volume measure that accounts
for all three of these factors. This strike volume variable is a product of the size,
duration, and frequency of strikes. Size is the ratio of strikers to number of strikes.
The duration is the ratio of eight-hour days (man-days) lost per striker. The frequency
is the ratio of strikes to 1,000 workers in the labor force. This is called strike volume
because it is akin to the geometric concept of volume: the product of length, height,
and breadth (Ibid, 1036). The strike volume reduces to the ratio of man-days lost
per 1,000 workers. This measure serves as an index of industrial conflict that is more
comprehensive than the count of strikers alone.
Additionally, I include an indicator for whether a state is in the South2 given
the distinctiveness of the states that mandated segregation. Because of the Dixiecrat
interest in preserving racial segmentation, the partisan cleavage over labor relations
is null in those states.
Also importantly, immigrants were politically distinct from the native-born:
the native-born were typically in the skilled AFL while the recent immigrants were
working in the unskilled jobs the CIO sought to organize. And, what is more, the
black population was not overwhelmingly likely to support the Democratic candidate
at the outset of the New Deal, thus helping install a partisan barrier between them
and the white recent immigrants in their economic class.
2The South are taken to be: Alabama, Arkansas, Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Louisiana, Ken-
tucky, Maryland, Mississippi, Missouri, North Carolina, Oklahoma, South Carolina, Tennessee,
Texas, Virginia, and West Virginia.
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I attained the proportions of black, immigrant, and urban residents as well as
state income per capita from the Statistical Abstract of the United States and my
expectations are directly informed by the theories of disruption-backlash and labor
market segmentation. A state with more urban residents has more individuals in
a geographic space to be inconvenienced by a strike. A state with more blacks is
likelier to have a more segmented labor force, implying an increased likelihood of
restriction. Finally, state income is a proxy for state capacity; I argue that states
with greater fiscal capacity would be less interested in restricting labor because the
New Deal party within the state has more reason to ambitiously form a ’baby’ New
Deal coalition.
Penalized maximum likelihood estimation can be generally applied to data that
su↵er from quasi-separation to generate unbiased finite estimates (Firth 1993; Heinze
and Schemper 2002). This has the attractive feature of enabling researchers to avoid
dropping covariates or groups (Zorn 2005). That the data su↵er from quasi-separation
or ’sluggish’ indicators is itself a fault of the data. (Bartels 2008, 28). However, the
data o↵er the opportunity to present a challenging test to the hypothesis that strike
disruption was decisive. Because I focus on the adoption of anti-strike laws, the
groups by state and year would be unbalanced if I deployed a standard logit model;
therefore, I use penalized maximum likelihood estimation to find odds-ratios that
would be analogous to those estimated by a standard logistic function.
Therefore, I estimate a logit model of the functional form: Pr(Yik = 1|Xik) =
1
1+exp( P ikXik) , where Yik is the probability that state i adopts a restrictive law
in year k. X is a vector of indicator variables associated with each state-year.3
3One might want to deploy a Cox regression or some other Event History method (like the
seminal Berry and Berry 1994) but the controls in a hazard regression in this dataset would violate
the proportional hazards assumption, and, therefore, bias the models. And, just as importantly,
128
These variables are whether the amount of strikers in a state, Black population,
urban population, State income, as well as indicators for Republican majorities or
governorships and Jim Crow laws.
Results and Discussion
[TABLES 4.2 AND 4.3 ABOUT HERE]
Strike volume finds support as a variable of interest. The strike volume variable,
though significantly associated with restrictive law adoption, appears quite small in
magnitude. By way of interpretation, every increase by one thousand man-days lost
increases the odds of restrictive law adoption by a tenth of a percent; that is, every
extra 10,000 man-days lost increases the probability of restrictive law adoption by one
percent. The e↵ect of this variable is significant alongside statehouse partisanship.
States under at least partial Republican control were about three times as likely
to adopt restrictive laws. The controls for state income, black population, and the
Jim Crow dummy variable are all insignificant, though they carry the expected sign.
Southern states and states with more blacks were more likely to adopt restrictive laws.
States that were relatively more prosperous were more likely to adopt restrictions on
strikes. Finally, the control for urban population is also significant in this model; on
average an increase of state urban population by one percent implies a two percent
decrease in the likelihood of adopting restrictive law.
Turning to the strike volume results for the non-South states in Table 4.3, we see
that the strike volume variable holds the same value and reaches conventional levels
of significance. The GOP veto variable, however, increases greatly in magnitude
estimating a fixed-e↵ects logistic model would entail substantial losses of statistical power as the
data are quasi-separated both temporally and spatially - that is, there exist years and states that
have no variation on the variable of interest. Because of this, variables or groups must be dropped
for a finite solution to arise from optimization.
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though is estimated less precisely than in the case of the previous regression. Here
an increase in 10,000 man hours implies a one percent increase in the likelihood
of adopting restrictive laws while states with at least partial Republican control are
more than 12.5 times as likely to adopt a restrictive law. In addition, the state income
variable is significant. Since this variable has been logarithmically transformed, the
interpretation is not straightforward: the key takeaway is that increasing state income
implied an increased likelihood of restrictive law adoption. And again, the urban
share of the population is negatively associated with the likelihood of anti-strike law
adoption, an increase of one percent urban resident implied a 3.5 percent decrease in
the likelihood of law adoption.
Though the magnitudes are small for the strike volume variable, the association
is robust to controls and the overall fit is high across models. Each component of the
strike volume variable captures an element of the disruption caused by strikes.
[TABLE 4.4 ABOUT HERE]
The marginal e↵ects for the full model with all forty-eight states are presented
as di↵erences in odds in Table 4.4. In the case of the binary variables, the marginal
e↵ect is that of going from zero to one and those are easily interpreted. The marginal
e↵ects imply probability changes for given values of the variables of interest. In this
case, the probabilities implied by the marginal e↵ects suggests that for every 10,000
man hours lost in a given year, the state was .29 times as likely to adopt a restrictive
law; while moving from no Republican control to at least partial control implied the
state was 1.32 times as likely to experience restrictive law adoption. These results
are consistent with the view that the adoption of restrictive laws was driven by a
backlash to strike action. The other marginals carry the expected signs.
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The chief impact estimated has been a mediated one: that of strike disruption
producing Republican gains outside the South. What happened in the states occurred
before Taft-Hartley - moreover, the state level retrenchment even occurred before the
1942 Smith-Connally Act was passed. More importantly, the phenomena of speedy
retrenchment and of restrictive law adoption in the states would suggest that the
antipathy to labor union power was broadly shared in the mass polity. That is, the
story of the crystallizing of US labor relations law was essentially democratic.
In this dissertation, CIO militance is proposed to be a neglected explanatory
factor in the literature as a result of the neglect of the states during the New Deal.
But this chapter does not have a direct measure of CIO militance - rather, it proceeds
on the basis of overall militance. Measurement in this fashion runs the risk of conflat-
ing non-CIO militance with CIO-driven outcomes. However, we know from historical
study that the CIO was a major component and instigator of workplace resistance.
Taken together, however, the point estimates tend to support the thesis that restric-
tive law adoption was driven by strike disruption mediated by partisanship.
In the non-Jim Crow states, the Republican electoral victories of 1938 were
themselves the product of disruption wrought by strikes. Or, at a minimum, the
election of conservative legislators is a clear predictor of restrictive law adoption.
This seems to imply a counterfactual that is consistent with the literature: no decline
in business power, no protective laws; no increase in business power, no restrictive
laws (Hacker and Pierson 2002, 318). Yet, to directly speak to this, a uniform proxy
for business strength in the states would need to be deployed. Including a proxy for
a neighboring state having a restrictive law does not add explanatory power to the
analysis. In fact, the measure is highly correlated with southern statehood.
But the preceding analysis raises the question of why Republican legislative
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majorities came to power at the state level; therefore, I estimate a regression model
of Republican seat gains in the 1938 election.
I draw the Republican seat gain data from the Book of the States (Council of
State Governments 1937; 1939). I add the seats in either chamber and use the sum. I
attained the state income data from the Statistical Abstract of the United States (US
Census Bureau 1940). I attained the FDR 1936 vote share from the California-Santa
Barbara American Presidency Project. Finally, the measure of CIO density is drawn
from the Troy count of dues paying 1939 members. In terms of expectations, as noted
above, CIO density should be associated with Republican seat gains in 1938; state
income4 should vary with Republican seat gains; and, FDR 1936 vote share should
vary directly with Republican seat gains, under a balancing theory (as in Bafumi,
Erikson, and Wlezien 2010).
[TABLE 4.5-4.7 ABOUT HERE]
Further work is needed to evaluate the seeming potential for omitted variable
bias in state labor retrenchment models. Another concern is whether the results in
the tables above were temporally as well as regionally driven. Indeed, it should be
noted that a Chow test performed at the break date of 1940 based on the model in
Table 4.1 yields a significant F score (see Table 4.5). This indicates that there is a
break in the coe cients between pre- and post-1939 groups (see Table 4.6 for odds-
ratios grouped around the break date). Put another way, the politics of retrenchment
against worker protest were deeply-seated in US politics. The coe cients for strike
volume are similar, though only significant in the pre-1939 specification. The value
of Republican partisanship is much higher after 1939, but this coe cient did not
4Ideally, I would be able to employ a measure for annual change in state income, but the Statistical
Abstract does not allow for this.
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approach conventional levels of significance. Importantly, 1939 is the only year where
an F -test indicates a break in the regression coe cients.
The OLS estimates5 for the non-Southern states presented in Table 4.7 show
a strong association between CIO density and Republican seat gains. A one-unit
increase in the CIO density implies an average of 62 additional seats in the state
legislature for the Republicans. That is, adding 1 to the ratio of CIO workers to the
labor force yields the coe cient estimates. Therefore, each increase in CIO density by
1.5 percent yielded an average increase of one Republican seat. The control variables
are not clearly associated with the GOP gains, which is furthermore consistent with
the understanding that labor militance was a highly salient issue. Nonetheless, they
carry the expected signs here where FDR 1936 vote, state income, and state urbanism
vary inversely with Republican gains, if tenuously. It is particularly important that
the income variable is insignificant because the ’Roosevelt recession’ was as salient
as the widespread labor stoppages. Density, though indirectly, captures the e↵ect of
militance because we know that the CIO could not and did not organize without a
large element of protest. A competing explanation for seat losses, which we engaged
with in the previous chapter, is the court-packing controversy, which resulted in
a salient defeat for FDR. And, importantly, no interaction terms would approach
conventional levels of statistical significance.
Taken together the estimations tabulated above point to the interrelation be-
tween strike disruption conceived narrowly or more broadly, partisan control, and re-
strictive law adoption. This lens points my investigation toward and under-explored
path. The operant sections of the Taft-Hartley Act that circumscribe worker protest
5The N is 29 because Nebraska and Minnesota are omitted since those states had non-partisan
legislatures. However, it is more likely that the results would be strengthened by their inclusion, as
the o cials who won behaved in a decidedly conservative fashion
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percolated upwards from these state laws. The experience of the states was a priority
in the drafting and advocacy for the Taft-Hartley Act. For example, as Representative
Hartley (R-NJ) argued: ”In many instances where secondary boycotts have occurred,
union trucks have refused to haul products of honest hard-working American farm-
ers. If the farmers or dairymen try to haul for themselves, their trucks are destroyed
and their lives threatened. For instance, the lettuce strike in Salinas [California] in
1936 caused a loss of 2000 [train] cars of lettuce which would have been distributed
over the United States” (Legislative History, 583). More to the point, Hartley elab-
orated: ”One of the main objectives of this bill is to break down authority to call
strikes which can cripple our entire economy” (Ibid, 784) Furthermore, the legislative
history of the Taft-Hartley Act contains several references to state labor peace laws
and how the national law is meant to be consistent with those statutes (Ibid, 422-4;
881-83, for example). Illustrative of this theme, Taft argued that ”This necessary
measure [anti-picketing provision] is practically contained in the Wisconsin Labor
Relations Act and has been used in Wisconsin as a means not only of preventing the
coercion of employees but also of attempting, bringing such action as can be brought
by administrative law to end mass picketing...It would be the simplest matter and
the matter which will bring up the least litigation to use the same words in this law
[Taft-Hartley]” (Legislative History, 1032-3).
This project does not mean to suggest that the labor laws are mere sca↵olding
for subsequent bargaining games, nor does this study assume the e cacy of labor
law; indeed, labor law is constitutive of the strategic context shared by the actors.
As Hattam (1990) and Forbath (1991) argue, the (hostile) judicial regulation of the
labor movement necessarily reduced the expectation that programmatic gains in the
legislature would be e↵ectual. Thus, voluntarism and dual unionism were rational
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results. Indeed, the new labor laws passed in the political units constituted the
grounds for subsequent conflict, particularly in the labor relations boards. Most
importantly, though, the laws that were passed had been designed to control labor
militance. Furthermore, the primacy of militance is evidenced by the fact that New
Deal policy gains were won by the CIO unions before they were enforced by the federal
government. In a sense, the strikes conducted by the nascent CIO unions supplanted
the preexisting political authority which almost certainly contributed to the adoption
of restrictive laws.
Does the preceding mean that the people got the labor laws they wanted?
Seemingly, the unpopular disruption was met with an electoral backlash, itself con-
sonant with opinion polls regarding sit-down strikes and defense strikes presented in
the previous chapter. Restrictions on private-sector union strikes that emerged from
the Wagner to Taft-Hartley period decisively ensured that the principals of corpora-
tions would have an outsized influence on American politics (more on this in the next
chapter).
Cases
In this chapter, the dissertation turned its focus from the media and public opin-
ion to the politics leading up to laws restricting the right to strike. The previous two
chapters have emphasized that the citizens of the various states were, broadly speak-
ing, exposed to the same information and that region did not apparently a↵ect the
way that information was processed. Bearing in mind that regional opinion was fairly
homogeneous, this chapter will be concerned with tracing whether and why states
that adopted Wagner-style laws adopted retrenching acts shortly thereafter.
This dissertation has been attempting to marry the behavioral and historical in-
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stitutional approaches. Where behavioralism takes actions and expressions to be the
site of revealed preference, historical institutionalism is concerned with how prefer-
ences are constituted and configured at particular times as products, not just causes;
but as causes as well as products.
In the states we will examine below, we will observe that the strikes for recog-
nition that precipitated Wagner reverberated through the political economy. The
rapid success of the conservative backlash within heterogeneous contexts presents the
opportunity for a most-similar comparison. Generalizing through the method of dif-
ference will suggest that the rules of the electoral game largely explain the successful
retrenchment against class protest during the New Deal. Within the two-party struc-
ture the organized labor movement lacked - necessarily so - the leverage to turn the
Democratic Party toward a labor-left agenda.
There are more potential explanations for retrenchment than cases in this chap-
ter. (See Table 4.11 reproduced from the Introduction.) Therefore, I am relying on
the previous chapters to eliminate plausible alternatives from contention. What I am
aiming to draw from the ’laboratory of history’ is a closer causal tracing of the mech-
anisms that governed whether the backlash manifested. And I rely on the similarity
of the states to enable semi-experimental comparison.
Why did states retrench to anti-strike laws? The Wagner Act and the Taft-
Hartley amendments have analogues at the state level during the New Deal. The
adoption of the ’little Wagner Acts’ mirrored the adoption of the national bill and
the adoption of conservative amendments are harbingers of Taft-Hartley; these are
a class of like phenomena that call for explanation. The union security laws created
statutory protection for collective bargaining, thus strengthening the hand of labor
against capital.
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An important assumption - also relied upon above - is that the 1930s constituted
a decisive break with the past, particularly in the area of labor relations. Though
many proposals were considered by the legislatures early in the twentieth century,
the economic crisis wrought by the Depression was likely an important causal force.
More to the point, if the growth of the government was a continuation of a then-
ongoing trend, then the presumed importance of the Depression period would be
attenuated.
The restrictive labor laws arising from the boomerang against unions ensured
that corporate tyranny would prevail on the shop-floor and, necessarily, I will argue,
spill over into politics. The relationship between corporate power and worker resis-
tance is clear: the acquisition of profits necessitated continuous production6 and the
resultant labor quiescence contributed to the long period of annual growth that char-
acterized the the 1950s to mid-70s (cf. Lichtenstein 2012, ”Postwar Accord”).
In evaluating the labor relations policy domain, the unity and hostility of Amer-
ican owners is relatively high in comparative perspective (Vogel 1979; 1981). More-
over, scholars have tended to assume that this business unity has led to political
strength. But the American experience does not support the claim that business
unity overrides popular majorities; rather, business unity is an imperfect predictor of
legislative outcomes (Smith 2000). Mass opinion during the period does not directly
support the claim that the citizens opposed Taft-Hartley or the drive to curb militant
unionism, generally (see Chapter Three).
Existing scholarship on progressive laws in the states (Patterson 1969; Shefter
1983; Bridges 1997; Weir 2005) focus on how state level variation in capacity and
political logics amplify or diminish the e↵ects of progressive interventions. Distinc-
6As did the war e↵ort.
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tively, this study aims to justify a generalized conclusion in the area of labor relations.
Though I would not argue that the state-level politics were governed by an invariant
logic, I argue that the actors in each state did perceive clear and contrasting policy
and political goals in an equivalent fashion.
What is distinctive about this investigation is the aggregating of the state-level
outcomes and the attention paid to specific subnational experiences in probing ex-
planations for the distinctive American pattern of labor relations. Nations are all
exceptional in their own way but the US case is preeminent because of its global
role; and, more importantly, given the opulence of the American society, its nig-
gardly policies are particularly striking. Moreover, state-level variation in labor laws
suggests that deterministic explanations the emphasize unique institutional configu-
rations cannot obtain. The states, sharing political rules and circumstances broadly,
vary in the labor relations regimes they adopt; this militates against exceptionalist
claims.
As the Democrats were motivated by an interest in leveraging the New Deal
labor relations institutions to sustain the growing industrial organization and immi-
grant voting bases, the Republican o ceholders were motivated by the demands of
business organizations and, importantly, farmer’s groups. In the following, I exam-
ine the statistical finding above that backlash to union disruption was predictive of
restrictive law adoption.
The statutes we have focused upon thus far are those that hamper class-based
union protest as opposed to those that hamper union organization, financing, or
political activity. These laws, though, were often passed in the same legislative session
if not the package, so these phenomena are closely related, if distinct.
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A portrait of American trade union decline is incomplete without a regional per-
spective. The declines in the South and Southwest are the product of labor laws that
restrained new organizing and curtailed the scope of militance for existing unions.
However, attention to the historical record reveals that the political, social, and eco-
nomic conditions that produce legal regimes hostile to unions prevailed in states where
unions achieved a range of outcomes, some of them fairly positive. This would suggest
that union power is at most a decisive variable in explaining the adoption of laws at
some times and not others.
Again revisiting Table 4.8 above, it is evident that the ownership of farms
distinguishes Wisconsin and Pennsylvania. However, consonant with the statistical
results from earlier in this chapter, the rural representation in the statehouses were
the main bloc in retrenching legislation. Because the farmer-labor possibility was
a threatening one to the status quo this chapter will focus on Wisconsin and treat
Pennsylvania as a site for opportunistic comparison.
New York
The progressive capture of the New York executive was a defining feature of this
case. Already strong unions were best positioned to capture the gains of New Deal
legislation; in the New York case, the national anti-Injunction Act provided support
to garment worker unionizing.
Most labor militance in New York State occurred in New York City. For the
period under investigation and the years just preceding it, New York CIty accounted
for 70 percent of man-days lost - and during the early Depression it was more than 90
percent (Annual Report of the Industrial Commissioner, 1931). The unions based in
New York City, particularly the Clothing Workers (ACWA) and the Ladies’ Garment
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Workers (ILGWU) actively lobbied for collective bargaining legislation. Moreover
the NYS Federation of Labor tended to actively endorse and support Democratic
candidates, in contrast with Gompersian voluntarism. And, indeed, the NYSFL
joined Governor Lehman in his call for union security legislation in line with the
Norris-LaGuardia Act (New York Times 8/15/33; 8/23/33).
And the garment workers were a potent force, given that the industry was
mostly small firms on tight margins. In the wake of a tri-state area general dress strike
in August 1933, Bernstein (1970) notes, ”The union’s power was so complete that
employer opposition collapsed at once....The employers accepted the closed shop...”
(87). What is more, just a month previous, Secretary Perkins had to prevail upon
ILGWU leader David Dubinsky to postpone a strike when federal-level negotiations
over an industry code broke down (New York Times, 7/25/33).
The state of New York had a sharp urban/rural cleavage reflected in the legis-
lature. The industrial areas of the state were Democratic strongholds and the less-
industrial areas were held by the Republicans. The Democrats were strong in the
New York City and the surrounding areas as well as the cities throughout the Hud-
son Valley and in the western part of the state. The Republicans represented largely
rural districts and benefited from malapportionment. Thus, it was nearly impossible
for organized labor to capture the seats they did not already hold.
Not unimportantly, elections in New York were governed under fusion rules;
that is, a candidate could be endorsed by more than one party. Thus, the centrist
parties can be pressured by the radical candidacies without those campaigns or their
supporters being concerned that their vote would only serve to get the less desirable
centrist party elected. In New York, the American Labor Party played that role on
the left in New York politics.
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After passing the state anti-Injunction Act in the previous session, Governor
Lehman said in his State of the State address that ”I stand ready to exercise my
veto power and my right to appeal directly to the people to combat any plan to
destroy what I sincerely believe to be the finest set of social legislation ever enacted
by any State in the country. The State of New York has now reached a happy
position” (quoted in New York Times 1/2/36). And later the same year, Governor
Lehman reiterated his support for pro-union legislation at the State Federation of
Labor Convention (New York Times 8/26/36). And in the next session, the State
Labor Relations Act was adopted.
The first enumerated unfair labor practice was that of interference, restraint, or
coercion of employees in their attempt to exercise collective bargaining rights. This
concept is a direct intervention against the owners most basic strategy in the face of
new organizing. The decision to whether and how apply penalties or issue judgments
on the basis of this unfair labor practice, because of its lack of precision, is a residue
of political contestation. In its first Report, the New York Labor Relations Board
summarized their concerns thusly
It is not possible, of course, to establish rules as to when a discharge will
and when it will not be held a violation of the Act. Each case must rest
upon its own facts and upon the inferences which may logically be drawn
therefrom. While it is possible to list the various considerations which have
a↵ected the decision of the board in a particular case, no one of them alone
can ordinarily be regarded as the determining factor where the Board
has made a finding of discriminatory discharge. Invariably, the evidence
reveals the presence of a combination of circumstances which, taken in
conjunction, may lead to the conclusion that the discharge involved in the
proceeding was in fact discriminatory (1939, 41).
After the progressive electoral victories in 1936, the Doyle-Neustein bill - the
State Labor Relations Act (SLRA) - passed the Senate and Assembly overwhelmingly
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(New York Times 5/5/37). And the labor board created by the bill would itself be
constitutive of the subsequent labor relations context. It should be noted that in
the case of any of the Labor Relations Boards, the first e↵ort was to find a way to
compliance without resort to hearing or charges. However, the new Board would, like
the national Board come to be seen as pro-CIO.
The SLRA was based o↵ Wagner. However, unlike Wagner, which listed five
unfair labor practices and left the interpretation to the triers of fact (read NLRB),
the SLRA enumerated ten unfair labor practices and defined them broadly. Also,
the SLRA contained a craft unit proviso (a majority of employees in a particular
craft could make the craft a bargaining unit) and the SLRA permitted employers to
petition for an election.
The NYSFL would not continue its support of the ’happy’ labor relations
paradigm erected in New York’s Little New Deal. In the first two years of the SLRB’s
existence, there were ten contests where the CIO and AFL were directly competing for
recognition and the Board found for the CIO in seven of the cases while the AFL won
just one (in one case neither won employee majority and in another an independent
union won recognition) (New York Times 9/18/39). As the NLRB came to be viewed
as an enemy by the AFL (Gross 1981, 246), the NYSFL would come to oppose the
SLRB. Indeed, after a crucial transit workers bargaining dispute was ruled against
the AFL, George Meany declared the SLRB was seeking to impose ’Nazi-Communist’
regulations upon labor (quoted in New York Times 12/7/39).
Where the state AFL a liate was opposed to the operation of the State Labor
Relations Act, the state CIO had ’not one single complaint’ regarding the admin-
istration of the act (quoted in Kim 2000, 233). On August 28, 1937, the Triboro
Coach Company entered into a collective bargaining agreement despite the CIO hav-
142
ing collected sign-ups from more than 109 of the 181 workers there. The State Labor
Relations Board ordered an election which the CIO was favored to win. The AFL was
incensed, having seen the Board put aside a previously existing collective bargaining
agreement. And at its annual legislative conference in April 1939, the NYSFL con-
demned the Board’s resolution as being prejudicial against the AFL and beyond the
color of law. The NYSFL would, subsequently, lobby in support of amendments to
jurisdictional strike laws and make common cause with the anti-labor Republicans
led by Irving Ives, a Republican state senator and later a US Senator who would vote
for Taft-Hartley (Ibid 241-3).
The Ives Committee, a parallel to the Smith Committee, was formed after the
conservative surge in 1938. With the support of the NYSFL, the SLRA was amended
to weaken its union security provisions: crucially, the preamble was amended to pro-
mote ’partnership and cooperation between workers and employers;’ and established
arbitration agreements as having the force of law. This latter point is crucial, it
encumbers workers’ legal recourse to protest grievances. The upshot of the amend-
ments, as Dubofsky concludes, ”Like the Ives bills, which weakened the New York
State Labor Relations Act and therefore diminished the power of organized labor, the
Taft-Hartley Act attempted to strip organized labor of what they had gained though
the New Deal law and labor policy” (1994, 204).
Unlike the Smith Committee, the Ives Committee - formally, the Joint State
Legislative Committee on Industrial and Labor Relations - was convened by Repub-
licans, rather than by co-partisans of the administration. However, the di↵erences
between the Dixiecrats and FDR were not unlike the di↵erences between Governor
Lehman and the New York Republicans; it also should be noted that a substan-
tial number of assembly Republicans voted for the SLRA much as House Dixiecrats
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supported Wagner (Red Book). Again distinctively, the Ives Committee was de-
signed to make ”recommendations designed to increase industrial peace” in contrast
to the anti-communist basis for the Smith Committee. In his Story of a Legislative
Committee, Ives writes that ”At the beginning of 1938, a↵airs between workers and
employers seemed to be getting out of hand. Bad administration of the Wagner Act
was threatening the proper administration of our SLRA which, with the backing of
both industry and labor in the state, had been enacted in 1937. So the Legislature
created a Committee of eight members for the purpose of finding out what could be
done by law to bring about a happier relationship between employers and employees”
(1944, 3-4).
Both Committees set out to rewrite the preambles of the protective labor statue
it assailed and move policy in a more pro-capital direction. Both committees were
interested in undermining the pro-labor ’bias’ of the Labor Relations Board. The Ives
Committee produced a number of bills, and unlike the Smith Committee’s recommen-
dations, some were adopted, including a new preamble and new employer guaranteed
rights to oppose unionization during elections (Ives 1944, 8-9). However, the provi-
sions that served to restrain militance - other than the ban on jurisdictional strikes -
were in fact opposed by the NYSFL.
However, even in the New York case where the American Labor Party (ALP), a
third party formed by the CIO’s John Lewis and Sidney Hillman (a New York garment
union leader), stemmed the conservative tide in 1938, the state LRA was still amended
in line with the Ives Committee recommendations. Ultimately, in the same way that
the AFL, Dixiecrats, and Republicans in the Congress formed a majority for the
adoption of hostile amendments to the Wagner Act, the NYS Federation of Labor and
Republicans formed a state-level majority to adopt employer-friendly amendments to
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the SLRA in the form of the Ives committee recommendations, which is analogous to
the contemporaneous Smith Committee at the national level. Moreover, as the Taft-
Hartley Act does concede that organized labor would be a factor in labor relations,
the Ives bills likewise accepted the fact.
Taken together, the New York retrenchment was swift but blunted by Lehman’s
governorship and the American Labor Party in the Assembly. Recommendations to
alter rules by which the Labor Board adjusted disputes were chief among the Ives
Committee proposals that were adopted. The New York case stands in the middle
between no retrenchment at all and a full retrenching bill. While strike rights were not
substantially curtailed, there were conservative amendments. The urban core of the
state legislature was su ciently numerous to resist legislative attempts to contract
labor’s capacity for action. These outcomes dovetail with the regression results from
the earlier in this chapter.
Strikes were not more popular in the Northeast, as we observed in Chapter
Three. But the electoral ramifications were blunted. Nor could the local newspapers
have been said to be neutral in their coverage of labor stoppages, as we observed in
Chapter Two. Referring to the appendix in that chapter, we observe numerous exam-
ples of the Times and Herald Tribune declaring the strikes to be forms of insurrection
with the articles typically preferring to use o cial sources or ownership sources as
opposed to those of the strikers. In the coverage from major papers in the East drawn
from the searches in the second chapter, the Times and Herald Tribune were carriers
of net negative source-messages.7 Overall, the New Yorkers were not in a distinct
information environment from those in Wisconsin, Utah, or the nation generally. As
7Sadly, the newspapers from Wisconsin and Utah are not amenable to digital searches; therefore
an analysis of source-message content is not possible.
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discussed in the second and third chapters, citizens were expressing attitudes more on
the basis of shared information and shared processing rules than they were operating
with di↵erent apprehensions of the state of the world.
Wisconsin
The Wisconsin SLRA followed the Wagner Act in its definition of unfair labor
practices for employers but not employees. And, like Wagner, a Labor Relations
Board was created to certify unions and investigate unfair labor practices. Unlike
Wagner, the Wisconsin Act specifically prohibited blacklisting and spying. Moreover,
the Wisconsin Board had the mandate to prevent and settle labor disputes, unlike
the Congress, which gave the NLRB no arbitration powers.
As a result of the SLRB, like the NLRB, there was a surge in new organizing,
particularly on the part of the CIO. And CIO new organizing would split the Farmer-
Labor Progressive Federation as cooperatives run by farm groups in the coalition were
targeted for organizing (Holter 1990, 35). This split contributed to the demise of the
majority coalition that had enacted a bill more pro-union than Wagner and paved
the way for the Republicans to take the majority in both legislative chambers.
The 1939 amendments to the Wisconsin SLRA presaged Taft-Hartley in nu-
merous respects. The Board lost its power to determine bargaining units - that is,
the Board lost its power to decide what the bargaining unit should be. As a result of
the defanging of the Board, its caseload dropped precipitously - unions seeking me-
diation or redress for grievances dropped by more than 90 percent (Ibid, 43). Also,
it allowed for employers to call an election at any time. The amendments instituted
a 2/3rd majority requirement for the union shop. Another important provision that
antedates Taft-Hartley was the ban on the secondary boycott.
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In Wisconsin, the SLRA was adopted by a coalition of farmers and progressives.
However, the intervening strikes after the passage of the law caused the farmers to
leave the coalition (Ibid, 37). However, just as CIO new organizing in the South
doomed the union security majorities in the Congress, CIO new organizing in trans-
port and dairy doomed the Farmer-Labor Progressive Federation. Nonetheless, the
farm interests were contingent in their support:
...exemption from the scope of this bill [Wisconsin Labor Relations Act]
cannot guarantee freedom from the disastrous e↵ects, due to the perish-
able nature of our products, that labor disputes would have upon agricul-
tural cooperatives. It is evident that exemption does not spell immunity.
In view of this, these farm cooperatives withdraw their demand for such
exemption. In doing this, we hope that labor will appreciate the fairness of
spirit on the part of agriculture and we hope that such mediation machin-
ery may be provided which, in the event of trouble, will be su ciently fair,
e↵ective, and quick to meet the unusual problems that would inevitably
result from a tie-up of our perishable farm commodities (Swanton to State
Sen. Earl Leverich 3/31/37, WCAC Files, Box 8, Folder 1).
The Wisconsin Farmers Cooperative Confederation, along with the Wisconsin
Council of Agriculture Cooperatives, was the preeminent farmer’s organization in the
state in the 1930s. Milo Swanton, their Executive Secretary, said to to the state
Manufacturers’ Association in 1938,
Unlike the industry manufacturer, the agricultural manufacturer main-
tains a constant production at a variable price. As an employer the farmer
is also in a very di↵erent position because of his very seasonal production
and because of the perishable nature of his products. An industrial strike
is a loss to all concerned....However, the farmer with goods that perish
in a few days or hours and with seasonal production is in a weaker posi-
tion as a bargainer with labor than the industrial employer. It is for this
reason that the Wisconsin Council of Agriculture, seeing the advance of
organized labor into the field of agriculture and carrying with it industrial
trade union policies, asked for a revision of state laws.(Wisconsin State
Historical Society, WCAC Files, Box 3, Folder 8)
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What is important in this passage is the fact that the Wisconsin farmer groups
moved away from the union protection coalition into the restriction coalition because
of the vulnerabilities to industrial disputes that were realized under the (baby) Wagner
law. The exercise of power by workers in Wisconsin undermined their future capacity
to exercise that power because it hurt the forces who were indispensable to the passage
of protective laws. Swanton, in private correspondence to an editor argues that
The farmer is both a capitalist and a laborer; and while in the past he has
been inclined to be sympathetic with labor, he has also come to realize
that he has a large investment in land, machinery, livestock, and buildings.
He is a purchaser of both consumer and capital goods. He has come to
realize that labor policies and high rates have a definite e↵ect upon his
cost of production and that labor disturbances frequently invade his rights
and his opportunities to make financial progress (Ibid, Letter to Roy Park,
February 6, 1942, Folder 10)
The previous two chapters proposed that there was a bulwark in mass opinion
against strikes that would increase workers’ relative power that coincided with pre-
vailing unfavorable coverage of strikes and strikers. Here, though, we can see that the
interests of would-be coalition partners with labor evidently diverged. The paths to
forestalling Taft-Hartley were occluded in two ways: the citizens qua consumers were
opposed to the costs of strikes; and, incumbent coalition partners were a↵ronted by
those selfsame costs.
Unlike New York, the labor militance was dispersed throughout the state. The
formation of the third party came from the radical farm groups that finally found
an ally in the progressive wing of the state Republican Party (Milwaukee Journal
3/4/34). The bill was passed by the Farmer-Labor majority after more than one
hundred roll calls (Backstrom 1956, 332). However, the result would not hold.
CIO success came at the cost of farmer groups who had tipped the majority of
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the state legislature toward labor interests. The CIO endeavored to organize coop-
eratives run by farm groups. These farmers, aggrieved by the concomitant strikes,
realigned with the Republicans after the 1938 elections and then they introduced a bill
to promote ’employment peace.’ The Employment Peace Act changed the processes
of unit determination, reducing the scope of Board activity in this area, in the same
ways as the Taft-Hartley Act did for Wagner. Moreover, like Taft-Hartley, the Act
outlawed secondary boycotts. This meant that unions could not operate in concert
to disrupt production. Atomizing unions in this way kept them from operating on a
class basis. More subtly, the theme of CIO new organizing disrupting long-existing
patterns of economic and social domination leading to harsh retrenchment is a story
that occurs outside the American South.
The Roosevelt recession was also costly to farmers: ”Butter is the same in price
as twenty-five years ago, while the wages of skilled workmen are, roughly, fifty percent
higher. Can the farmer help to boost wages which he has to pay, while his own income
stagnates, or goes lower?” (Swanton address to Milwaukee Chamber of Commerce,
WCAC Files, Box 3). And, these losses exposed the rift: ”It is true in a country like
ours, with surplus farm production, that, when the farmers are prosperous the rest
of society is prosperous. This is true because a surplus of farm product cannot be
sold at good prices to unprosperous customers. The converse of this statement is not,
however, equally true.” (Ibid, ”Mutual Relations of Agriculture, Labor, and Industry,
WCAC Files).
The opportunity for a farmer-labor alliance, then, was very di cult to exploit.
And, what is more, antipathy toward Lewis would make forming such a coalition
di cult. In the Hoard’s Dairyman, a predominant industry newsletter in Wiscon-
sin and Minnesota, an editorial argued that ”control of food is a weapon. John L.
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Lewis knows this. Any man who can control the distribution of food can control the
destinies of the people. The organization of farmers into unions controlled by labor
dictators would take away from farmers freedom of action, and could conceivably
put farmers in a strait jacket from which there would be no escape” (WCAC Files,
Hoard’s Dairyman, 1943)
In the way that Operation Dixie proved a grave threat to the Roosevelt New
Deal coalition, CIO farm organizing proved a grave threat to Governor LaFollette’s
little New Deal coalition of labor and farmers. And, indeed, progressives, who were
Republican defectors went back to the Republicans in the 1938 elections. As Thomas
Amlie, the progressive Congressman, pointed out:”Although organized workers did
not vote for Heil, neither did they enthusiastically work for LaFollette, having become
somewhat dissatisfied with the independent role the governor played in the matter of
appointments to various boards and commissions, and the failure on the part of the
governor to consult representatives of labor on plans of reorganization and matters
of public interest” (Thomas R. Amlie Papers, Memoranda, Box 2)
One might wonder about the awareness level of farmers, though. Curiously, a
Farmer’s Cooperative poll in 1944 found that more than half of the members were
unaware whether the co-op was required to pay taxes; only 26 percent correctly
answered that the co-ops were obligated to pay taxes (WCAC files).
The ascendant farmer-labor coalition elected with the support of organized labor
and the coattails of FDR’s reelection campaign, delivered a protective labor law. The
organizing that resulted from that law broke the coalition. The fractious relation
between agriculture groups and organized labor, particularly the CIO, ensured that
any progressive majority would need to be delicately ushered through the adoption
and administration of its legislative program.
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The Midwest was not out of step with the rest of the nation in terms of opposi-
tion to strikes. The Milwaukee Journal has not been archived in a fashion conducive
to subject and keyword searching. However, as we saw in Chapter Three, the opinion
in the Midwest was in sync with the national disapproval of labor militance. The agri-
culture bloc proved decisive in the state legislature in a context where mass opinion
was cool toward labor militance. The crucial takeaway here, though, is the emergent
opposition between the farm coalition that was essential to the progressive law and
the CIO unions strengthened by that law.
Aside from the fracturing of the farmer-labor majority, the sit-down strikes in
urban Milwaukee were themselves highly disruptive. Over the course of the first year
of WLRA administration, there were 28 sit-down strikes in Milwaukee. Nine hundred
workers in the textile a liate of the CIO sat down at the Rhea manufacturing plant
for 17 hours. The garment workers held the factory throughout the night and saw
their wage and workplace safety pleas answered the next day (Holter 2001, 214-5).
But, over the course of the year, the sit-downs became less a tactic for winning union
gains and more a tactic in furtherance of shopfloor protest (Ibid 215).
Utah
Though we have been focusing on the cases of protective laws being wholly or
partially retrenched, we now turn to a case where the protective statute remained
intact. Indeed, in contrast to New York and Wisconsin, a restrictive statute did not
even make it onto the legislative calendar following the 1938 elections (Hinton 1975,
160)
Utah was ravaged by the Depression, having the fourth highest unemployment
rate in the nation in 1934. Further, the mining industry, which was the basis of the
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state’s economy was decimated by the Depression, seeing a decline in mineral value
from approximately 122 million dollars to 22 million (Ibid, 4). And, Importantly,
the Mormon First Presidency was in favor of capitalism and against socialism in
principle. And all Mormons are beholden to the directives of they First President
(this is a more serious commitment than say a Catholic has to the Pope). The Mormon
Church cannot be said to have dictated political behavior during the early statehood
years but at least some politicians did feel su ciently beholden to change their votes
on spending bills and Senate elections - and in one case even changing parties and
switching again on church orders (McCormick and Silito 2011, 439-42).
These distinctions do not render Utah unsuitable for comparison with the other
states. Though it is a state with a religious power parallel to the civil government
(more on this in a moment), it is not as if the Mormon domination of state politics
had subsumed political conflict, as there was sti↵ partisan competition between the
Democrats and Republicans since it had acceded to the United States. Also, it is
important to note that the state was ravaged by the Depression and was a major
recipient of relief expenditures. Ranked ninth among the states in receipts from fed-
eral spending from 1933 to 1939 , Utah benefited from New Deal programs. This is
attributable to Governor George Dern’s having been appointed FDR’s second Secre-
tary of War, though Utah’s unemployment rate was more than twelve points above
the national average (Cannon and Embry 2009 115-6).
The Mormon hierarchy largely opposed the New Deal and sought to get people
o↵ the relief rolls and put them on to the Latter Day Saints Security Plan (Cannon
2004; Darowski 2009).8 On the other hand, some Mormons helped people enroll
8The LDS scheme is extant, rechristened as the Welfare Plan in 1939, though most of its clients
are located in the third world nowadays.
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in FDRs relief programs at the outset to the New Deal. With respect to foreign
policy, the Mormons supported FDR in lockstep; favoring intervention in the second
world war and could be reasonably described as patriots. The long-time Senator
Reed Smoot (R-UT) was an apostle and was openly endorsed by the First President
leading observers to draw a link between the Mormon Church and the Republican
Party (Hinton 1975, 183). However, the failure of the Church to forestall prohibition
repeal as well as the delivery of Utah’s electoral votes to FDR in 1936 and 1940 go
to demonstrate that while the Church was deeply influential, it was not able to set
policy as it wished. Though the Mormon Church issued statements in opposition
to the seeming unconstitutionality of the New Deal, it did not seek to erase federal
contributions to the state budget (Ibid, 190). Broadly speaking, we can think of the
Mormon Church as an influential pressure group during this period, rather than as a
dictator.
That said, the Mormon Church o cials tended to oppose the union shop pro-
visions that were commonly a part of protective labor laws. Not only were Church
o cials typically businessmen, there also existed the fear that solidaristic unionism
would supplant the Mormon faith (Powell 2013, Chapter 9). Nonetheless, when Lewis
called on the United Mine Workers to organize in Utah in 1933, the question was not
whether the mines would be represented but whether they would be represented by
an independent union or the CIO. Ultimately, though citizens were wary of resultant
price increases, the New Deal Democratic majorities ensured that protective labor
laws would stand (Ibid). Indeed, the New Deal would lead to the election of Demo-
cratic majorities that would govern uninterrupted until 1970 (May 1987, 181). This
is due in large part to the benefits Utah received from New Deal spending: Utah
was ninth in per-capita spending among the states and the state’s own Chamber of
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Commerce lobbied against decreased Civilian Conservation Corps federal spending in
1938 (Hinton 1986, 276-6).
While party control did not change from the Democrats until well after the
War, Utah would abandon its protective law regime after Taft-Hartley’s passage in
1947. Likely between the influx of Black soldiers and the national Republican turn
against labor, the Mormon leadership saw an opportunity to press against socialism
which was opposed by the Church hierarchy prior to the New Deal because ”Social-
ism endangered capital; God’s kingdom should be one where business interests and
investments were safe; Mormons should champion the capitalistic system and the
values on which it was based and work within the two-party system to support it”
(McCormick and Silito 2011, 421). Though, in all fairness, the First President op-
posed FDR’s reelection in 1936, after the church had enacted its Security Plan and
Roosevelt carried Utah by 70 percent of the vote in that election and would gain more
than sixty percent of the vote in the next two races (Frankoski 2009, 169).
Though the adoption of the Wagner Act impelled further organizing in Utah’s
copper and silver mines, the resultant chaos did not spill over into the major conurba-
tions. The general strike in Eureka, Park City, and Bingham mines from October 10
to December 16, 1936 resulted in property damage and violence between picketers and
strike-breakers and led the (Summit) county Sheri↵ to request that the Democratic
Governor Blood call in the national guard. In response, the governor sent a skeleton
force and mediated the dispute. The resultant wage increase was hailed as a victory
for labor (Deseret News 12/8/16, 1; Hinton 1975, 217). There was some organizing
among taxi drivers and auto mechanics in Salt Lake City, the scale of this organizing
was in no way comparable to the general strikes that crippled major metropolitan
areas in the East and Midwest.
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Thus, the Utah strikes were not particularly disruptive because the radical
unions in the mining industry did not generate an interested constituency that would
leave the protective majority to help form a retrenchment coalition. In contrast to
the logic that prevailed in Wisconsin, there was no farmer interest to overcome and in
contrast to the logic that prevailed in the New York, there was little urban citizenry
to provoke with shortages, nor would workers have been inclined to impose such
shortages on people they considered brethren as more than two-thirds of the state
was Mormon in the 30s.
Importantly, the state was homogeneous in its population; the state was the
whitest in the nation in the 1930s. Interestingly, the state had an influx of black resi-
dents during the war as more than a million black GIs moved to Utah. This might be
a cause for the Utahan move from protection to restriction, which would, of course
be consistent with the received wisdom on New Deal retrenchment. But the homo-
geneity decreased the threat implied by radical worker militance because the Mormon
church was not concerned about being politically or economically marginalized. Put
another way, if there were some disruption, there was no reason for sweeping backlash
because the mining unions would never have been ascendant in Deseret.9 Though the
most widely-circulated newspaper in Utah o↵ered more contextualized coverage of
strikes than most other presses, the overall tenor of the coverage was negative in line
with the articles analyzed in the second chapter. Altogether, it is more likely that
Utah’s distinctive policy outcome was the result of a comparatively lower social cost
to strikes than it was of a distinct information environment.
The state of Utah stands as the only state that did not enact a retrenching law
9The name the original Mormon settlers gave to Utah. The Deseret News is the name of the
newspaper the Church has owned and printed continuously since 1850; it was and remains a good
source for the o cial line of the LDS chieftains.
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after having adopted a protective law during the working class interlude. Though
state urbanism was previously found to be negatively associated with restrictive law
adoption, the Utah case is not particularly in tension with this finding because of
the relatively muted worker protest. This view is, however, in tension with the core-
periphery distinction drawn above. Utah was decidedly on the periphery, in contrast
to the industrial core states that adopted protective laws, yet, unlike the periphery
states in the Southwest, it maintained a protective labor relations framework until
the Taft-Hartley amendments. Overall, this case suggests that there was a qualita-
tive di↵erence in the e↵ects of militance depending on the arrangement of partisan
coalitions ex ante. The apparent uniqueness of the Utah case indicates how it is an
exception that proves the rule: strike retrenchment was avoided where the strikes
themselves were not disruptive.
Discussion
What is being addressed by the historical comparison is the relative impor-
tance of union activity in politics conditional on partisan composition. Students of
the laggard status of the American welfare state pay special attention to political
institutions, particularly majoritarian electoral rules, federalism, and separation of
powers. But a systematic comparison of the states challenges these explanations.
Even in contexts where labor was politically strong, it su↵ered setbacks. Also vari-
ant across cases - though increasing over the 1935-47 time frame - was the unity of
capitalists.
Taken together, in some sense the labor law outcome is a product of partisan-
ship. However, partisanship does not carry a uniform meaning. Regional di↵erences
imply di↵erent coalitional fractures and alignments. For example, the farmer-labor
divide (or coalition), was put under varying degrees of tension; whereas the in New
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York State union density and a pro-union executive, itself elected by largely Catholic
majorities, combined to create a circumstance wherein labor could achieve union se-
curity laws and blunt (if only somewhat) capitalist-led e↵orts at retrenchment.
Alternately, explanation arising from theories of political composition can be
understood as the residue of social and economic forces within the political unit.
That is, the partisan labels might not matter as much as the balance of the factors
of production and the degree of racial or religious fracture. But, again, attending
to demographics and economic factors yield heterogeneous results. The farmer-labor
coalition for progressive policy was fractious to be sure. However, it is a question of
degrees. And, the Utah and New York experiences suggest that di↵erent factors of
production can yield similar statutory results. Though Wisconsin’s legislature had far
less party discipline than New York’s - indeed, the Wisconsin lower house regularly
had cross-party voting on the vote to organize the chamber and elect the speaker
(Backstrom 1956, 339) - the partisan composition of the two 1937 legislatures that
adopted SLRAs did not a↵ect the substantive contents directly.
So, then, why were the protective laws adopted in the first place if they would
be so easily undone? As Patterson (1967, 79) wrote,
”The reform impulse of the 1930s unlike that of the progressive era was
federal in origin and limited in duration. [...] since many key New Deal
laws a↵ecting states – social security, the Wagner Act, and fair labor
standards – were passed in or after 1935, and since the Supreme Court
did not sustain them until 1937 or later, many states were reluctant to
enact ”Little New Deals” before 1937. Then the conservative reaction of
1937-38 descended and the main chance was gone.
Moreover, subnational Democratic parties were as fractious as the Party in
Congress (Ibid, 80). The factionalism within the Party was at times the outgrowth
of liberals confronting long-standing political machines and sometimes it was provin-
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cial selfishness in the state chambers but the general upshot was to ensure that a
unified Party program would not be adopted.10 The initial adoption of a protective
labor law required a then-novel concept of the American state intervening in labor
organization.
In practice, the socio-political coalition for progressivism in Wisconsin had to
be a farmer-labor alliance. The majority of the political unit in most cases could not
be unionist, so alliance would be necessary. (This is the logic that labor relies upon
in lending support to the civil rights movements of the 1960s while subordinating the
crucial goal of 14(b) repeal). In order to build an alliance with the farmers, labor
had to o↵er inducements. From a programmatic standpoint, labor and agriculture
could agree on the necessity of aid from the public till during the Depression. But
the class actors needed a class vehicle. If a class is constituted by persons sharing
utility functions, then it is evident that labor laws applied to agriculture result in
a coalitional tension. That is, the direct result of labor militancy implies a loss for
agriculture insofar as transport and workers are involved.
In this analysis, the equivalency premise takes a di↵erent shape. Across political
units there is a struggle for internalization of the union to the Democratic Party or
the Democratic Party to the union in each case. The extent to which unions are
internalized, I expect, depends in part on the degree to which the AFL (dualist) can
resist the CIO (monist) unions. In Wisconsin, the monist unions needed to coalesce
with farmers to form a majority. That is, the rural urban cleavage is dominated by
New York City in New York while Madison and Milwaukee had no such preeminence
10Not to suggest that had FDR actively sought to purge uncooperative Party members at the
state level, the Democrats would have developed forty-eight New Deals. Though FDR was highly
popular after his first reelection, there would have been entrenched and resentful forces opposing
such an e↵ort.
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in popular terms by comparison.
What comes through clearly from considering the cases is that the CIO new
organizing was destabilizing. In each unit under consideration, CIO new organizing
and growing rivalry with the AFL exacerbated fault lines in the majority coalitions
that adopted union security legislation in the first place. The labor law became
constrained as a result of its success. This implies that the reason for the adoption
for restrictive laws is the upshot of the adoption of the protective laws. The character
of restrictive provisions adopted by the states of New York and Wisconsin also speak
to the coalitional costs of labor action: New York adopted a ban on jurisdictional
strikes while Wisconsin was sure to impose a cooling-o↵ period on agriculture-related
labor stoppages.
The media and public opinion probes in Chapters Two and Three revealed
that the prospect for worker protest finding public support was minimal; and, fur-
ther, that the media portrayal of strikes only served to limit that prospect. This
chapter advanced the overarching argument of the dissertation in that it shows why
the unions could not have forestalled Taft-Hartley under any plausible circumstance.
The various states suggest strongly that the pathway to a workplace rights regime like
the ones that govern the a✏uent counterparts of the US was a foreclosed possibility,
even at the height of industrial union strength. Though the states provided varying
political opportunities and threats, the result was the same across varying contexts.
The unions could only avoid retrenchment in a political context wherein workplace
resistance was not especially costly to preexisting political actors.
Attention to these states indicates that the intimate relationship between the
Democrats and the unions was not the result of the union leadership having been
co-opted or their having missed the potential of an alternate partisan coalition with
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farmers. Furthermore, the successful resistance to the restrictive amendments in New
York in contrast to neighboring Pennsylvania suggests that the rules of the game
determined labor’s position in partisan competition. The shrewd progressive, Amlie,
explained why voluntarism was a non-starter by the mid-40s,
The day is over when labor can a↵ord to take the position that in Congres-
sional contests it will support its friends and oppose its enemies. Unless
labor takes the responsibility of brining its friends into the political arena
to run for o ce by undertaking to carry the financial load involved, labor
will have no friends to supports. This has been strikingly brought home in
the present [1944] campaign. According to Governor Benson of Minnesota,
there are only two candidates for Congress that liberals can properly sup-
port in Minnesota this year. In the other seven Congressional districts,
the candidates who won the Democrat-Farmer-Labor nomination are no
better than their Republican opponents. In my opinion, the situation is
almost as bad in the other mid-west and northwestern states.”(Thomas
R. Amlie, ”Memo to Sidney Hillman,” ibid)
It appears more likely that Hillman and Murray made a strategic calculation
that was basically correct: failing to wed with FDR and liberal Democrats would have
likely ensured that labor would lose all its Depression gains in the post-war period,
much as it did after the First World War (Gall 1989, 24-6).
The new institutions that enshrined collective bargaining in the law promoted
disruptive militance which generated an electoral backlash. These labor boards al-
tered the preferences of industrial unions because accepting the benefits of legal pro-
tection implied submission to subsequent amendments. To order large-scale extra-
legal militance like the organizing drives of the CIO during its break from the AFL
after Wagner being ratified by the Court would have cost the CIO its relationship
with the president they paid dearly to elect. And the very acquiescence of the Court
to the packing scheme itself further suggested that the CIO was well-advised to main-
tain its close alliance with the Roosevelt administration. Congressional conservatism
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within the southern delegation combined with Republican hostility in the North also
demanded that the labor movement eschew voluntarism and work to alter the group
composition of the Democratic coalition.
But, just as importantly, Lewis’ voluntarism ran aground in its e↵ort to form an
alliance with farm owners. Due to their self conception as capitalists; their historical
primacy over labor; and, inclination toward patriotism for the war e↵ort, the farmers
in the Midwest were themselves unwilling to forge such an alliance. Though these
alliances were intermittently in power at the state level, the newly ascendant unions
of the 1930s would not have been able to form these coalitions because the militance
that empowered the new unions was unacceptable to agriculture.
The fact that heterogeneous states arrived at similar outcomes amidst a variety
of union postures suggests that alternate political paths were occluded. Organized
labor as a political vehicle was presented with four strategies vis a vis the parties and
polities. First, quietism; second, voluntarism; third, form the parties-in-chambers
with unionists themselves; fourth, become constituent members of the Democratic
Party, like the British Trades Union Congress and the Labour Party. Each of these
alternatives is freighted with costly tradeo↵s, and moreover, each was tried with
varying degrees of success. In the several states, the unions tried to sta↵ the parties
(MI), become central to the Democrats (PA, NY); play both ends against the middle
(WI, OR).
The Michigan unionists were riven by racial division and therefore were unreli-
able a a progressive force. Moreover, though the UAW became a predominant force
in Michigan politics, they were unable to unseat Republican Senator Vandenberg,
who opposed Wagner and helped override Truman’s veto until after the passage of
Taft-Hartley (Greenstone 1969, 111-4). In Oregon, the unionists were able to work
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with Republican Senator Wayne Morse - who voted to uphold Truman’s veto - but
this course was freighted with di culty. As Morse wrote to the CIO political director
Jack Kroll late in 1949, ”You people in the CIO are going to have to make up your
minds in respect to my candidacy for reelection as to whether or not you want any
liberals in the Republican Party. The attitude of you CIO critics in Oregon leads me
to believe you want liberals only in the Democratic Party” (quoted in Foster 1975,
197). It eventuated that the CIO had to work to only have liberals in the Democratic
Party because the third party option was not viable and because the Republican
Party had senior o cials as hostile to labor as the Southern Democrats.
But standing firmly with the Democratic Party, even outside the South, did
not imply that the CIO could have forestalled retrenchment. In the states without
a segmented work force, the AFL held great sway and their opposition to state La-
bor Relations Boards and to the new organizing helped galvanize opposition to the
Democrats, particularly Governor George Earle (D-PA) who was unseated in 1938
(Davin 2000). And, the presence of fusion balloting in New York State enabled
Hillman’s American Labor Party to operate as an adjunct of the Democratic Party
without being subsumed by it and without siphoning votes o↵ it. That is to say, the
case of New York being without a significant retrenchment law (i.e. not one that in-
hibits most strikes) is not necessarily an implication that these comparisons indicate
a way forward for labor. The cases are more useful to rule out courses of action.
Nonetheless, to counsel pre-War labor to take the militant tack that John L.
Lewis recommended would have likely resulted in further legal repression, rather than
further programmatic gains. Taken together, the results tend to strongly indicate that
industrial labor would not have been better served by choosing a path of militance in
line with Lewis’ persuasion. This implies that labor cannot expect to form a majority
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for socioeconomic reform via militance without forming alliances with other groups,
as standing on principle alone would more likely than not returned unions to the late
1890s. But this is something of a straw man, as Lewis did not counsel militance
alone but sought alliances with farm groups (Zieger 1988, 118-24; James A. Wechsler
Papers Box 1, WSHS).
From a strategic perspective, the unionists (particularly, the CIO) were not in
a dissimilar position with respect to the Democratic Party than they were vis-a-vis
capital. The withholding of the cartel’s services constituted the gravest threat the
union could muster. And, like in a strike, the workers’ resistance is highly costly.
What the unionists wanted to achieve in order to adopt social democratic policy was
to ensure that a majority of the majority coalition in the chambers were pro-union
voters. Because of the Dixiecrats, this was nigh-impossible in the Congress. But, in
principle, this goal was achievable in the statehouses.
Students of American labor politics have not failed to notice the crucial im-
portance of the CIO’s split from the AFL (Galenson 1960; Davis 1986; Rogers 1990;
Weir 2013) which divided the American labor movement into an industrial wing with
a Democratic partisan a liation and a ’bread-and-butter’ wing that often acted at
cross-purposes with the other. What is distinctive about this dissertation is the sys-
tematic examination of the inability of the CIO to forge protective coalitions after
the schism. The split between the AFL and CIO came to define labor politics from
1936 onward. Indeed, the fragmentation of American labor is a major reason the
United States has never known a viable socialist party. As Zolberg (1986) argues, the
American labor movement is the most decentralized and divided among the a✏uent
nations. But all labor movements are distinctive for they are embedded in distinctive
contexts (400).
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The battle between the rival federations necessitated the use of jurisdictional
strikes, which certainly helped foster the impression that labor stoppages were as
much a tool for racketeering as they were a tool for economic or social change, writ
broadly. Indeed, this line of argument featured in the Senate debate in favor of the
ban on secondary boycotts. However, in areas where the transport union (Teamsters)
engaged in secondary boycotts and hot cargo boycotts, these strikes were more often
mafioso tactics than class-organizational.
Moreover, the fragmentation of American unions is a mirror for the contestation
between class sympathies and particularistic benefit-seeking. The CIO was more
designed as a class vehicle but its growth was dependent on the occupation of o ce
by liberal Democrats. As a result, the CIO became internalized to the Democratic
Party. The AFL, being threatened with marginalization, necessarily had to pose
itself in opposition to the nascent labor-left coalition. Without a unified, or at least
undivided, labor movement in politics, there did not exist a feasible majority for
union security measures.
Conclusion
The rapid failure of protective laws outside the South implies both that racial
segmentation is not what doomed the labor movement to adjutant status and that
militant unionism would have failed even if the US had not entered the War. The
cases in this chapter take a representative cross-section of the varying results that
labor enjoyed at the state level; where New York serves as an exception that proves
the rule. Fusion balloting in New York elections was and remains a crucial tool for a
third-party vehicle on the left.
An expanded focus on labor relations in the states takes the unevenness of New
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Deal interventions seriously, which suggests that study of the New Deal order should
consider the national initiatives as being interwoven with di↵ering political units. In
a sense, the disconnections between the national AFL and CIO and political parties
and the state-level organizations and parties generated an ’intercurrent’ (Orren and
Skowronek 2004) labor relations order.
The overall role of labor law has been, on the one hand, to provide a platform
for asserting labor’s right to contend on an equal footing with capital but, on the
other hand, to limit the very capacity to engage in militant confrontation. The price
of legitimate access to the political arena is tactical moderation. But within this law
framework, labor and capital have structural dissimilarities that favor the owners.
Claus O↵e summarized the problem thusly,
For the sake of their power, unions are forced to maintain a precarious
balance between mobilization of resources and mobilization of activity,
between size and collective identity, between bureaucracy and internal
democracy. None of these dilemmas applies with comparable seriousness
to business and employers organizations for the reason that they do not
depend on internal democracy, collective identity, or the willingness to
engage in solidary action, because of the very fact that they are already
in a structural power position which renders complications such as these
avoidable (O↵e 1985, 187-88).
In a sense, Plotke’s (1996) argument is a restatement of O↵e’s point in that
observers should be impressed with the achievements of the poorly institutionalized
labor movement in the midst of a relatively low-capacity American State. This point
is well-taken as the CIO (and AFL) was in a di cult spot. It would not be wrong
to say that unionists faced a Hobson’s choice between allying with the Democratic
Party and increased militancy.
The only jurisdiction where the protective law was left intact was Utah, which,
as we have seen, was unique in that the newly empowered unions did not threaten
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to undo the preexisting political equilibrium. That is, although the New Deal was a
challenge to LDS supremacy in broad strokes, the worker protest element in itself did
not constitute a grave threat as it did to the order in political units in the industrial
core, or racially segmented units in the periphery. The experience of the Wisconsin
case clearly illustrates the immense di culty of constructing a farmer-labor coalition
after the New Deal.
But none of the above is meant to say that the Taft-Hartley Act would not have
been passed without the states having passed laws first. Statehouses were not full of
’hayseeds’ (Teaford 2002, 5) but they were not leaders in national policy on important
substantive matters. The reason states passed laws that anticipated Taft-Hartley
was, I have argued, because of the disruption to commerce and society wrought by
industrial strikes that politically marginalized radical organized labor.
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Table 4.1: Strike and CIO Membership Trends
Sources: Bureau of Labor Statistics and Troy and Sheflin (1965)
























Table 4.2: Penalized Maximum Likelihood Odds-Ratios of
Restrictive Law Adoption, 1936-1947, All 48 States
Variable Odds-Ratio
Strike Volume 1.001**
95% Conf. Interval 1.00 - 1.01
GOP Veto 4.18**
95% Conf. Interval 1.68 - 10.41
South 1.16
95% Conf. Interval .394 - 3.38
Urban .972
95% Conf. Interval .941 - 1.00
Black 1.01
95% Conf. Interval .982 - 1.05
Income 1.85
95% Conf. Interval 1.19 - 2.86
Immigrant .98
95% Conf. Interval .899 - 1.07
N 576
Log-Likelihood 148.840
Model p >  2 .0064
*p < .05 **p < .01 ***p < .001
Table 4.3: Penalized Maximum Likelihood Odds-Ratios of
Restrictive Law Adoption, 1936-1947, Non-South
Variable Odds-Ratio
Strike Volume 1.001**
95% Conf. Interval 1.00 - 1.002
GOP Veto 12.55*
95% Conf. Interval 1.01 - 155.66
Urban .956*
95% Conf. Interval .921 - .993
Black .865
95% Conf. Interval .629 - 1.19
Income 2.45**
95% Conf. Interval 1.31 - 4.58
N 361
Log-Likelihood -83.528
Model p >  2 .0056
*p < .05 **p < .01 ***p < .001
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Table 4.4: Marginal E↵ects on Restrictive Law Adoption, United States, 1936-1947
Variable dy/dx Z X
Strike Volume .2971* 2.34 8.96
GOP Veto 1.32* 2.89 .578
South -.031 -.06 .373
Black .013 .82 9.33
Immigrant -.006 -.14 8.09
Urban -.037* -2.14 46.8
Log-Income .224 .81 11.07
Owner Occupancy .149 .08 .487
Farm Own .139 .95 9.14




95% Conf. Interval .999 - 2.41
GOP Veto 16.29
95% Conf. Interval .922 - 287.78
Break 1024.634*
95% Conf. Interval 1 - 2217
Break*Strike Volume .694
95% Conf. Interval .435 - 1.1
Break*GOP Veto .061
95% Conf. Interval .003 - 1.15
N 576
Model p >  2 .032
Chow p >  2 .019
*p < .05 **p < .01 ***p < .001
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Table 4.6: Odds Ratios, Pre- and Post-1939
Variable Pre-1939 Post-1939
Strike Volume 1.008* 1.011







*p < .05 **p < .01 ***p < .001
Table 4.7: OLS Estimates of E↵ects of Republican Seat Gain
in 1938 State Elections
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
CIO Density 58.79* 57.64* 60.2* 59.07* 62.35* 63.5*
(Std. Error) (24.03) (24) (23.95) (24.65) .(24.42) (24.98)
FDR Vote - -.456 -.504 -.496 -.211 -.222
(Std. Error) (.43) (.429) (.438) (.479) (.495)
Urban - - -.174 -.21 -.224 -.194
(Std. Error) (.150) (.191) (.188) (.282)
Black - - - .829 .080 -.056
(Std. Error) (2.59) (2.6) (2.82)
Income - - - - -24.59 -24.48
(Std. Error) (18.01) (18.42)
Immigrant - - - - - -.112
(Std. Error) (.766)
N 29 29 29 29 29 29
Constant 13.55 40.63 52.04 52.37 128.83 129.23
Adj. R2 .1512 .1550 .1658 .1347 .1648 .1277

























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 4.10: Variable Summary
Variable Min Max Mean Std. Dev.
Strike Volume .009 4223.71 53.24 200.05
GOP Veto 0 1 .578 .494
South 0 1 .37 .48
Urban 16.6 92.4 46.8 18.64
Black .1 50.2 9.33 13.06
Immigrant .4 26.3 8.09 6.5
Farm Owned 5.21 11.39 9.14 1.13
Owner Occupied .29 .64 .487 .07
Table 4.11: Summary of the Cases
Wisc. New York Penn. Utah Mass.
Protective Law 1937 1937 1937 1937 1937
Restrictive Law 1939 (1940) 1939 1947 (1941)
Change to GOP Yes No Yes No No
Strike Volume Rank 8 6 4 41 23




Putting It All Together
The previous chapters have made the argument that the retrenchment against
worker protest was a result in line with majority preferences and, indeed, was a fairly
popular result across the nation. Yet, this dissertation has been premised on the claim
that the abrogation of the right to strike was a depredation borne by the workers of the
United States. So, then, the democratic competence of the mass public is called into
question - but not from the public side; rather, from the elite side - because the mass
public can only be judged based on the information available to it. The newspapers,
though factual in their reporting, did prefer to emphasize the supply shortages and
public disorder arising from strikes than the grievances or class interests being upheld
by the labor stoppages.
In the second chapter, I turned to the information that citizens relied upon. I
examined the coverage of salient and consequential strike episodes during the New
Deal period as well as editorials and syndicated columns alongside automated keyword
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searches. I established that militant union leadership received the preponderance of
coverage. And with respect to the content of news coverage, unfavorable items against
strikes were generally prevalent from the Flint strikes onward. Also, o cial sources
became more denunciatory over the course of the 1930s and 40s. That the content
was analyzed episodically as opposed to continuously imposes a limitation on the
conclusions drawn. Though it is unlikely, there is a chance that the content of media
reports were more evenhanded than these samples suggest. More subtly, it is not
evident that, to the extent coverage was against unions, the news was leading or
lagging mass opinion. Whether editors and owners were ’chasing eyeballs’ remains an
open question. But I proceed with an emphasis on the finding that the coverage was
mostly unfavorable to unions when it plausibly could have been more balanced.
The third chapter dealt with surveys of the citizens that returned retrenchment
majorities to the statehouses in 1938 and the Congress in 1946. I examined surveys
regarding support for unions, labor militance, the Wagner Act and militant union
leadership and compared them on a regional and class basis. Although this disser-
tation has been somewhat agnostic on the puzzle of why the militance that led to
protective laws also led to restrictive laws, the third chapter regarding public opin-
ion data suggests a tentative answer: namely, that the public approved of strikes
in furtherance of bargaining unit organization but deplored strikes in furtherance of
working-class interest or in contravention of war aims. Though the opinion and media
data are only analyzed graphically, it is evident that there was a connection between
sentiment toward unions and volume of coverage. The survey data presented were
arranged as rather limited time-series datasets because of the paucity of repeated
survey items. Moreover, that the data were not broken out by state in some polls
- instead by region - implies potential conceptual slippage between the opinion and
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media data on a sub-national basis. The sampling procedure employed makes impu-
tation of state level opinion di cult. Nevertheless, we saw that the citizens were not
meaningfully divided along regional or class lines.
In the fourth chapter, we learned that the restrictive laws against unions were
adopted in order to delegitimize worker protest. Here I regressed state-level char-
acteristics alongside strike volume on the adoption of restrictive strike laws across
the nation and in the non-Southern states. The statistical results suggested that the
pattern of labor restriction was in some sense orthogonal to race, for the non-Jim
Crow jurisdictions also rapidly retrenched against unions. Further, the statistical re-
sults in that chapter suggested that the turning point in labor law history was in the
1938 elections. As noted in that chapter, the baby Wagner laws might not have been
adopted without the adoption of the Wagner Act in the first place, but the retrench-
ing laws did not need federal leadership to be adopted. Moreover, this chapter does
dampen potential observed variation in the laws in its focus on anti-strike provisions.
Union activity went beyond strikes, of course. What is gained in recompense is a
clarity of focus on worker resistance.
Alongside the work in these chapters, I compared states that elected to adopt
’baby’ Wagner Acts, asking whether and how the logic of the chapter applied to the
cases, and, in the fourth chapter, I asked why did they retrench so quickly. These
comparisons dovetailed neatly with the statistical results, showing that organized
labor coexisted uneasily with other members of the protective coalition1 while indi-
cating that the skilled workers contributed to the programmatic defeat of industrial
1Though it might be noted that farmer-labor coalitions had existed in both parties; the discus-
sion in that chapter should not be taken as assuming that farmer-labor coalitions were inherently
progressive, though it was undeniably progressive in the majorities they it enjoyed in Wisconsin and
Minnesota.
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unionism. Moreover, the similar outcomes among heterogeneous industrial states is
in keeping with the key lesson of the mass opinion data: across regions, the public
was hostile to labor militance.
These findings imply that the anti-strike character of US labor law would have
found a genealogy outside the South, even if the Jim Crow delegation had not been
opposed to the CIO. The subsequent experience of the US labor movement demon-
strated that capital would grow increasingly intransigent as the usage and e cacy of
the strike weapon waned. Strikes were not circumscribed to wage and benefit dis-
putes under a contract because other strikes are just o↵ensive to capital; they were
circumscribed because other strikes are o↵ensive to many in the mass public.
If there was in fact no connection between the unfavorable coverage that salient
strikes received and the unfavorable opinion toward militance that was broadly ex-
pressed, then we would have encountered a notable coincidence. The connection
between the unfavorable public opinion toward strikes and the adoption of retrench-
ing policies is perhaps more tenuous. However, I did find that strikes in Northern
states were positively associated with Republican seat gains in the 1938 elections.
And, given that the capitalist class was united in its opposition to labor, the absence
of broad public support for militance was a su cient condition for retrenchment to
take hold.
Nonetheless, if these linkages did not hold, the core observation that the behav-
ior of the state legislatures in the 1930s took the character of a conservative reaction
to liberal strike policy furthered by the Wagner framework would also remain valid.
Furthermore, the core finding that this conservative reaction enjoyed broad tolerance,
if not favor, by the mass public would remain valid. The argument that the glass was
’half-full,’ also would remain valid, in light of the state cases.
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As Lichtenstein points out, drawing from Daniel Bell, the Taft-Hartley law
amounted to a statement of power more than anything else (Lichtenstein 2002, 137).
Treating the restrictive legislative outcomes and the popular support they enjoyed
without reference to their normative content would be an error. The extant legal
framework that emerged from the New Deal is characterized by workplaces wherein
workers are subject to the arbitrary dominion of owners and managers. And, when I
say ’arbitrary,’ I say this because the workers do not enjoy any meaningful check on
the authority of management. The prevailing legal view is that workers are meant
to obey the dictates of owners and managers. This perspective is rooted in the com-
modification of labor and the common law traditions concerning disposal of property
(Gourevitch 2016, 315-7). In this chapter, I sketch an understanding of strike rights
as being inherently bound in the bundle of rights that make citizenship real. But,
one could just as easily follow Gourevitch in pointing out that the right to strike ”is
a right to refuse to do work while maintaining a right to the job. This conceptual
structure makes sense if we see the strike as a way of reversing the structural domina-
tion of workers as the most immediate, concrete point at which they experience that
domination: the threat of losing, or never acquiring, a job” (2016, 318). That is, the
right to strike is the right for a collective of workers to resist capitalist domination in
itself.
In the remainder of this chapter, I will turn to the question of the relationship
between strikes and freedom. The foregoing investigation of the delegitimizing and
truncation of the right to strike was not motivated by a perspective that is neutral
with respect to workers; nor was its central motivation an interest in the fortunes of
labor unions as such; rather, it was motivated by the idea that abrupt and collective
cessation of employment is an essential tool for securing the rights of workers, and,
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by, extension, their political power. The phenomena of strike restriction is meaningful
because labor is central to American constitutional development (cf. Orren 1995) as
well as its political development, and is constitutive of much of civil society as well as
economic production. In other words, the fact of strike restriction is also value-laden
(cf. Putnam 2002, ’Chapter 1).
Strikes and Freedom, Reconsidered
The previous chapters have been preoccupied with delimitations on the right
to strike. In this chapter, I will be guided by two questions: What is the relation-
ship between strikes and freedom; and, how does the freedom to strike coexist with
prevalent concepts of liberty? This chapter will be a good deal more normatively
theoretical than the previous ones.2 We will be further interested in how the lessons
of the crucial New Deal period bear on the present political economy whose labor
market contains a large share of ’algorithmic’ jobs (cf. Collier 2015), and, therefore,
are patterned far di↵erently on the shopfloor than in the New Deal.
Therefore, given the information that citizens had, was their opposition to
strikes a wise attitude to express? In the present context, what is meant by ’wise’ is
a sound policy that coheres with democratic values. But in this instance, the policy
that coheres with democratic values is one that is incoherent with liberty. Drawing
upon David Hackett Fischer (2005, 4-10), observing the theoretical tension between
the right to be a free person fully as part of a society of free people (i.e. freedom) and
the right to be separate and independent (i.e. liberty). Further, English is the only
Western language containing this bifurcation (Ibid, 11). Opponents, particularly con-
servative ones, of protective laws that shield labor militance typically emphasize(d)
2Though I would suggest that it is impossible for a study of labor politics - or, truly, politics
generally - to be normatively innocent. For this reason, I reject the typical reticence of social science
to eschew value-neutrality
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the violation of the liberty of contract borne by the worker excluded by union. In-
deed, the problem with union dues was laid bare by opponents who argued that
paying tribute to any organization one disagrees with as a condition of employment
was an injustice. And this does not even contend with the urban scourge of union
racketeering. Witwer (2005, 528) argues that this narrative played a central role in
the late 1930s backlash against unions.
The investigation of the newspaper coverage of crucial labor episodes during
the New Deal suggested that the newspapers were likely to rely on o cial sources
and tended to give less voice to labor sources. Moreover, the coverage featured de-
nunciatory statements against unions that usually were left unrebutted (examples in
the Appendix of the second chapter). So, then, the pessimism implicit in my pre-
vious work was on the bases of political knowledge and perception (cf. Shapiro and
Bloch-Elkon 2008): knowledge in the sense that the public was led to view strikes
from the perspectives of those most interested in maintaining labor peace; perception
in the sense that the strikes were framed as injurious to the war e↵ort, or a threat to
Lockean values of property and liberty.
Let us start with perceptual bias. Because strikes were framed by the press as
a direct assault on the American tradition (cf. Hartz 1955) and unpatriotic3 - leaving
aside the inconvenience wrought by strikes - the framing of strikes were commonly
depicted as having placed the US in the ’domain of losses’ (cf. Kahneman and Tversky
1973). That is, there was a mass cognitive bias toward viewing the costs of strikes,
rather than imagining the kind of society that would result from labor denying capital
the whip hand in socio-economic relations.
3This is not to say that the conservative tradition in American political thought is more ’essential’
than the progressive tradition.
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Dahl argued that ”if democracy is justified in governing the state, then it must
also be justified in governing economic enterprises; and to say that it is not justified
in governing economic enterprises is to imply that it is not justified in governing the
state” (quoted in Frymer 2010, 609). I will not attempt to evaluate this syllogism
here; however, I will argue that the extant imbalance in political power between
elite citizens4 and the mass public - so great that Page and Winters (2009) term it
’oligarchy’ - is a result of a demobilized and insecure workforce. This decline in worker
power was attended by a decrease in union membership and militance. Contrary
to prominent approaches in political science (Goldfield 1988; Getman 2010; Frymer
2010) I privilege the decline in militance over the decline in union membership or
coverage. This is because collective bargaining is only secured by the threat of the
labor stoppage.
What is the relationship between strikes and freedom, directly stated? If a
person cannot abruptly cease working, in what sense is that person a free citizen? If
a person cannot abruptly cease working jointly and simultaneously with confederates,
then in what sense can the cessation of labor be instrumentally e↵ective toward
political or economic ends? These are more informal statements of the argument in
the conclusion of Lambert (2005). The right to strike is indispensable to citizenship
because work itself is inextricably bound with social standing and inclusion. As
Judith Shklar argues, ”the dignity of work and of personal achievement is [integral
to] American civic self-identification” (1991, 1). And, like Shklar, I am persuaded
by the contention that citizenship is best understood as a kind of belonging. What
is more, I identify this right to belonging - the right to be a free and full part of
4By ’elite,’ I mean those citizens who are capable of causing serious trouble for politicians (i.e.
damage their reelection chances) either unilaterally or in concert, given their number is small. So,
then, labor leaders are only elites within the Democratic Party, largely as a result of the geographic
concentration of labor density in the United States (Dark 2000; Roof 2011).
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a society - is in tension with the right to liberty as construed in the tradition of
American political thought. As Shklar points out (Ibid, 67), ”this vision of economic
independence, of self-directed ’earning’ as the ethical basis of democratic citizenship”
has been predominant since the advent of Jacksonian democracy; and, therefore, ”we
are citizens only if we earn” (Ibid). Indeed, it is not accidental that the Philadelphia
convention never considered extending the franchise to low-wage workers for it was
their considered view that their status of dependence on the pay packet disqualified
them from citizenship (Forbath 1999, 18-20).
In contrast to Lambert’s argument, upon which I am indeed reliant, I do not
defend the right to strike against the argument that the strikes are to be deplored for
their inconvenience (cf. Bok and Dunlop 1970, 229) - a core goal of the Taft-Hartley
amendments as presented in its statement of policy - in contrast, I take seriously the
tension that was and continues to be powerfully exploited by conservative politicians.
Thus, I am defending the right to strike against liberal and libertarian objections.
The result of the New Deal, with respect to the emergent policy of strike restriction,
was not a capitalist auto-correction; it reflected a majoritarian preference for anti-
democratic policy.
The dominant school of thought in the formation of the Roosevelt labor rela-
tions policy was the industrial pluralist school. These thinkers held that collective
bargaining was itself beneficial for society but only to the extent that it did not in-
volve protracted labor stoppages. This is because in the pluralist tradition held that
labor disputes were not born from class antagonism but rather from social complex-
ity in large enterprises. A leading pluralist of the 1930s, Arthur Ross, acknowledged
class antagonism thusly, ”One of the virtues of collective bargaining is that it permits
the formulation of limited issues which are amenable to resolution and blurs over the
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large di↵erences of principle which can never really be settled” (1954, 532). More
pointedly, A.H. Raskin, a labor reporter and editor for the New York Times, argued
”I see no reason why in this institution alone [the labor relations order], of all facets
of our society, we should exalt the right to make war as the hallmark of industrial
civilization when we seek to exorcize it everywhere else” (1967, 136).
Conservative opponents to industrial unionism who proceeded on principle
would likely endorse Hayek’s position that ”the whole basis of our free society is
gravely threatened by the powers arrogated by the unions” (1960, 269). Hayek, and
the libertarians generally, were unalterably opposed to strikes because they involved
denying to other citizens the liberty of contract to replace the strikers. The e cacy
of a strike is indeed grounded in coercion. Therefore, for my position to obtain, I
must make an appeal to a theory of justice; otherwise, I will merely be arguing for
the privileging of workers interests over those of capitalists (or consumers).5 It would
be tempting to appeal to Rawls’ original position here because any rational person
behind the veil of ignorance would prefer that the rights of strikers trump the right
to private property. This is because any individual would be far more likely to be
in the position of worker than that of capitalist. However, the Rawlsian concept is
based on individual liberty.
Thus, I focus on the right to strike as being a component of citizenship, an
essential property of which is the right to belonging. Shklar, in her seminal work
does not directly treat the right to strike but the work of TH Marshall upon whom
she draws does. ”Strikes usually involve breach of contract or the repudiation of
agreements. Appeal is made to some allegedly higher principle - in reality, though
this may not be expressly asserted, to the status rights of industrial citizenship”
5This is the legal (logical) positivist reading of my claim.
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(Marshall and Bottomore 1950, 26). And this is crucial: a one man strike is just
a quitter. By entangling the group right claim to citizenship, the right to strike is
placed on a secure theoretical footing. If a group of workers cannot exercise the right
to strike, then they must be subordinate citizens; therefore, not truly citizens at all.
Note, this is distinct from saying that the worker is servile because of dependence on
the pay packet. I find this defense of the right to strike highly persuasive because
denying a citizenship right constitutes a civil excommunication.
Implicitly, I have been conceiving of rights as a claim that circumscribes the
legitimate grounds under which legal coercion might be applied. Necessarily, then,
equality of rights must infringe on liberty - broadly construed. Here, I propose,
following Dworkin (1977), that liberty be understood as a bundle of distinct rights
and not as a broad shield. In the Hayekian concept of liberty and commutative justice,
the right to several property is a shield against inequality. Yet, in contrast to Hayek’s
supposition that social justice is a fig leaf for politically motivated expropriation, I
emphasize that it is a purely theoretic contest between rights, that of citizenship and
property. I can further appeal to Michael Sandel (1996) who argues persuasively that
all rights are in some sense collective because all people must be embedded in a social
context of some kind. By definition, rights involve a claim and a corresponding duty
so they cannot exist in theoretical isolation.
Therefore, the Labor-Management Relations Act is a law that denies the social
dimension of humanity. The right to strike necessarily implies a protection from
job loss or criminal sanction as a result of industrial stoppage. In denying such
protection(s), the extant labor law serves to excise social citizenship from worker
citizenship. In their haste to delegitimize worker protest, the Congress promised to
contribute to the atomizing of society.
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Though the rationale of maintaining the free flow of commerce can be found in
the Wagner Act, the Taft-Hartley amendments evidently turn the purpose of Wagner
labor law on its head. In this sense, though, it could be viewed as an anteceding case-
in-point for Schiller’s (2015) recent argument that the contradictions of progressive
policies adopted under the Democratic regime doomed postwar liberalism from the
outset. He summarizes thusly, ”When liberalism emerged from World War II, the
focus of workplace regulation was on ensuring the right of workers to organize labor
unions, and on forcing employers to bargain with those unions. By the middle of the
1970s, the regulation of employers had shifted. Paramount now was the protection
of the rights of individuals not to be discriminated against because of the immutable
characteristics” (Ibid, 240).
Another way of understanding the policy responses to labor militance in state
and nation is to note what the retrenchment chamber majorities did not do. To wit,
none proposed unconstitutional legislation to disband unions6, nor did they attempt
to disband unions on an intra-state basis. Indeed, as Paster (2015, 21) points out, the
politics surrounding the New Deal reforms suggest some strategic accommodation on
the part of capital.
Citizens who themselves had little stake in capitalist accumulation undeniably
had a stake in the delivery of consumer goods. Observers, such as Cohen (2003) have
made the case that in the social arena, that citizens tended to place a primacy on
their identity and interest as consumers. Halting production therefore pits workers
against consumers as well as capitalists. So, it is hard to argue that there was an
oligarchic distortion during the formation of New Deal policy.
6Such a measure would contravene the Wagner Act and so would have run aground upon the
Supremacy clause.
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Nonetheless, many observers of present-day politics would argue it tends toward
oligarchy (Bartels 2008; Gilens 2012; Gilens and Page 2014; Page and Winters 2015,
for example) and that the weakness of unions is a major cause of the United States’
distinctively unequal society (Morris and Western 1999; Stitglitz 2015, for example).
The weakness of the unions as a class vehicle stem chiefly not from membership
or density but from the absence of direct resistance. Indeed, the present-day gains
for the labor movement, such as they are, are dependent on extra-union class-based
social movement organizing (Fantasia and Voss 2004; Milkman and Voss 2004; Francia
2006).
Yet, worker resistance is essential to balancing capital. And this means more
than union organization, membership, or density - for example, the German experi-
ence which shows that regulatory liberalization and economic inequality have risen
even with high union density; this is because the unions prefer(red) insiders (cf. The-
len 2014; Collier 2015).
The present political economy has been increasingly characterized by non-
production work in recent decades and that trend should continue. If, in this new
economy, a CIO for the twenty-first century were to be formed, it would be based in
the service sectors and the health care sectors. While the nurses and janitors have
a worksite to seize, militance that denies medical care is as unsympathetic as strikes
that cut milk delivery or strikes that undermine a war e↵ort. Moreover, many of the
present-day workers and economic losers are in atomized workplaces, making organi-
zation di cult - and making organization in the absence of militance useless. But,
again, I do not recommend the importance of unions qua unions, for they are only po-
litically meaningful for a broad swath to the extent that they engage in class politics.
Indeed, public sector unions are all too happy to be adjutant to the Democratic Party,
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as Democratic majorities serve as a proxy for worksite co-determination.7
It should be noted that the use of replacement workers to break strikes has been
an essential tool in the capitalist countero↵ensive. The replacement worker doctrine
comes out of late 1930s Supreme Court cases (cf. Klare 1978; Barenberg 1993).
While the decline of the e cacy strikes would be impossible without the employment
of replacement workers, the climate in which owners felt free to negate the right to
strike is an outgrowth of the context in which they were embedded; namely a context
in which the right to strike was narrowly legitimized.
Schiller (2015, 245-8) rightly argues that the collapse of the New Deal coali-
tion had its origins in the very formation of the policy itself; because the New Deal
o↵ered so little to working-class whites, those voters were quick to bolt for the Re-
publican Party. And because the labor relations framework made it di cult for civil
rights demanders to believe that the union o cers elected by white majorities would
allow the unions to petition and be vehicles for racial justice, there was little on of-
fer to Blacks. So, then, legal challenges raised by the civil rights demanders came
into direct conflict with union rights. Had there been a robust right to strike, the
industrial workforce would have been impelled to adopt racially harmonious policies
(like that of unions in the young CIO, the autoworkers, mine workers, mill workers,
rubber workers and textile workers), lest the Blacks be rational strikebreakers. So,
then, if workers could strike freely, the tension between majoritarian labor law and
minority-shielding employment law likely would not have made rivals of the merged
AFL and CIO and the civil rights movement. Also, as Lee (2014, 236) shrewdly
points out, the conservative movement, in its linking of union trouble with Black and
7Co-determination also implicates political theories of dignity which are important but distinct
from the focus of this chapter.
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women claimants helped blunt the white supremacist undertones of the the ascendant
conservative coalition.
The right to strike conceived as part and parcel of citizenship rights would lead
to the imposition of the worker’s voice into the production process and enshrine the
workers’ cartels as a civic institution. Industrial unions, then, were not merely a
vehicle for wage gains, they were a potential site for self-government and, therefore,
would have concomitant responsibilities to avoid the use of strike leverage as a means
to secure sub-group advantage. That is, these hypothetical, non-Taft-Hartley-bound
organizations, would have to elude the iron law of oligarchy. Whether this possibility
is theoretically possible is beyond the scope of this chapter, though I would share a
skeptical reader’s doubts. Nonetheless, this consideration is altogether distinct from
the question of citizenship as belonging or whether rights to full belonging in society
trump rights to property or liberty, broadly construed. It is worth pointing out, as
Lambert (2005, 194-6) does, that the thirteenth amendment can be credibly read
to guarantee the right to strike in its forbidding involuntary servitude; however, the
Supreme Court has summarily dismissed this idea without seriously engaging it. That
said, the ’switch in time’ involved a shift in doctrine as great as this one.
In summary, the right to strike is a group right that conflicts with individual
liberties. Because this group right is essential to citizenship (or, social belonging),
it is presented as prior to individual rights to property and contract in principle.
This argument generates the paradoxical insight that majoritarian preference ran
counter to democracy. And, indeed, this preference was borne out, for democracy
lessened and oligarchy flourished in the subsequent decades. This elides discussion
of the intervening political shocks of the civil rights movement and economic shocks
associated with deindustrialization, though; and this is why the present chapter has
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taken normative theory as its focus, because the argument from principle is clearer
than the argument from consequence, as unhappy as those have been.8
1930s Backlash and the Present
The rollbacks that unions in Wisconsin faced in 2011 was one that overturned
an old law, in contrast to the backlash of the 1930s that immediately pared down a
new law. Upon winning the statehouse in President Obama’s first midterm, Governor
Scott Walker and his co-partisans set about applying a right-to-work law to state and
municipal employees (Stein and Marley 2013, 12-5).9
Also importantly, the backlash against the public sector unions was one made
in a context where the private sector unions had already been substantially weakened.
And, indeed, an important element of the Republicans’ advocacy for the rollback of
collective bargaining rights was rhetoric concerning fairness. If private sector workers
are exposed to the vicissitudes of the market, why should public sector workers be
insulated (Devinatz 2015, 9; Chesters 2016, 3)? But the previous decline of private
sector unions was not only rhetorical in its e↵ect. The weakness of existing unions also
left the public sector unions politically isolated. Though Republicans were variously
in support of public sector union security laws in the middle of the twentieth century,
Republican unified government is necessary for substantial rollbacks at present. The
partisan cleavage that emerged placed the public sector unions in an adjutant role
to the Democrats; but unlike the 1930 and 40s, this role was one that was happily
8Taking us back to our discussion of Smith’s (2000, Chapter 9) agnosticism over whether people
would be better o↵ under a social democratic regime. Here, our normative argument reveals that
the middle tercile whose fortunes may or may not be better than their European counterparts
have a stunted citizenship, even if the inequality that arose from working-class enervation is not
demonstrably catastrophic for them.
9The Democrats, while in the majority, had a chance to enshrine the collective bargaining agree-
ments into statute, but were unable to muster su cient party unity. Two Democrats defected and
the measure failed in the upper chamber.
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played by public sector workers.
Because of these limitations, a comparison between these eras is unlikely to
be deeply illuminating. However, the argument that union weakness arising from
the retrenchments against Wagner is connected to latter-day reversals is plausible.
Notably, victory of the ’Fight for 15’ in New York in 2015 was itself reliant on the ’baby
Wagner’ law adopted in 1937. In New York, workers picketed fast food restaurants
and dirsupted tra c on throughfares while protesting for a statutory increase in the
minimum wage to fifteen dollars an hour. The New York Governor Andrew Cuomo
established an industry commission with the purpose of devising regulations toward
that end. These industrial commissions are authorized by the 1937 State Labor
Relations Act.
Altogether, this exercise in historical social science is of less utility to students
interested in union revival than it is to students of faded potentialities. This disser-
tation shows more about why and how the paths to American social democracy were
occluded at the height of labor’s power. The 1930s were the only time in US history
when business opposition to union formation and protest was overcome by the state
or the unions. But, even given this, the present-day condition of legal and political
weakness could not have been forestalled.
Limitations and Final Thoughts
This dissertation set out to see what could be gained from a revisiting of the
Wagner to Taft-Hartley interlude with a focus on the uneven experience of the states.
What came out of that analysis chiefly was an emphasis on the social control impetus
aroused by union militance among the public. This causal emphasis stands in contrast
to the emphasis that would be gleaned from study limited to the federal level where
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scholarship has pointed to the preferences of the white supremacist delegation or the
preferences of corporate liberals within the Roosevelt administration.
In exploring this pattern of retrenching laws against strikes, we turned to the
media and opinion context in which the electorates were embedded. This investigation
was inconclusive in terms of determining whether the public was manipulated but
it did illuminate the hostility which worker protest encountered and, importantly,
suggested that majority preference had been served by retrenchment. Investigation
of these factors in the states highlighted the unease with which a muscular organized
labor movement was integrated into the existing partisan coalitional alignments. But,
just as importantly, the pattern of popular support for strike restraint carried with it
thorny normative implications, which formed the focus of the present chapter.
Crucial among the contributions of this dissertation is to locate the turning
point in US labor law history in 1938, as opposed to 1941, 1947, 1959, 1968, or 1980.
Before the Congress adjourned in 1939, Senator Claude Pepper (D-FL) rose to in-
tervene, ”I am unwilling to let this session of Congress end without lifting my voice
to decry the unrighteous partnership of those who have been willing to scuttle the
American government and the American people and jeopardize the peace of the world
because they hate Roosevelt and what Roosevelt stands for....I accuse that design-
ing alliance of a deliberate attempt to sabotage the first real e↵ort ever made in this
nation to secure for the workers of America industrial democracy and economic eman-
cipation. I accuse them of having prostituted their power to serve the US Chamber of
Commerce, the Manufacturer’s Association, and the beneficiaries of special privilege
who hate in their hearts the man who has tried to lighten the burden of toil on the
back of labor (quoted in Patterson 1967, 326). Here Senator Pepper has identified
the backlash as having occurred well before the traditional understanding. In short,
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the limits of labor liberalism were reached at the height of the New Deal.
This is important because it strongly suggests that the present political order
is an altogether unhelpful basis on which to proceed for the labor-left. If attempts
to forge a new political economy at the apogee of militance were doomed, then the
present circumstance is untenable.
At the outset, I argued that the investigation of the states would also yield
counter-factual insight into the question of whether the Taft-Hartley Act might have
been forestalled or prevented in addition to facilitating testing theories of New Deal
policy change. In order to more convincingly make this case, further research might
structure the historical path as a sequence of variations represented by nodes that
connote the various strategies taken by state-level and local union a liates during
this period.
The experience of the states bears upon union revival in that imagining a mus-
cular labor movement that is not subordinate to the Democratic Party requires imag-
ining a political order in which the right to strike is respected. In the absence of this
ability to exercise such power, it is nigh-impossible to suggest a di↵erent outcome.
Though unions may coalesce with social movement organizations (e.g. ’Fight for 15,’
the mass protest movement to raise the minimum wage to fifteen dollars per hour), the
success of that struggle is dependent on attention-grabbing disruptive protest which
raises the salience of their concerns. And, importantly, the major recent success that
protest movement secured in New York State was an exercise of gubernatorial author-
ity resting upon the old Doyle-Neustein bill, that is, the baby Wagner Act. But, here,
this should not be taken to undermine the normative argument presented above, for
the strike is a commercial (and, by extension, political) tool as well as an expression
of worker citizenship and personhood.
This dissertation is in some sense limited by its temporal scope. If we expanded
the time frame forward, we would contend with the role of public sector strikes in the
latter-day relationship between unionists and the Democrats. While the public sector
is strategically distinct from the private sector in terms of union purpose, protest,
and organization, the central problem of how everyday citizens wrest control from
the strong is the same. There is a cost to limiting the temporal scope to the adoption
of Taft-Hartley but the limitation of the right to strike in the private sector was an
essential component of the politics surrounding the incorporation of public sector
unions into state politics in the mid-20th century. Put another way, it is di cult
to believe that the depredations su↵ered by latter-day public sector unions are not
a direct result of the losses incurred by unionists during the New Deal. Indeed, the
rhetoric of proponents of state laws that erode public union security justify the public
sector depredations on the basis that it would be unfair to exclude the government
workers from the precarity faced by private-sector workers.
The relationship between capital and labor that prevailed in the industrial po-
litical economy is extinct; but, the relationship between the two forged during the
New Deal persists. The relationship between white voters and the Democratic Party
has changed; the unions that support the Democratic Party are now more likely to
be public sector workers. The temptation for public sector unions to work for class
gains10 or to use militance is diminished because the politicians constitute the senior
managers. But, again, the relationship between the unions and the Democrats was
forged during the New Deal and set the pattern for the next century.
10Moe (2011) or DiSalvo (2015) would deem this an understatement and make the case that
the public sector unions constitute a cartel of insiders extracting gains from the public till at the
expense of the citizenry. I am agnostic regarding diagnoses of latter-day unions. Su ce to say,
we have considered the roles and anticipations of militant worker activists and we can say that the
decision to bureaucratize and become adjutant to the Democratic Party was freighted with tradeo↵s.
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The focus on the industrial political economy seems to limit the relevance of
the dissertation to the present circumstance, for the nature of work has changed. The
’less hierarchical organization of the workplace in algorithmic jobs seems to suggest
that workers are managing the managers as much as the other way around. However,
there is an ineluctable disparity in power between owners and managers and workers,
even if the workers are autonomous in how they go about meeting production goals.
The social conventions of work are apparently less hierarchical than the industrial
plants of the 1930s and 40s, but this is a veneer over the insecurity of the workers
that are also increasingly atomized. In the final instance, the fortunes of workers
remain dependent on their capacity to form e↵ectual collective organizations.
Crucially, the judiciary has been on the outskirts of this dissertation while their
causal role is quite central: judicial hostility explains why Lewis was right to form the
renegade CIO, and judicial amenability explains the transformation of the Wagner
Act from parchment into a social and political reality. This is consistent with Orren’s
(1992) and Forbath’s (1991) ’judicial supremacy’ argument: in the development of
the labor relations order, the courts have served to set the rules of the game.
A virtue of this dissertation has been to ask whether the racial segmentation
of the labor force and, indeed, US society was an essential component of the politics
that established the extant labor law regime. The experience of the states suggests
that the US would have had a comparatively restricted labor movement, even if the
Jim Crow states had been in a separate polity.11 However, in leaving race o↵ to the
side, the present-day applicability of the foregoing insights is again limited.
These limitations notwithstanding, the foregoing analyses of the states and
11A comparison with the experiences of other English-speaking nations would also lend insight
onto this matter.
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regions strongly suggest that worker-protesters were in an untenable position even at
the apogee of their might, and the resultant legal regime is more or less what the
mass public wanted: unions should be legally recognized but their protest should
be muted. The resultant original contributions are twofold: first, to identify a race-
neutral explanation for the prevalence of union restriction; second, to outline pre-
War limits to liberalism in the states. The subsequent course of events throughout
the twentieth century substantiates the logic of placing our focus squarely on strike
restraint across the nation and upon the hollowing out of the concept of freedom that
arises from a truncated right to strike. These are consequential because they place the
current oligarchic US politics in a perspective that highlights the absence of a class-
counterweight precisely because worker protest has been diminished greatly.
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There are twenty newspapers across the nation from January 1936 until January
1948 used in these searches: The New York Times, New York Herald Tribune, Daily
Boston Globe, The Washington Post, Los Angeles Times, The Sun, The Christian
Science Monitor, Chicago Daily Tribune, The Atlanta Constitution, Wall Street Jour-
nal, Atlanta Daily World, Afro-American, The Chicago Defender (National edition),
Philadelphia Tribune, The Pittsburgh Courier, Cleveland Call and Post, and Los An-
geles Sentinel.
Search Strings
Figures 1-3: All indexed strike articles: (((all(strike) AND labor AND at.exact
(”Front Page/Cover Story”)) AND ti(labor OR strike) AND pd(19360101-19480101);
John L. Lewis articles: (all(john l. lewis) AND at.exact(”Front Page/Cover Story”))
AND pd(19360101-19480101); Racketeering articles: (all(union) AND racket* AND
at.exact(”Front Page/Cover Story”)) AND pd(19360101-19480101); CIO articles:
(all(CIO) OR all(C.I.O) OR all(C-I-O) AND at.exact(”Front Page/Cover Story”))
AND pd(19360101-19480101); Communism articles: all(labor union) AND (com-
munist* OR reds) AND at.exact(”Front Page/Cover Story”)) AND pd(19360101-
19480101)
Figures 4 and 5: John L. Lewis Articles: (all(john l. lewis) AND at.exact
(”Front Page/Cover Story”)) AND pd(19360101-19480101); Sidney Hillman articles:
(all(sidney hillman) AND
at.exact(”Front Page/Cover Story”)) AND pd(19360101-19480101); Philip Murray
articles: (all(philip murray) AND labor union AND at.exact(”Front Page/Cover
Story”)) AND pd(19360101-19480101); David Dubinsky articles: (all(david dubin-
sky) AND at.exact
(”Front Page/Cover Story”)) AND pd(19360101-19480101); Harry Bridges articles:
(all(harry bridges) AND at.exact(”Front Page/Cover Story”)) AND pd(19360101-
19480101); William Green articles: (all(William Green AND AFL) AND at.exact
(”Front Page/Cover Story”)) AND pd(19360101-19480101)
Figure 11: Plea: all(labor union) AND (plea OR grievance) AND at.exact(”Front
Page/Cover Story” OR ”Article” OR ”Image/
Photograph” OR ”Feature” OR ”Illustration” OR ”Front Matter” OR ”Editorial”
OR ”Editorial Cartoon/Comic” OR ”News” OR ”Commentary”) AND pd(19350101-
19490101); Demand: all(labor union) AND demand AND at.exact(”Front Page/Cover
Story” OR ”Article” OR ”Image/Photograph” OR ”Feature” OR ”Illustration” OR




Flint Sit-Down, January 1, 1937 to February 22, 1937:
New York Times: ”sit-down strikers still defying an injunction to vacate;” ”Demands
which are called conditions of settlement,” January 4, 1937, pg. 1; ”Alfred P. Sloan,
president of General Motors, accepted the gage of battle o↵ered by the United Au-
tomobile Workers of the Committed for Industrial Organizing,” January 5, 1937, pg.
1; ”General Motors held out little hope tonight of an early settlement of the strike
which has thrown more than 52,000 men out of work,” January 8, 1937, pg. 1; ”every
e↵ort will be made to get men back to work and General Motors will never toler-
ate the domination of its employees by a small minority” January 17, 1937, pg. 1;
”employees are engaged in a back to work movement,” January 22, 1937, pg. 1; ”the
President’s statement was a rebuke to John L. Lewis,” January 23, 1937, pg. 1; ”the
strike is an issue between property rights and no property rights,” January 24, 1937,
pg. 1; ”employees being deprived of the right to work by a small minority who have
seized certain plants and are holding them as ransom,” January 28, 1937, pg. 1; ”
Sloan applauded the demonstration of loyalty and described that over 100,000 have
signaled their desire to return to work,” ibid; ”these strikes have passed beyond the
sit down stage into the occupational stage,” February 1, 1937, pg. 1; ”Congressman
Reed of New York said that the sit-down strikes were the most un-American thing in
America,” February 5, 1937, pg 1;
New York Herald Tribune: ”The union has made collective bargaining impossible by
using coercion,” pg.1; ”The General Motors corporation today made public telegrams
sent to it by leaders of craft unions opposed to the United Auto Workers of the
Congress for Industrial Organizing, January 9, 1937, pg. 1; ”The auto strike situation
was worse here in its potentiality for violence tonight than at any point since its
beginning,” January 29, 1937, pg. 1; ”Sheri↵ Thomas Walcott mobilized the entire
police force here to enforce an injunction order as Governor Frank Murphy ignored
an entreaty by the Sheri↵ to send troops,” February 4, 1937; ”John L. Lewis, the man
behind the strike which has paralyzed General Motors and the Governor,” February
8, 1937, pg. 1.
Chicago Tribune: ”the UAW-CIO met to coordinate the movement they started and
which has gone somewhat our of hand,” January 1, 1937, pg. 1; ”the manufacturers
do not want a showdown but Lewis is forcing one,” ibid; ”being led by a private
group of labor dictators,” January 6, 1937, pg. 1; ”the strikes which are an unlawful
occupation of General Motors plants,” January 10, 1937, pg. 1; ”the strikers mixed
in riotous melees,” January 12,1937, pg. 1; ”The strike of General Motors that has
kept 115,000 out of work and has cost workers and the corporation 10 million dollars
moved toward a definite conclusion,” January 16, 1937, pg. 1; ”John L. Lewis said
we helped Roosevelt lick industry, now let him help us lick industry,” January 22,
1937, pg. 1; ”Lewis had baldly attempted to force upon the Roosevelt administration
the obligation of repaying the political debt arising out of the support Lewis gave,”
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January 23, 1937, pg. 1; ”General Motors corporation will continue its e↵orts Monday
to reopening of plants not closed by direct strikes in order to give work to as many
employees as possible,” January 24, 1937, pg. 1; ”The violence flared out of control
with the suddenness of a cyclone resulting in a new sit-down strike,” February 2,
1937, pg. 1.
Baltimore Sun: ”Charging their enforced idleness to the dictates of a small group
of radical agitators,” January 22, 1937, pg. 1; ”C.I.O. is a group of agitators and
racketeers,” ibid; ”General Motors says a back to work movement is supported by
123,724 workers,” January 31, 1937, pg. 1; ”John L. Lewis strike dictator-general,”
February 10, 1937, pg. 1.
Washington Post: ”’John L. Lewis strike dictator-general,” February 10, 1937, pg.
1.
Christian Science Monitor: ”the seizure and possession of plants is not su cient to
club an illegitimate demand out of employers when they have public opinion back of
them,” February 12, 1937, pg. 1.
Boston Globe: ”John L. Lewis, generalissimo of the strike,” January 22, 1937, pg.1;
Los Angeles Times: ”Strike generalissimo, John L. Lewis, head of the Committee for
Industrial Organizing,” February 7, 1937, pg. 1.
Wall Street Journal: ”United Auto Worker chieftains drafted a program of far-
reaching demands, threatening a company-wide walkout as an alternative to employer
capitulation,” January 4, 1937, pg. 1; ”John L. Lewis knit more closely the divisions
of the army he is hurling at the mass production industries,” ibid; ”A rising tide of
resentment on the part of employees thrown out of work because of strikes engineered
by a minority was seen yesterday,” January 8, 1937, pg. 1; ”the corporation released
figures showing that 79 percent of employees have protested against strikes,” January
22, 1937, pg. 1.
Lewis and Hillman, 1937-1940:
New York Times: ”’Hillman has declined to go along with Mr. Lewis is attacking the
New Deal,” January 30, 1940, pg. 1; ”Lewis is Rebu↵ed on Defense Post,” August
11, 1940, pg. 1; ”Hillman’s Union Will Stay in CIO, in Reply to Lewis Taunts,”
November 21, 1940, pg. 1.
New York Herald Tribune: ”Hillman Fights in CIO for Labor Peace: Accepts Lewis
Challenge,” November 21, 1940, pg 1.
Los Angeles Times: ”CIO Warned Against Isms Menace to Labor by Hillman, Re-
jecting the Suggestion of John L. Lewis” November 21, 1940, pg. 1.
Baltimore Sun: ”Hillman Vies Against Lewis For Contracts,” October 29, 1940, pg.
1.
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Wall Street Journal: ”New Dealers and members of Congress supporting new wage
and labor standards have picked Sidney Hillman to appear before the joint committee
meeting and o↵set the unfavorable reaction that resulted from the testimony of John
L. Lewis,” June 6, 1937, pg. 1.
Captive Mines, September 21, 1941 to November 23, 1941:
New York Times ”President Roosevelt’s plea to Mr. Lewis to arrange for the con-
tinued production in the captive mines was supplemented by a plea by Mr. Davis
[National Defense Mediation Board Chair],” October 25, 1941, pg. 1; ”If a general
strike were called the walkout would cripple the entire national defense program,”
October 26, 1941, pg. 1; ”Steel men look upon the present strike as a culmination
of the e↵ort of John L. Lewis to force a closed shop,” ibid; ”Mr. Roosevelt appealed
tonight to the John L. Lewis of 1941 with the language of the Lewis of 1919, if Mr.
Lewis refuses his patriotism will be impugned,” October 27, 1941, page 1; ”Come to
the aid of your country,” ibid; ”Sen. Byrd says there has been no more disgraceful
or humiliating episode in American history,” October 28, 1941, pg. 1; ”On the heels
of John. L. Lewis’s refusal, the storm aroused in Congress beat higher today with
suggestions and plans for drastic anti-strike legislation for the defense industries,”
Ibid; ”Senator Ellender declares John L. Lewis a traitor to our American ideals, and
a menace to the peace and prosperity of our nation,” October 30, 1941, pg. 1; ”’Sen.
Russell deems the walkout sabotage,” October 31, 1937, pg. 1; ”The president said
the government will never compel the remaining to join the union by a government
decree. That would be too much like the Hitler methods toward labor,” November
15, 1941, pg. 1; ”O cials of the United Mine Workers of American, defying President
Roosevelt, late today ordered 53,000 men in the captive mines to withdraw,” Novem-
ber 16, 1941, pg. 1; ”53,000 Told to Quit: UMW Heads Defy Roosevelt Warning,”
November 16, 1941, pg. 1; ”I don’t mind strikes, but every minute? Why hell’s fire,
I’m no rich man. I’m a working man says rank-and-file miner,” November 17, 1941,
pg. 1; ”FDR described as not a valid point John L. Lewis’s principal gal for insisting
upon acceptance of the union shop,” November 19, 1941, pg. 1; ”Faced with spread-
ing sympathy stoppages of coal production, President Roosevelt was reported tonight
to be nearing the point of cracking down on John L. Lewis,” November 21, 1941, pg.
1; ”Carnegie Illinois says enough steel to build thirty destroyers was irrevocably lost
to the national defense e↵ort,” November 23, 1941, pg. 1.
New York Herald Tribune: ”For the third time, your government through me asks you
and the o cers of the United Mine Workers to authorize an immediate resumption
of mining,” October 28, 1941, pg. 1; ”The president says he is considering legislation
to strengthen the powers of the Executive to deal with labor controversies,” October
29, 1941, pg. 1; ”The president has very strong cards in his hand with strong popular
support for suppression of strikes which hold up defense production,” November 13,
1941, pg. 1; ”Too much like Hitler methods,” November 15, 1941, pg. 1; ”Every [CIO]
delegate is asking himself whether such a strike is justified in a time of national emer-
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gency,” November 16, 1941, pg. 1; ”the president says Lewis strike justifications are
not valid,” November 19, 1941, pg. 1; ”Lewis Scorns Two Peace Plans of Roosevelt,”
November 20, 1941, pg. 1.
Christian Science Monitor: ”Come now to the defense of your country, President
says,” October 27, 1941, pg. 1; ”US to Run Mines Unless Lewis Yields; Nation Backs
FDRs Fighting Talk,” October 28, pg. 1; ”The interruption of woe by strikes is the
greatest help the aggressors can get,” November 3, 1941, pg. 1.
Washington Post: ”Lewis Rejects Plea to End Mine Strike,” September 17, 1941, pg.
1; ”in this crisis of our national life there must be uninterrupted production of coal
for making steel,” October 27, 1941, pg. 1; ”Anti-Labor Feeling Sweeps Capitol,”
October 28, 1941, pg. 1; ”NAM president says if we can’t lick Lewis, then we better
lay o↵ Hitler,” November 19, 1941, pg. 1; ”President calls John L. Lewis’s reasons
not valid,” ibid; ”Up to Mr. Lewis,” November 11, 1941, pg. 12; ”Three were shot in
striker melee” November 22, 1941, pg. 1.
Baltimore Sun: ”President calls on John L. Lewis to come to the defense of your
country,” October 27, 1941, pg. 1; ”NAM Sounds Warning on Strike,” Ibid, 19;
”Roosevelt makes fourth Plea to Lewis to End Strike,” October 30, 1941, pg. 1;
”John L. Lewis ended his truce with the government and 53,000 of his miners went
on strike in defiance of the president’s edict,” November 16, 1941, pg. 1; ”We must
find a way to halt these strikes in defense and we can no longer beg,” November 18,
1941, pg. 1.
Los Angeles Times: ”uninterrupted production is essential to the preservation of
our freedoms, says President,” October 27, 1941, pg. 1; ”President Again Calls on
Lewis to Halt Strike,” October 28, 1941, pg. 1; ”public is against strikes in defense
industries,” November 2, 1941, pg. 1; ”An e↵ective CIO strike has slowed the flow of
steel and John L. Lewis belligerently defied the government to use troops,” November
18, 1941, pg. 1; ”FDR Rebukes Lewis,” November 19, 1941, pg. 1; ”public hostility
toward the unions together with repeated signs the administration is about ready to
advocate sharp labor control legislation were believed non factors in the mine workers
decision [to abort strike],” November 23, 1941, pg. 1.
The Atlanta Constitution: ”Roosevelt calls on Lewis to Avert Mine Strike Threat-
ening US Defense,” October 25, 1941, pg. 1; ”uninterrupted production is essential
to the preservation of our freedoms, says President,” October 27, 1941, pg. 1; ”An
e↵ective CIO strike has slowed the flow of steel and John L. Lewis belligerently defied
the government to use troops,” November 18, 1941, pg. 1; ”FDR Rebukes Lewis,”
November 19, 1941, pg. 1.
Chicago Tribune: ”uninterrupted production is essential to the preservation of our
freedoms, says President,” October 27, 1941, pg. 1; ”The president now finds himself
at the mercy of tyrants which he brought into being and established in power,”
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October 29, 1941, pg. 1; ”Anti-strike was introduced to crush would-be dictators,”
November 18, 1941, pg. 1; ’FDR Rebukes Lewis,” November 19, 1941, pg. 1; ”John
L. Lewis bowed to the opposition of public opinion,” November 23, 1941, pg. 1.
Boston Globe: ”uninterrupted production is essential to the preservation of our free-
doms, says President,” October 27, 1941, pg. 1; ”An e↵ective CIO strike has slowed
the flow of steel and John L. Lewis belligerently defied the government to use troops,”
November 18, 1941, pg. 1; ”FDR Rebukes Lewis,” November 19, 1941, pg. 1; ”Gun
fire fells 11 pickets in Pennsylvania,” November 22, 1941, pg. 1.
Wall Street Journal: ”Unions appear to hold the position that mediation is all right
when employers lose but it is all wrong when employers win,” November 11, 1941,
pg. 1; Mr. Lewis clearly wants to maneuver the president into the role of an enemy
of organized labor,” November 19, 1941, pg. 1.
Reconversion Strikes:
New York Times: ”President Truman moved today to arrest a spreading wave of
industrial strife, ordering a comprehensive reorganization of the labor functions of
government,” September 18, 1945, pg. 1; ”James A. Krug, chairman of the War Pro-
duction Board, expressed concern that strikes and work stoppages had deal industrial
reconversion a severe blow and that they were the sole obstacle to the swift return
of long sought consumer goods,” October 6, 1945, pg. 1; ”City Faces Milk Supply
Cut As Steel Strike O↵shoot,” January 22, 1946, pg. 1; ”Government Calls Soft
Coal Strike National Disaster,” May 4, 1946, pg. 1; ”President Truman denounced
the walkout today as nearing the status of a strike against the government,” May 9,
1946, pg. 1.
New York Herald Tribune: ”President Truman acting to halt the strike wave which is
endangering the nation’s reconversion program called on Congress to pass anti-strike
recommendations,” December 4, 1945, pg. 1.
Christian Science Monitor: ”President orders seizure of meatpacking plants, AFL
will work, CIO not known,” January 23, 1946, pg. 1.
Los Angeles Times: ”The Republican Party in recent months has gained ground
steadily with the public on the issue which voters themselves consider to be the
number 1 question - regarding strikes and labor battles,” June 23, 1946, pg. 1.
Wall Street Journal: ”The CIO high command is pushing s sustained campaign for
a planned American economy,” January 17, 1946, pg. 1.
Pre-Wagner:
Atlanta Constitution: ”The National Association of Manufacturers intends to propose
legislation this winter to ban general and sympathetic strikes. Association o cials
announced the plan tonight along with the opposition to the proposed Wagner labor
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disputes bill...” January 15, 1935, pg. 1; ”A long-awaited report on wages in the
cotton textile industry today brought from the United Textile Workers a number of
fresh demands and a definite threat of another bitter strike unless they are granted,”
January 21, 1935, pg. 1.
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Chapter 3:
Figures 1-5; 27: ”Are you in favor of labor unions?”
Figures 6-10: January 1937, February 1937 ”In the current General Motors strike
are your sympathies with the John L. Lewis group of striking employees, or with
the employers?” July 1937 ”John L. Lewis is trying to organize the workers of the
Ford Motor Company into a CIO (Congress of Industrial Organizations) labor union.
Do you hope he succeeds?” December 1937 ”Would you like to see John L. Lewis
succeed in organizing the steel industry?” May 1939 ”Which labor leader do you like
the best–William Green of the A.F. of L. (American Federation of Labor) or John L.
Lewis of the C.I.O. (Congress of Industrial Organizations)?” November 1941 ”What
is your opinion of John L. Lewis?” April 1942 ”John L. Lewis is planning to organize
the dairy farmers of the country into a branch of the C.I.O. (Congress of Industrial
Organizations) Union. Do you favor or oppose, this movement to organize farmers
into unions?” June 1943 ”What is your opinion of John L. Lewis?”
Figures 11-15: April 1941, May 1941 ”Should the Government forbid strikes in
industries manufacturing materials for our national defense program, or should the
workers in those industries continue to have the right to go on strike?”; June 1941, July
1941, August 1941, September 1941, October 1941, November 1941, December 1941
”Should the government forbid strikes in defense industries, or should the workers in
those industries continue to have the right to go on strike?”
Figures 16-21: ”Do you think the Wagner Labor Act should be revised, repealed
or left unchanged?”; ”In general, do you approve or disapprove of the Roosevelt
Administration?”
Figures 22-26: February 1937 ”Do you favor President Roosevelt’s plan to increase
the size of the Supreme Court to make it liberal?” March 3, 1937 ”Are you in favor
of President Roosevelt’s proposal to reorganize the Supreme Court?” March 12, 1937
”Are you in favor of President (Franklin) Roosevelt’s proposal regarding the Supreme
Court?” April 1937 ”Are you in favor of President Roosevelt’s proposal to reorganize
the Supreme Court?” May 5, 1937 and May 12, 1937 ”Should Congress pass President
Roosevelt’s Supreme Court plan?” June 3, 1937 ”Should Congress pass the President’s
plan to enlarge the Supreme Court?”
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